Abstract
Fiscal illusion is the most common form of political illusions. This article introduces an agent-based model developed for testing the Fasiani model of fiscal illusion. The Fasiani model introduces fiscal illusion as a source of extra taxation that can lead to an impoverishment of citizens and to null national production after a several periods of increasing levels of fiscal illusion. We modeled this strategy as a “dictator game,” in which we show that a state that constantly deceives its citizens is a source of national instability, deeply harming its national security.
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Mourao, P., Cabral, J.P. (2013). How Political Illusions Harm National Stability: Fiscal Illusion as a Source of Taxation. In: Herrero, Á., et al. International Joint Conference CISIS’12-ICEUTE´12-SOCO´12 Special Sessions. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 189. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33018-6_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33018-6_11
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-33017-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-33018-6
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