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Comparing Hard Cases

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Refining Privacy in Tort Law

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Abstract

We have come to value privacy through a process of socio-genetic change. Privacy is an essential constituent of the human personality, property and the community. Normative agency and all that we know and cherish is not possible without it. Respect for privacy is therefore crucial in a liberal democracy and it follows that privacy warrants legal protection.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For a similar approach to comparative study, see Markesinis et al, Tortious Liability of Statutory Bodies (1999).

  2. 2.

    Dworkin, ‘Hard Cases’ (1975) at 1060.

  3. 3.

    Alder, ‘Dissents in Courts of Last Resort’ (2000) at 224.

  4. 4.

    The Data Protection Act allows the individual to ‘control’ the personal data stored in databases though is generally not used as a cause of action for invasion of privacy claims in tort. Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 is an exception but the data protection claim was not explored by the House of Lords. The Protection from Harassment Act provides for a civil remedy of an injunction in cases of criminal harassment. Scott details some successful actions for injunctions under the Act. In each case, the claimant was a public figure who had been harassed by ‘persistent pursuit’. See Scott, ‘Harassment’ (2010) p 791.

  5. 5.

    While Article 8 ECHR, as originally conceived, enjoys vertical effect, courts and commentators have agreed that states also have a positive obligation to take measures to ensure that the right of an individual under Article 8 is not infringed by another private party. See X and Y v Netherlands (1985) 8 EHRR 235; A v United Kingdom (1998) 27 EHRR 611, MC v Bulgaria (2005) 40 EHRR 20, Pla and Puncernau v Andorra (2006) 42 ECHR 25, von Hannover v Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 1. See also Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (2006) pp 349–352. Indirect horizontal effect in this context means the use of existing causes of action or equitable doctrines in order to give effect to ECHR rights. English courts have found it easier to defend this sort of incremental development. On their account, they ‘will not invent a new cause of action to cover types of activity which were not previously covered.’ See Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 at 495 (per Baroness Hale).

  6. 6.

    Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 at 465 (per Lord Nicholls).

  7. 7.

    The Coco v Clark doctrine continues to apply to photographs with commercial value: see OBG Ltd v Allan [2008] 1 AC 1.

  8. 8.

    Morgan, ‘Hello! Again’ (2005) at 550.

  9. 9.

    See, for example, Morgan, ‘Privacy, Confidence and Horizontal Effect’ (2003); Phillipson, ‘Transforming Breach of Confidence?’ (2003); Moreham, ‘Privacy in the Common Law’ (2005); Sims, ‘A Shift in the Centre of Gravity’ [2005]; Mulheron, ‘A Potential Framework for Privacy?’ (2006); Aplin, ‘The Development of the Action for Breach of Confidence in the Post-HRA Era’ [2007]; Witzleb, ‘Monetary Remedies for Breach of Confidence in Privacy Cases’ (2007).

  10. 10.

    Coco v Clark [1969] RPC 41.

  11. 11.

    Lord Nicholls refers to the equitable doctrine as a tort in Campbell: ‘The essence of the tort is better encapsulated now as misuse of private information’. See Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 at 465 (per Lord Nicholls).

  12. 12.

    Ibid at 495 (per Baroness Hale).

  13. 13.

    Ibid.

  14. 14.

    Scott, ‘Introduction’ (2010) at 18.21.

  15. 15.

    Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 at 466 (per Lord Nicholls).

  16. 16.

    Attorney General v Observer Ltd [1990] 1 AC 109 at 282B-F.

  17. 17.

    Ibid.

  18. 18.

    On consent see A v B and C (2 March 2001, unreported). On the question of capacity, see T v BBC [2008] 1 FLR 281 in which a documentary was made about intimate details of a vulnerable adult’s life. The Court found that the individual did not have capacity to give consent to her participation in the documentary. See Scott, ‘Misuse of Private Information’ (2010) at 19.74.

  19. 19.

    Zimmerman, ‘The “New” Privacy and the “Old”’ (2012) at 125.

  20. 20.

    Ibid.

  21. 21.

    Ibid.

  22. 22.

    Attorney General v Observer Ltd [1990] 1 AC 109 at 148 (per Lord Goff). Though, as Eady J held in McKennitt: ‘the mere fact that information concerning an individual is “anodyne” or “trivial” will not necessarily mean that Article 8 is not engaged.’ On his account, it depends on the circumstances of the case in question. See McKennitt v Ash [2006] EMLR 10 at para 58 (per Eady J).

  23. 23.

    In re S (A Child) [2005] 1 AC 593 at 603 (per Lord Steyn).

  24. 24.

    Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 at 497.

  25. 25.

    Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EMLR 20 at 689.

  26. 26.

    Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 at 499 (per Baroness Hale).

  27. 27.

    Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe SRPL (No 3) [2007] 1 AC 359 at 408 (per Baroness Hale).

  28. 28.

    Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 at 501 (per Baroness Hale). For an interesting comparison, see also the New Zealand case of Hosking v Runting [2003] 3 NZLR 385.

  29. 29.

    Robertson & Nicol, Media Law (2007) p 67.

  30. 30.

    von Hannover v Germany (No 1) (2005) 40 EHRR 1.

  31. 31.

    I again use the verb ‘to define’ very cautiously here given that the ECtHR has, in the past, stated that it ‘does not consider it possible or necessary to attempt an exhaustive definition of the notion of “private life”.’ See Niemetz v Germany (1992) 16 EHRR 97, at para 29.

  32. 32.

    Ibid, para 50.

  33. 33.

    Robertson & Nicol, Media Law (2007) p 70.

  34. 34.

    Kay, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and the Control of Private Law’ (2005) at 477.

  35. 35.

    Ibid at 477.

  36. 36.

    According to Lord Phillips: ‘the ECtHR has recognised an obligation on member states to protect one individual from an unjustified invasion of private life by another individual and an obligation on the courts of a member state to interpret legislation in a way which will achieve that result.’ Douglas v Hello (No 3) [2006] QB 125 at 149 (per Lord Phillips MR).

  37. 37.

    Ibid at 201.

  38. 38.

    HRH Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2008] Ch 57.

  39. 39.

    McKennitt v Ash [2006] EMLR 10 at para 57.

  40. 40.

    Douglas v Hello [2006] QB 125 at 157.

  41. 41.

    See, for example, Theakston v MGN Ltd [2002] EMLR 398 in which the claimant was pictured outside a brothel. Ouseley J held that he could not prevent the verbal description of the claimant’s activities being published but he could enjoin the publication of the photographs. He considered at 401 ‘that even though the fact that the claimant went to the brothel and the details as to what he did there were not to be restrained from publication, the publication of photographs taken there without his consent could still constitute an intrusion into his private and personal life and would do so in a peculiarly humiliating and damaging way. It did not seem to be remotely inherent in going to a brothel that what was done inside would be photographed, let alone that any photographs would be published.’

  42. 42.

    In D v L, Waller LJ explains: ‘A court may restrain the publication of an improperly obtained photograph even if the taker is free to describe the information which the photographer provides or even if the information revealed by the photograph is in the public domain. It is no answer to the claim to restrain the publication of an improperly obtained photograph that the information portrayed by the photograph is already available in the public domain.’ See D v L [2004] EMLR 1 at 10 (per Waller LJ).

  43. 43.

    McKennitt v Ash [2008] QB 73 at 90.

  44. 44.

    Ibid.

  45. 45.

    It must be noted, however, that in von Hannover (No 2), perhaps mindful of such criticisms, the ECtHR has made an effort to set out a number of ‘criteria relevant for the balancing exercise’ of Arts 8 and 10. Drawing on previous decisions, the Court identifies the following considerations: ‘contribution to a debate of general interest’, ‘how well known is the person concerned and what is the subject of the report?’, ‘prior conduct of the person concerned’, ‘content, form and consequences of the publication’ and ‘circumstances in which the photographs were taken’. See von Hannover v Germany (No 2) (Judgment of February 2012) (Applications nos 40660/08 and 60641/08) at paras 108–113.

  46. 46.

    Storck v Germany (2006) 43 EHRR 96, para 143.

  47. 47.

    R (Countryside Alliance) v Attorney General [2008] 1 AC 719 at 774 (per Baroness Hale).

  48. 48.

    R (Purdy) v DPP [2008] EWHC 2565 (Admin) para 54.

  49. 49.

    R (Purdy) v DPP [2010] 1 AC 345.

  50. 50.

    See also the more recent case of Axel Springer v Germany (Judgment of February 2012) (Application no 39954/08), in which the ECtHR at para 83 confirms that Art 8 ECHR extends to the protection of reputation. The Court notes, however that ‘[i]n order for Article 8 to come into play… an attack on a person’s reputation must attain a certain level of seriousness and in a manner causing prejudice to personal enjoyment of the right to respect for private life.’

  51. 51.

    Scott, ‘Introduction: Privacy and Publication’ (2010) p 579.

  52. 52.

    See, for example, Reklos v Greece [2009] EMLR 290; Sciacca v Italy [2006] 43 EHRR 20.

  53. 53.

    Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EMLR 20.

  54. 54.

    Ibid at 679.

  55. 55.

    Ibid at 687.

  56. 56.

    Ibid at 686.

  57. 57.

    Ibid at 688.

  58. 58.

    Ibid at 708.

  59. 59.

    Ibid at 713.

  60. 60.

    Ibid at 716.

  61. 61.

    Ibid at 715.

  62. 62.

    Ibid.

  63. 63.

    Ibid at 714.

  64. 64.

    Ibid at 732.

  65. 65.

    Ibid.

  66. 66.

    See also Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex [2008] 2 WLR 975; Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134.

  67. 67.

    Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EMLR 20 at 736.

  68. 68.

    Theakston v MGN Ltd [2002] EMLR 22; A v B plc [2003] QB 195.

  69. 69.

    Quoted in Bennett, ‘Corrective Justice and Horizontal Privacy’ (2010) at 552.

  70. 70.

    BVerfGE 65, 1 = NJW 1984, 419 (Volkszühlung).

  71. 71.

    Götting, ‘Inhalt, Zweck und Rechtsnatur des Persönlichkeitsrecht’ (2008) p 11.

  72. 72.

    BVerfGE 35, 202 = NJW 1973, 1226 (Lebach I).

  73. 73.

    BVerfGE 54, 148 = NJW 1980, 2070 (Eppler).

  74. 74.

    BVerfGE 65, 1 = NJW 1984, 419 (Volkszählung).

  75. 75.

    Wanckel, ‘Der Schutz vor Indiskretion’ (2008) p 332.

  76. 76.

    Ibid, citing BVerfG NJW 2000, 1021, 1022 (Caroline von Monaco).

  77. 77.

    Brüggemeier, Haftungsrecht (2006) p 286.

  78. 78.

    See Hesse, Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1993) paras 72, 317 et seq.

  79. 79.

    Brüggemeier, Haftungsrecht (2006) pp 289–291.

  80. 80.

    Ibid p 290.

  81. 81.

    See BVerfGE 7, 198, 208 (Lüth).

  82. 82.

    BVerfGE 35, 202 = NJW 1973, 1226 (Lebach I).

  83. 83.

    See also OLG Nürnberg, NJW-RR 2007, 1267 (Anforderungen an Unterlassungsantrag wegen Verletzung des Persünlichkeitsrechts).

  84. 84.

    On this point, see Götting, ‘Allgemeine Fragen’ (2008) p 8.

  85. 85.

    BVerfGE 101, 361, 389ff = NJW 2000, 1021, 1023 (Caroline von Monaco).

  86. 86.

    See Götting, ‘Allgemeine Fragen’ (2008) pp 8–9.

  87. 87.

    Brüggemeier, Haftungsrecht (2006) p 297.

  88. 88.

    §§ 22 and 23 KUG. The person, however, must be ‘sufficiently recognisable’ in the photograph according to BGH, NJW 1979, 2205 = GRUR 1979, 732 (Fußballtorwart). Nude photographs are an exception to this general rule. Even if the person depicted is unrecognisable from the photograph and even if the person has consented to the taking of the photograph, publication can still be declared unlawful due to the fact that nude photographs constitute a particularly serious injury to personality. See BGH, NJW 1974, 1947 (Nacktfotos).

  89. 89.

    Neumann-Deusberg, ‘Bildberichterstattung über absolute und relative Personen der Zeitgeschichte’ 114.

  90. 90.

    See Schertz, ‘Das Recht am eigenen Bild’ (2008) at 227.

  91. 91.

    LG Berlin AfP 2003, 176 (Gerüchte über die Kanzler Ehe).

  92. 92.

    BGH AfP 1996, 66 (Abschiedsmedaille/Gedenkmedaille).

  93. 93.

    OLG Hamburg AfP 1999, 486 (Backstreet Boys).

  94. 94.

    BVerfGE 35, 202 = NJW 1973, 1226 (Lebach I).

  95. 95.

    But if they are merely accompanying the absolute person in an Alltagssituation, then it is unlikely that they will be considered a person of contemporary history. See, for example, BGH, NJW 2007, 3440 (Lebensgeführtin H Grünemeyers); BGH, NJW 2008, 3138 (Einkaufsbummel im Urlaub).

  96. 96.

    BVerfG AfP 2000, 75 (Caroline von Monaco).

  97. 97.

    See, for example, BVerfG, NJW 2000, 2191 (Pierre Casiraghi); BVerfG NJW 2005, 1857 (Charlotte Casiraghi).

  98. 98.

    See, for example, BGH, NJW 2004, 762 (Sabine Christiansen); BGH, NJW 2007, 1981 (Caroline und Ernst August von Hannover (No 1)); BGH, NJW 2008, 749 (Oliver Kahn).

  99. 99.

    See, for instance, BGH NJW 1996, 1128, 1129 (Caroline von Monaco IV).

  100. 100.

    Forkel, ‘Das “Caroline-Urteil” aus Straßburg’ (2005); Teichmann, ‘Abschied von der absoluten Person der Zeitgeschichte’ [2007]; Herrmann, ‘Anmerkung zum Urteil des EGMR vom 24.6.2004’ (2004).

  101. 101.

    See, for example, BGH, NJW 2007, 1977 (Caroline im Urlaub) where the photographs of the claimant on holiday were not considered to be a zeitgeschichtliches Ereignis.

  102. 102.

    BGH, NJW 2007, 1977, 1978.

  103. 103.

    See Brüggemeier, Haftungsrecht (2006) pp 301–310.

  104. 104.

    BGHZ 24, 200 = NJW 1957, 1315 (Spütheimkehrer); BGH, NJW 1966, 2353 (Vor unserer eigenen Tür); BGHZ 20, 345 = NJW 56, 1554 (Paul Dahlke).

  105. 105.

    Brüggemeier, Haftungsrecht (2006) p 301.

  106. 106.

    Ibid p 302.

  107. 107.

    OLG München ZUM 1997, 388, 390 (Abbildung einer Person in einem Lichtbildwerk). Employers are allowed to secretly film their employees, if a crime is suspected and all other means of establishing this have been exhausted. See BAGE 105, 356 = NJW 2003, 3436 (Videoüberwachte Kassiererin).

  108. 108.

    Hubmann, Das Persünlichkeitsrecht (1967).

  109. 109.

    BVerfGE 54, 148, 154 = NJW 1980, 2070 (Eppler).

  110. 110.

    Baston-Vogt, Der sachliche Schutzbereich des zivilrechtlichen allgemeinen Persünlichkeitsrechts (1997) p 186.

  111. 111.

    Götting, ‘Allgemeine Fragen’ (2008) p 5.

  112. 112.

    Wanckel, ‘Der Schutz vor Indiskretion’ (2008) p 349.

  113. 113.

    See, for example, BGH NJW 1999, 2893 (Ehebruch). Confirmed in BVerfG NJW 2000, 2189 (Scheidungsgrund).

  114. 114.

    BGH NJW 2005, 2844, 2848 (Esra).

  115. 115.

    Wenzel, Das Recht der Wort- und Bildberichterstattung (1994).

  116. 116.

    BGHZ 131, 332, 339 (Caroline von Monaco); BVerfG NJW 2000, 1021, 1022 (Caroline von Monaco). See Dannemann, ‘Of Princesses and Politicians’ (2005).

  117. 117.

    See, for example, BGH NJW 1988, 1984, 1985 (Telefonsex); LG München I ZUM 2005, 922 (Nichte Veraces).

  118. 118.

    On this point, see Wanckel, ‘Der Schutz vor Indiskretion’ (2008) pp 349–354.

  119. 119.

    BGH NJW 1999, 2893 (Ehebruch), confirmed by the Constitutional Court in BVerfG NJW 2000, 2189 (Scheidungsgrund).

  120. 120.

    See, for example, LG München I NJW 2004, 617, 618 (FKK-Gelände); BGH NJW 1985, 1617, 1618 (Sexualkundelehrbuch); OLG Stuttgart NJW-RR 2004, 619, 623 (Sexvideo).

  121. 121.

    This is known as the Wechselwirkungstheorie.

  122. 122.

    BVerfGE 34, 269 = NJW 1973, 1221 (Soraya).

  123. 123.

    See further Wagner, ‘The Protection of Personality Rights’ (2005).

  124. 124.

    BVerfGE 7, 198 = NJW 1958, 257 = JZ 1958, 119 (Lüth).

  125. 125.

    BGH, NJW 1994, 124 (Alle reden vom Klima).

  126. 126.

    BGH NJW 2007, 686 (Terroristentochter).

  127. 127.

    See, for example, BGH, NJW 2005, 594 (Uschi Glas).

  128. 128.

    Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EMLR 20 at 735.

  129. 129.

    BVerfGE 66, 116 = BVerfGE 66, 116 (Springer/Wallraff).

  130. 130.

    BGHZ 131, 332 = NJW 1996, 1128 (Caroline von Monaco).

  131. 131.

    See Wenzel, Das Recht der Wort- und Bildberichterstattung (1994).

  132. 132.

    BGHZ 131, 332 = NJW 1996, 1128 (Caroline von Monaco).

  133. 133.

    See Dannemann, ‘Of Princesses and Politicians’ (2005) p 36.

  134. 134.

    BGHZ 131, 332, 339 (Caroline von Monaco).

  135. 135.

    BVerfGE 35, 202, 226 f. = NJW 1973, 1226 (Lebach I).

  136. 136.

    BGHZ 128, 1, 16 = NJW 1995, 861 = JZ 1995, 360 (Caroline von Monaco). See also BVerfGE 34, 269, 283 ff. = NJW 1973, 1221 (Soraya).

  137. 137.

    Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EMLR 20 at 717.

  138. 138.

    Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe SRPL (No 3) [2007] 1 AC 359 at 377 (per Lord Bingham).

  139. 139.

    BGH, NJW 2004, 762 (Sabine Christiansen).

  140. 140.

    See Hesse, Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1993) paras 72, 317 et seq.

  141. 141.

    OLG Hamburg, NJW-RR 1995, 790 (Caroline von Monaco); BGHZ 131, 332 = NJW 1996, 1128 (Caroline von Monaco); BVerfGE 101, 361 = NJW 2000, 1021 (Caroline von Monaco).

  142. 142.

    BGHZ 131, 332 = NJW 1996, 1128.

  143. 143.

    BGHZ 131, 332, 339.

  144. 144.

    BVerfGE 101, 361 = NJW 2000, 1021 (Caroline von Monaco).

  145. 145.

    BVerfGE 101, 361 = NJW 2000, 1021, 1023.

  146. 146.

    BVerfGE 101, 361 = NJW 2000, 1021, 1024.

  147. 147.

    Reproduced from the ECtHR decision in von Hannover (No 1) (2005) 40 EHRR 1.

  148. 148.

    BVerfG, NJW 2000, 1021, 1025 (Caroline von Monaco).

  149. 149.

    Reproduced from the ECtHR decision in von Hannover (No 1) (2005) 40 EHRR 1.

  150. 150.

    The second group of cases concerned photographs of Princess Caroline with her husband Prince Ernst August von Hannover (No 1): OLG Hamburg, 10.3.1998 (7 U 206/97); BVerfG, NJW 2000, 2194. The third group concerned the ‘Beach Club’ Monte Carlo photo: OLG Hamburg, 13.10.1998 (7 U 63/98); BVerfG, NJW 2000, 2192.

  151. 151.

    BVerfG, NJW 2000, 1021, 1023 (Caroline von Monaco).

  152. 152.

    BVerfG, NJW 2000, 1021, 1026.

  153. 153.

    von Hannover (No 1) v Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 1.

  154. 154.

    See, for example, Cass Civ, 8.7.1981, D 1982, 65, note Lindon.

  155. 155.

    Wagner, ‘The Protection of Personality Rights Against Invasions By Mass Media in Germany’ (2005) p 154.

  156. 156.

    BGH, NJW 2007, 1977 (Caroline im Urlaub).

  157. 157.

    BGH, NJW 2007, 1981 (Caroline und Ernst August von Hannover (No 1)).

  158. 158.

    BGH, NJW 2007, 1977, 1978 (Caroline im Urlaub).

  159. 159.

    Ibid citing BVerfG, NJW 2006, 3406, 3407 f (Uschi Glas).

  160. 160.

    Ibid citing BVerfG, NJW 2000, 1026 but also citing von Hannover (No 1) v Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 1.

  161. 161.

    BGH, NJW 2007, 1977, 1979 (Caroline im Urlaub).

  162. 162.

    Ibid citing BVerfGE 34, 269, 283 = NJW 1973, 1221 (Soraya); BGHZ 131, 332, 334 = NJW 1996, 1128 (Caroline von Monaco).

  163. 163.

    BVerfG, NJW 2006, 3406, 3407 (Uschi Glas).

  164. 164.

    BGH, NJW 2007, 1977, 1980 (Caroline im Urlaub).

  165. 165.

    Ibid.

  166. 166.

    BGH GRUR 2007, 523 (Abgestuftes Schutzkonzept). See further Coors, ‘Headwind from Europe’ (2010).

  167. 167.

    BVerfG, NJW 2008, 1793 (Caroline von Monaco).

  168. 168.

    BGH, NJW 2007, 3440 (Lebensgeführtin H Grünemeyers).

  169. 169.

    BGH, NJW 2008, 749 (Oliver Kahn).

  170. 170.

    BGH, NJW 2009, 754 (Caroline von Monaco und Prinz Ernst August von Hannover).

  171. 171.

    BGH, NJW 2008, 3138 (Einkaufsbummel im Urlaub).

  172. 172.

    See Teichmann, ‘Abschied von der absoluten Person der Zeitgeschichte’ [2007].

  173. 173.

    von Hannover v Germany (No 2) (Judgment of 7 February 2012) (Applications nos 40660/08 and 60641/08).

  174. 174.

    Ibid at para 121.

  175. 175.

    Ibid at para 124.

  176. 176.

    Ibid.

  177. 177.

    Ibid at para 126.

  178. 178.

    Ibid at para 84.

  179. 179.

    We should note that the old German categorisation did not suggest anything of this sort—it merely created a presumption in law that the publication of private information about absolute persons of contemporary history was in the public interest (and therefore lawful) unless the absolute person could demonstrate that one of his legitimate interests (such as privacy) was at stake.

  180. 180.

    Cf, for instance, Murray v Big Pictures Ltd [2008] 3 WLR 1360 and BVerfG AfP 2000, 75 (Caroline von Monaco).

  181. 181.

    Moreham, ‘Privacy in the Common Law’ (2005) at 645.

  182. 182.

    Ibid.

  183. 183.

    Ibid.

  184. 184.

    Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 at 499 (per Baroness Hale).

  185. 185.

    Stephens v Avery [1988] Ch 449 at 454 (per Sir Browne-Wilkinson VC).

  186. 186.

    A v B plc [2001] 1 WLR 2341 at 2353.

  187. 187.

    A v B plc [2003] QB 195 at 216.

  188. 188.

    Theakston v MGN Ltd [2002] EMLR 22 at 418.

  189. 189.

    Scott, ‘Misuse of Private Information’ (2010) p 598.

  190. 190.

    CC v AB [2007] EMLR 11 at 319.

  191. 191.

    Ibid.

  192. 192.

    See Hong Kong Law Reform Commission, Consultation Paper on Civil Liability for Invasion of Privacy (1999) p 70.

  193. 193.

    Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62 at 63.

  194. 194.

    Ibid at 64.

  195. 195.

    Ibid (per Glidewell LJ) citing Potter J at first instance.

  196. 196.

    Ibid.

  197. 197.

    Ibid at 70 (per Bingham LJ).

  198. 198.

    Ibid at 66 (per Glidewell LJ).

  199. 199.

    See also Markesinis, ‘The Calcutt Report must not be forgotten’ (1992).

  200. 200.

    Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62 at 67. Glidewell LJ stated that the judgment of the Master of the Rolls in Coulson v Coulson [1887] 3 TLR 46 is ‘still the rule in actions for defamation, despite the decision of the House of Lords in American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396 in relation to interim injunctions generally.’

  201. 201.

    Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62 at 68–69.

  202. 202.

    Ibid at 68.

  203. 203.

    Ibid at 70.

  204. 204.

    Wanckel, ‘Der Schutz vor Indiskretion’ (2008) p 337.

  205. 205.

    BGH NJW 1957, 1315, 1316 (Spätheimkehrer).

  206. 206.

    BVerfG NJW 2000, 1021, 1022 (Caroline von Monaco).

  207. 207.

    On this point, see Wanckel, ‘Der Schutz vor Indiskretion’ (2008) p 337.

  208. 208.

    BGH GRUR 2004, 438, 439 (Feriendomizil I).

  209. 209.

    Wanckel, ‘Der Schutz vor Indiskretion’ (2008) p 338 citing BGH NJW 1981, 1366, 1367 (Aufmacher II).

  210. 210.

    Consider, for example, Hausfriedensbruchs (breach of the peace of the home) under § 123 StGB and the various provisions on breach of confidentiality under §§ 201–203 StGB. On this point, see Heuchemer, ‘Die Verletzung des persönlichen Lebens- und Geheimbereichs’ (2008) pp 459–465.

  211. 211.

    British Steel Corp v Grenada Television Ltd [1980] WL 264756.

  212. 212.

    Lord Walker in Douglas (No 3), speaking obiter, contrasted the Douglases’ claim of invasion of privacy and the claimant’s predicament in Kaye. See Douglas v Hello (No 3) [2008] 1 AC 1 at 81 (per Lord Walker).

  213. 213.

    See, for example, Wacks, Personal Information, Privacy and the Law (1993) p 38.

  214. 214.

    Bloustein ‘Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity’ (1964) at 988.

  215. 215.

    Brüggemeier, Haftungsrecht (2006) p 300.

  216. 216.

    Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457, at 470.

  217. 217.

    Perhaps the most common action in publicity-type cases is passing-off. But this cause of action too provides only limited protection in cases where an individual is subjected to the commercial appropriation of her personality. This is because a successful action in passing-off requires the following elements to be present: ‘(1) A misrepresentation, (2) made by a trader in the course of trade, (3) to prospective customers of his or ultimate consumers of goods or services supplied by him, (4) which is calculated to injure the business or goodwill of another trader and (5) which causes actual damage to a business or goodwill of the claimant or will probably do so’. See Erven Warnink Besloten Vennootschap and Another v J Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd [1979] AC 731 at 742 (per Lord Diplock). What proves most problematic for claimants is demonstrating that they have ‘trading goodwill’ within the meaning of the action. Taken on its own, this is a significant obstacle, but in McCulloch v May, Wynn-Parry J introduced the further requirement that there has to be a common field of activity between the claimant and defendant. See McCulloch v Lewis A May (Produce Distributors Ltd) [1947] 2 All ER 845. Despite the existence of such procedural hurdles, the courts have been willing to allow claims in passing-off in a limited range of circumstances. In Irvine v Talksport, Laddie J held that the modern law of passing-off should apply to cases where there is a false claim or implication that the claimant has endorsed a product. According to him, the claimant has to prove that he had significant reputation or goodwill at the time of the infringement. Moreover, he has to show that the actions of the defendant gave rise to a false message which would be understood by ‘a not insignificant section of his market’ that the product had been endorsed by the claimant. See Irvine v Talksport Ltd [2002] FSR 60, at 959. Yet, despite decisions of this sort, on the whole, courts have remained unmoved by arguments to extend the passing-off doctrine to cater for publicity interests generally. Pure character merchandising, for instance, is not actionable under the tort of passing-off. See, for example, Elvis Presley Trademarks [1999] RPC 567 at 597–8 (per Brown LJ).

  218. 218.

    Douglas v Hello (No 3) [2006] QB 125 at 140 (per Phillips MR).

  219. 219.

    Douglas v Hello (No 3) [2006] QB 125; Douglas v Hello (No 3) [2008] 1 AC 1.

  220. 220.

    Douglas v Hello (No 3) [2006] QB 125 at 140.

  221. 221.

    Ibid.

  222. 222.

    Ibid at 141.

  223. 223.

    Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2001] QB 967.

  224. 224.

    Douglas v Hello [2003] 3 All ER 996.

  225. 225.

    Ibid at 1053.

  226. 226.

    Ibid.

  227. 227.

    Douglas v Hello (No 3) [2006] QB 125.

  228. 228.

    Ibid at 163.

  229. 229.

    Ibid at 162.

  230. 230.

    Ibid at 169.

  231. 231.

    Ibid at 163.

  232. 232.

    Ibid at 164.

  233. 233.

    The Court cited a number of English cases including Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell Engineering Co Ltd (1948) 65 RPC 203; Mustad & Son v Dosen (Note) [1964] 1 WLR 109; Shelley Films Ltd v Rex Features Ltd [1994] EMLR 134; Creation Records Ltd v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1997] EMLR 444. From these cases, the Court extracted the following general principle: ‘Where an individual (“the owner”) has at his disposal information which he has created or which is private or personal and to which he can properly deny access to third parties, and he reasonably intends to profit commercially by using or publishing that information, then a third party who is, or ought to be, aware of these matters and who has knowingly obtained the information without authority, will be in breach of duty if he uses or publishes the information to the detriment of the owner.’ Ibid at 165.

  234. 234.

    Ibid at 168.

  235. 235.

    Allen & Hanbury Ltd v Generics Ltd [1986] RPC 203.

  236. 236.

    Douglas v Hello (No 3) [2006] QB 125 at 200.

  237. 237.

    Ibid at 202.

  238. 238.

    Cream Holdings Ltd v Banjerjee [2005] 1 AC 253.

  239. 239.

    Douglas v Hello (No 3) [2008] 1 AC 1.

  240. 240.

    Ibid at 49.

  241. 241.

    Lord Nicholls argued that the ‘secret information cannot lie in the differences between the unapproved photographs and the approved photographs. The secret cannot lie there, because the six unapproved photographs contained nothing not included in the approved photographs. That is common ground. This being so, the inevitable differences, in expression and posture and so on, cannot constitute “confidential” information for the purposes of this equitable principle. The expression of the bride in one wedding photograph compared with her expression in another is insufficiently significant to call for legal protection. It has not been suggested that the unapproved photographs were embarrassing in any way, or that they were detrimental to the Douglases’ image. Accordingly, once the approved pictures were published, albeit simultaneously, publication of the unapproved pictures was not a breach of confidence.’ Ibid at 73.

  242. 242.

    Douglas v Hello (No 3) [2006] QB 125 at 113.

  243. 243.

    Heitman, Der Schutz der materiellen Interessen an der eigenen Persünlichkeitssphüre durch subjektiv-private Rechte zugleich ein Beitrag zur Abgrenzung des allgemeinen Persünlichkeitsrechts (1963) cited by Götting, ‘Ideeller und kommerzieller Persönlichkeitsschutz’ (2008) p 198.

  244. 244.

    On the distinction between a Dualistischer and Monistischer Ansatz, see Götting, ibid pp 197–199.

  245. 245.

    Ibid p 199.

  246. 246.

    Ibid pp 311–316.

  247. 247.

    Ibid p 311 citing RGZ 74, 308 (Graf Zeppelin).

  248. 248.

    RGZ 74, 308, 311–312.

  249. 249.

    Brüggemeier, Haftungsrecht (2006) p 311 citing von Gierke, Deutsches Privatrecht (1895) p 706.

  250. 250.

    BGHZ 20, 345 = NJW 1956, 1554 (Paul Dahlke).

  251. 251.

    BGHZ 20, 345, 353.

  252. 252.

    BGH, NJW 1992, 2084 (Fuchsberger).

  253. 253.

    BGHZ 143, 214 = NJW 2000, 2195 (Marlene Dietrich).

  254. 254.

    BGHZ 143, 214, 218.

  255. 255.

    Ibid.

  256. 256.

    BGHZ 143, 214, 219.

  257. 257.

    Reproduced from the Institute for Transnational Law website, available at: www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/work_new/german/case.php?id=726

  258. 258.

    BGHZ 143, 214, 220 (Marlene Dietrich).

  259. 259.

    Ibid.

  260. 260.

    BGHZ 50, 133, 137 = NJW 1968, 1773 (Mephisto).

  261. 261.

    BGHZ 143, 214, 222 (Marlene Dietrich).

  262. 262.

    BGHZ 143, 214, 222–223.

  263. 263.

    Reproduced from the Institute for Transnational Law website, available at: www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/work_new/german/case.php?id=726

  264. 264.

    BGHZ 143, 214, 223 (Marlene Dietrich).

  265. 265.

    For an enlightening analysis of these points, see Peifer, Individualität im Zivilrecht (2001).

  266. 266.

    BGHZ 143, 214, 221–222 (Marlene Dietrich).

  267. 267.

    Ibid.

  268. 268.

    Brüggemeier, Haftungsrecht (2006) p 313.

  269. 269.

    Douglas v Hello (No 3) [2006] QB 125 at 163.

  270. 270.

    See in particular, Beverley-Smith, The Commercial Appropriation of Personality (2002); Black, Publicity Rights and Image (2011); McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy: Vols I & II (2008).

  271. 271.

    Douglas v Hello (No 3) [2008] 1 AC 1 at 72.

  272. 272.

    Ibid.

  273. 273.

    Ibid at 75–86.

  274. 274.

    Ibid at 84.

  275. 275.

    Council of Europe Res 1165 of 1998, para 6.

  276. 276.

    Douglas v Hello [2003] EMLR 31 at 711.

  277. 277.

    Douglas v Hello (No 3) [2008] 1 AC 1 at 79.

  278. 278.

    Ibid at 81.

  279. 279.

    Ibid at 80.

  280. 280.

    Ibid. Consider, for instance, Elvis Presley Trademarks [1999] RPC 567.

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    Patrick O’Callaghan

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O’Callaghan, P. (2013). Comparing Hard Cases. In: Refining Privacy in Tort Law. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31884-9_4

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