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Future Atoll Scenarios: Adaptation Strategies and Their Implication Under UNCLOS

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Abstract

It is a difficult task to predict what will actually happen to Atoll Island States in the future, though a number of scenarios and adaptation counter-measures can be envisaged, which will be discussed in terms of how each will affect the delimitation of maritime zones. It is important to note that the viability of these measures will depend on the financial capacity of each Atoll Island State, with smaller atolls on poorer countries probably disappearing first. The disappearance of each individual island would have consequences for the ability of an Archipelagic State to continue to claim an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) around it, while the submergence of the last island in the country could affect its status as a sovereign State. The problems presented in this chapter are examined from an interdisciplinary engineering and international law approach in order to evaluate what could be the most desirable adaptation strategy. The engineering options that would allow an Atoll Island States to protect coastal areas will be examined together with suggestions by international law researchers on how the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) could be interpreted or amended in order to preserve the maritime boundaries of Atoll States. Although amendments to such treaties would be welcome, the difficulty and cost involved in doing so probably means that it would be better to invest resources in protecting the coral reefs or (if this is not possible) in constructing traditional coastal defence mechanisms and raising key islands within the archipelago.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Wei (2011), p. 1.

  2. 2.

    Gagain (2012).

  3. 3.

    Caron (1990), p. 629.

  4. 4.

    Caron (1990), p. 629.

  5. 5.

    Caron (1990), p. 629.

  6. 6.

    Lusthaus (2010), p. 113.

  7. 7.

    Lusthaus (2010), p. 114.Tensions in the area around the Spratley Islands appears to be intensifying at the time of writing this book, with multiple incidents between China and other countries in the area, such as the Philippines. BBC 2012.

  8. 8.

    United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm#Historical Perspective, Accessed 16 July 2012.

  9. 9.

    United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (1982). http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm. Accessed 24 August 2009.

  10. 10.

    Grote (2011), p. 269.

  11. 11.

    Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (2010). Submission by the Republic of the Maldives. http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mdv53_10/MAL-ES-DOC.pdf.

  12. 12.

    Wei (2011), p. 2.

  13. 13.

    Though the articles note that this “does not apply to submarine elevations that are natural components of the continental margin, such as its plateaux, rises, caps, banks and spurs”.

  14. 14.

    Submission by the Republic of the Maldives. http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mdv53_10/MAL-ES-DOC.pdf. The map shows the Maldives Archipelago at the centre, with a dotted line around the archipelago indicating the archipelagic baselines encompassing all the different atolls. Around this baseline is the 200 miles EEZ (which is shorter in areas where it overlaps the Indian EEZ, for example), and the Extended Continental Shelf claimed in 2010, which extends beyond the 200 miles of the EEZ. The EEZs of India, Sri Lanka and that which would correspond to the Chagos Archipelago are also shown. The UK government enacted the BIOT Order 1965, which separated the Chagos Islands from what was their colony of Mauritius at the time. This created the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT). The islands were then made available to the US government, and secretly exiled the indigenous population of the entire Chagos Archipelago (around 1800 individuals at the time) to Mauritius. The US took possession in 1971, though the UK retains and currently exercises sovereignty over the islands. For more details on this and the problems and legal processes that this started see Allen 2008, p. 684.

  15. 15.

    Grote (2011), p. 294.

  16. 16.

    The Bay of Fundy is located on the Atlantic coast of North America, between the Canadian provinces of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia.

  17. 17.

    It is the estuary of River Severn, which is the longest river in Great Britain.

  18. 18.

    Which expand on the rules set forth in the 1958 Convention on the Territorial sea and Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, which entered into force Sept. 10 1964, according to Caron (1990), p. 632.

  19. 19.

    As opposed to the situation of the Great Barrier Reef in Australia, where the reef in some places is up to 150 miles from the coastline.

  20. 20.

    SOPAC (2006).

  21. 21.

    The LOSC in fact does not indicate whether the boundaries of the maritime zones move as baselines move. Baselines are clearly not fixed, as they are based on low-water marks, and these move following various morphological processes. This has led a number of commentators to conclude that these outer boundaries of the territorial see must be ambulatory, see Soons (1990), p. 216 and Caron (1990), p. 634. This principle of the ambulatory nature of baselines and maritime zones is accepted by most researchers. All authors referenced in this chapter accept this concept of the ambulatory nature of baselines and a proof of this is that a significant number of papers have attempted to find solutions to this problem, see for example Rayfuse (2010), p. 3 and Grote (2011), pp. 271–276.

  22. 22.

    As expressed by the President of the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), General Information—Judges: The Presidency, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=17. Accessed 26 March 2012, cited by Gagain (2012), p. 99.

  23. 23.

    Houghton et al. (2010), p. 814.

  24. 24.

    Houghton et al. (2010), p. 814.

  25. 25.

    Paskal (2010), http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10635956.

  26. 26.

    Paskal (2010), http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10635956.

  27. 27.

    Paskal (2010), http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10635956.

  28. 28.

    UNCLOS Art. 6, as noted by Caron (1990), p. 637.

  29. 29.

    United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (1982). http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm.

  30. 30.

    The territorial waters, or territorial sea, as defined by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, is a belt of coastal waters extending at most twelve nautical miles from the baseline (usually the mean low-water mark) of a coastal state.

  31. 31.

    Minura et al. (2007).

  32. 32.

    Barnett and Adger (2003), p. 333.

  33. 33.

    Caron (1990), p. 622.

  34. 34.

    It should be noted that not all States are members of the UN, and up to 1999 Kiribati, Nauru and Tonga were not part of the UN. For a more detailed discussion see Grant (2000), p. 181. The formulation of the basic criteria for statehood can be found in Art. I of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 1933. This states that a State as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications:

    a permanent population; although no minimum limit is apparently prescribed. Currently the smallest States by population are the Vatican city with 768 inhabitants and Tuvalu with just under 10,000.

    a defined territory; although a State must possess some territory, there appears to be no rule prescribing the minimum area of that territory. The smallest State by territory is Vatican City with 0.4 km2, the second smallest is Monaco with 1.5 km followed by Nauru, 21 km and Tuvalu 26 km.

    a government; it is the governing power with respect to a certain territory.

    the capacity to enter into relations with other states; this is more a consequence for statehood than a criterion for it, being a conflation of the requirements of government and independence.

  35. 35.

    Webb (2005), p. 1.

  36. 36.

    Rakova (2009).

  37. 37.

    Which are set out in Arts. 46–54 of UNCLOS. Art. 46 States how:

    “archipelagic State” means a State constituted wholly by one or more archipelagos and may include other islands;

    “archipelago” means a group of islands, including parts of islands, interconnecting waters and other natural features which are so closely interrelated that such islands, waters and other natural features form an intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity, or which historically have been regarded as such.

  38. 38.

    Vidal http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2005/nov/25/science.climatechange.

  39. 39.

    Rakova (2009) and Minivan News (2009).

  40. 40.

    According to Yamamoto and Esteban (2010), p. 3.

  41. 41.

    Magnan et al. (2011), p. 5.

  42. 42.

    Magnan et al. (2011), p. 5.

  43. 43.

    Bindoff et al. (2007), FAQ 5.1 Is sea level rising?

  44. 44.

    Bindoff et al. (2007), FAQ 5.1 Is sea level rising?

  45. 45.

    Kench et al. (2005), p. 148.

  46. 46.

    Vidal (2005) http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2005/nov/25/science.climatechange.

  47. 47.

    Minura et al. (2007).

  48. 48.

    Barnett and Adger (2003), p. 326.

  49. 49.

    Rakova http://ourworld.unu.edu/en/how-to-guide-for-environmental-refugees/.

  50. 50.

    Mimura et al. (2007).

  51. 51.

    Barnett and Adger (2003), p. 326.

  52. 52.

    Westmacott et al. (2000).

  53. 53.

    Kench et al. (2009), p. 187.

  54. 54.

    Vidal (2005) http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2005/nov/25/science.climatechange.

  55. 55.

    Yoshikawa (2007) www.japanfocus.org/products/details/2541.

  56. 56.

    Hogg (2007) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6758271.stm.

  57. 57.

    Xue (2012), p. 352.

  58. 58.

    Hiroshi Terashima as cited by Xue (2012), p. 353.

  59. 59.

    Dyke (1988).

  60. 60.

    Caron (2008), p. 640.

  61. 61.

    Westmacott et al. (2000), p. 11.

  62. 62.

    United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982 http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm.

  63. 63.

    Houghton et al. (2010), p. 815.

  64. 64.

    According to UNCLOS, as explained by Soons (1990), p. 214.

  65. 65.

    Rayfuse (2010), p. 2.

  66. 66.

    Though it has been pointed how this could ultimately create an environmental tragedy, Houghton et al. (2010), p. 815.

  67. 67.

    Caron (1990), p. 649.

  68. 68.

    This issue is explored in more depth in Caron (1990), p. 648.

  69. 69.

    Grote (2011), p. 302.

  70. 70.

    Grote (2011), p. 302.

  71. 71.

    As these states often have very limited resources it is already quite difficult to effectively patrol their maritime areas, and it would be impossible to really do so if other States did not recognise them at all.

  72. 72.

    Houghton et al. (2010), p. 813.

  73. 73.

    Grote (2011), p. 269.

  74. 74.

    Caron (1990), p. 642.

  75. 75.

    Grote (2011), p. 269.

  76. 76.

    Caron (1990), p. 636.

  77. 77.

    Caron (1990), p. 638 and Soons (1990), p. 218.

  78. 78.

    Hayashi (2010), p. 107.

  79. 79.

    Indeed it could be argued that sea level change is also natural, and that is has been changing for millennia, making any such attempts to agree on a date even more difficult. See also Maas and Carius (2012), p. 657.

  80. 80.

    Maas and Carius (2012), p. 657.

  81. 81.

    As required by Art. 16 of UNCLOS, see Rayfuse (2010), p. 6.

  82. 82.

    Although Caron argues that even nowadays there is not such a close relation between the shoreline and the present baseline, due to the acceptance of drying rocks as baselines, the use of straight baselines and the fact that nowadays seamen are often out of visual and even radar contact with the coastline. See Caron (1990), p. 643.

  83. 83.

    Grote (2011), p. 273

  84. 84.

    Rayfuse (2010), p. 3.

  85. 85.

    Soons (1990), p. 216.

  86. 86.

    It is also not clear if this provision was originally intended to apply exclusively to this “broad” continental shelf or also to the EEZ. Thus, it would seem unjust if a “distance-based” EEZ that was 200 nautical miles was treated differently than a 210 nautical miles “broad” continental shelf, just because of geomorphological reasons, especially in the case where the loss of sea areas would be significant, as explained by Soons (1990), p. 217.

  87. 87.

    Grote (2011), p. 294.

  88. 88.

    And the Maldives has indeed already submitted a map showing the proposed limits of its continental shelf, as can be see from Fig. 5.2, which is a map is adapted from the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (2010). Submission by the Republic of the Maldives. http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mdv53_10/MAL-ES-DOC.pdf.

  89. 89.

    See UNGA Res. 55/7 of 30 October 2000, Annex II, Trust fund for the purpose of facilitating the preparation of submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf for developing States, as explained in Grote (2011), p. 288.

  90. 90.

    Grote (2011), p. 274

  91. 91.

    Soons (1990), p. 225.

  92. 92.

    Grote (2011), p. 274 and Soons (1990), p. 217.

  93. 93.

    For the case of Funafati atoll in Tuvalu, sea depth of over 1,000 m can be reached within 2.3 km of the shore of the atoll, see Fitchett (1987).

  94. 94.

    Grote (2011), p. 267.

  95. 95.

    As Art. 76 of the UNCLOS provides that the continental shelf’s outer limits can be fixed by placing charts and information to describe it at the UN Secretary General, and the limits of this area depend on geological and geomorphological factors, as explained by Soons (1990), p. 216.

  96. 96.

    For example the EEZ and continental shelf are generally restricted to 200 and 350 miles, respectively.

  97. 97.

    Grote (2011), p. 275.

  98. 98.

    This is referred to as a strategy of “Masterly Inactivity” by Grote (2011), p. 279.

  99. 99.

    Hayashi (2010), p. 106.

  100. 100.

    Grote (2011), p. 279

  101. 101.

    Caron (1990), p. 641 and Rayfuse (2010), p. 4.

  102. 102.

    Grote (2011), p. 279.

  103. 103.

    Caron (1990), p. 635.

  104. 104.

    Wei (2011), p. 3.

  105. 105.

    Grote (2011), p. 275.

  106. 106.

    Grote (2011), p. 275.

  107. 107.

    Grote (2011), p. 275.

  108. 108.

    Grote (2011), p. 279.

  109. 109.

    Making it difficult to estimate from satellite photographs, for example.

  110. 110.

    Rayfuse (2010), p. 5.

  111. 111.

    Rayfuse (2010), p. 5.

  112. 112.

    Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 61.

  113. 113.

    Soons (1990), p. 227.

  114. 114.

    Grote (2011), pp. 279–280.

  115. 115.

    Grote (2011), p. 281.

  116. 116.

    Grote (2011), p. 281.

  117. 117.

    Grote (2011), p. 281.

  118. 118.

    Here Soons cites the 1965 continental shelf delimitation between the United Kingdom and the Netherland, were subsequent seaward shifts of the Netherland’s baseline of up to 7 km—though natural and artificial processes- did not affect the delimitation of the continental shelf, see Soons (1990), p. 227.

  119. 119.

    Although Soons concludes that even in this situation it would be difficult for either of the two States to really break the treaty, see Soons (1990), p. 228.

  120. 120.

    Lusthaus (2010), p. 115.

  121. 121.

    Caron (1990), pp. 650–651, Grote (2011), p. 284, Soons (1990), p. 225.

  122. 122.

    Grote (2011), p. 284.

  123. 123.

    Soons (1990), p. 225.

  124. 124.

    Grote (2011), p. 285.

  125. 125.

    Grote (2011), p. 284.

  126. 126.

    Grote (2011), p. 285.

  127. 127.

    Grote (2011), p. 285.

  128. 128.

    Grote (2011), p. 285.

  129. 129.

    Grote (2011), p. 286.

  130. 130.

    Grote (2011), p. 286.

  131. 131.

    Grote (2011), p. 286.

  132. 132.

    Soons (1990), p. 225.

  133. 133.

    Grote (2011), p. 286.

  134. 134.

    Grote (2011), p. 286.

  135. 135.

    Grote (2011), p. 286.

  136. 136.

    The Spratly Archipelago are claimed in their entirety or partially by Vietnam, China, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei, see Lusthaus (2010). Nevertheless since there are issues regarding the effective and continuous occupation of the islands by each country and there is a lack acquiescence by other claimants regarding the claims of sovereignty over the islands the dispute is far from reaching a solution. In turn, this dispute could become even more complex in the context of sea level rise.

  137. 137.

    Grote (2011), p. 289

  138. 138.

    Grote (2011), p. 287.

  139. 139.

    Grote (2011), p. 288.

  140. 140.

    Such an Implementation Agreement would then stipulate that “a coastal state can deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations charts and relevant information, including geodetic data, permanently describing its baselines and outer limits of its maritime zones” and would simply “extend the existing regime of fixed continental shelf limits to the other maritime zones” according to Grote (2011), p. 290.

  141. 141.

    Grote (2011), p. 291.

  142. 142.

    Such situations have actually already taken place, where the island of Bermeja, in the Gulf of Mexico, that led to the USA stating that without an island Mexico (who originally owned Bermeja) could no longer claim an EEZ around it, see Paskal (2010), http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10635956.

  143. 143.

    Though it is not clear to what extent third states can assert conflicting rights over a maritime area, if they are not directly involved in the dispute, for more details see Grote (2011), p. 298.

  144. 144.

    In this case only the undisputed parts could be subject to a claim of permanency. Only in the case where the various States could solve their differences and publish joint maps depicting the limits of the maritime zones would these then also become permanent. See Grote (2011), p. 297.

  145. 145.

    Grote (2011), p. 304.

  146. 146.

    Grote talks about the legal significance of UN General Assembly resolutions, and if a State votes to freeze maritime zones it would be precluded from subsequently rejecting this principle, see Grote (2011), p. 309.

  147. 147.

    Kagami (2005).

  148. 148.

    Minura et al. (2007) IPCC 4AR.

  149. 149.

    BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) Island Disappears Under the Seas (1999), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/368892.stm.

  150. 150.

    Minivan News 2009 Seawall built around Dhuvaafaru http://www.minivannews.com/news_brief.php?id=6878.

  151. 151.

    Warner et al. (2009), p. 42.

  152. 152.

    CIA Website (2012), www.cia.gov website.

  153. 153.

    Rakova http://ourworld.unu.edu/en/how-to-guide-for-environmental-refugees/.

  154. 154.

    Rakova http://ourworld.unu.edu/en/how-to-guide-for-environmental-refugees/.

  155. 155.

    Takagi et al. (2011), p. 30.

  156. 156.

    CIA Website (2012), www.cia.gov.

  157. 157.

    Bird and Prescott cited by Grote (2011), p. 277.

  158. 158.

    Rakova (2009).

  159. 159.

    Wikipedia (2009), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polder.

  160. 160.

    The Netherlands have spent centuries reclaiming lands from the sea through a complex system of sea dikes and drainage systems mean that a considerable area of the country is composed of lands that are located under mean sea level (and that would be flooded if sea dikes did not exist). The lands behind these coastal defences are referred to as polders, and they form a characteristic landscape that is crucial to the survival of the country. Considerable effort is invested in their maintenance, as any break in them can have potentially catastrophic consequences. Throughout the centuries, indeed, the Netherlands have suffered a number of flooding events when sea defences were broken by particularly high storm surges. The most recent disaster occurred in 1953, when a severe extratropical cyclone combined with a high spring tide resulted in water levels being 4.55 m above the Normal Amsterdam Water Level (NAP). The resulting flooding led to deaths in many neighbouring countries, 307 in the UK and 28 in the Flanders in Belgium. For the case of the Netherlands several sea dikes were breached, which resulted in massive flooding and loss of life. 1,365 km2 of land were inundated (about 9 % of the Dutch farmland) and 1,836 lives were lost. The Dutch people and government extracted many hard lessons from this incident, and 20 days after the floods the Delta commission was inaugurated. Eventually in 1958 the Delta Law was passed, which would lead to the enormous “Delta Works”, which are a dramatic series of dams and flood protection works destined to protect the Netherlands from future repetitions of this catastrophe. Sea level rise does, of course, pose a serious problem to the safety of these protection works, and it appears likely that it will be necessary for the Dutch government to reinforce some of the coastal defences to deal with it. However, there appears to be little doubt that in the same way that the Netherlands decisively responded to the 1953 storms, action will be also taken against other consequences of climate change. The Dutch people, it can be argued, have the history, expertise, commitment and financial resources to adapt to this particular problem. It is a problem that Dutch engineers are aware of, and discussions are often heard about the consequences of these problems for the country. In this respect the Delta Program is currently assessing possible scenarios (including sea level rise and climate change) and are due to give their recommendations in 2014 for suggestions to protect the Netherlands for the next 200 years. To implement the measures suggested from 2020 there will be a Delta Fund of about 1 billion euros per year to provide suitable financial stability and reduce the Delta Programme dependency on economic and political developments. Hence, although sea level rise will require a number of adaptation measures, there appears to be little chance of any sizeable areas of the Netherlands being flooded, and hence the problems will be different in nature to those of Atoll Island States. See Deltawerken online (2011) http://www.deltawerken.com/.

  161. 161.

    Caron (1990), p. 640.

  162. 162.

    Rakova http://ourworld.unu.edu/en/how-to-guide-for-environmental-refugees/.

  163. 163.

    This has also been called a “sovereignty marker” Scenario, though it is unlikely that such a structure can really assert sovereignty over an area, see Yamamoto and Esteban (2010), p. 3.

  164. 164.

    The number of people to inhabit an island was already discussed by Dyke and Gurish (1988) In their definition, human inhabitation would be the capacity of living in the island on the basis of the natural resources of the island, in a stable community which is an institutionalized human group without external assistance. In this “stable” community 5 people would be considered few, but if there were 50 people it would be enough for it to be classified as inhabited.

  165. 165.

    Yamamoto and Esteban (2010), p. 5.

  166. 166.

    Dyke and Gurish (1988).

  167. 167.

    Kagami (2005).

  168. 168.

    Hayashi (2010), p. 106.

  169. 169.

    Soons (1990), p. 224.

  170. 170.

    Grote (2011), p. 281.

  171. 171.

    Soons (1990), p. 216.

  172. 172.

    Grote (2011), p. 282.

  173. 173.

    Caron (1990), p. 651.

  174. 174.

    Soons (1990), p. 223.

  175. 175.

    Grote (2011), p. 283.

  176. 176.

    Soons (1990), p. 224

  177. 177.

    Grote (2011), pp. 282–283.

  178. 178.

    The President of Kiribati mentioned in a speech to the 16-nation Pacific Island Forum how he had been looking at a $2 billion plan that involved “structures resembling oil rigs”, as reported by Vidal (2011) http://ourworld.unu.edu/en/artificial-island-could-be-solution-for-rising-pacific-sea-levels/.

  179. 179.

    ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v. Netherlands), Judgement of 2 February 1969, at para.96.“…since the land is the legal source of the power which a State may exercise over territorial extensions to seaward, it must first be clearly established what features do in fact constitute such extensions.”

  180. 180.

    Such as an attempt to declare a new State in a British World War II anti-aircraft platform located off the cost of the UK, see The Principality of Sealand, http://www.sealandgov.org/ Accessed 27 March 2012.

  181. 181.

    For more details on how an artificial island is not considered as an island by art. 80 UNCLOS, see Gagain (2012), p. 101.

  182. 182.

    BBC News (2011) Maldives ‘Rubbish Island’ is ‘overwhelmed’ by garbage, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16072020.

  183. 183.

    Busines Insider (2011) http://www.businessinsider.com/artificial-islands-2011-7#12-thilafushi-1.

  184. 184.

    Which by 2020 is expected to have a population of 20,000 people, according to the Housing Development Corporation (2012) Website, a housing development corporation owned by the government of the Maldives, undertaking to construct housing projects in the country. thttp://www.hdc.com.mv/development/introduction.php. Sand is being obtained from nearby “coral sand”, DEME (Dredging, Environmental & Marine Engineering) (2012) website, http://www.deme.be/projects/maldive_hulhumale.html.

  185. 185.

    Schmetzer (2000) http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20000227&slug=4007063.

  186. 186.

    The development of the term “naturally formed” with regards to previous treaties on maritime law can be found in Gagain (2012), p. 98.

  187. 187.

    Which would include the need to give other States notification of their construction or maintain a permanent warning system. More details on the responsibilities and benefits that a State can obtain from artificial islands can be found in Gagain (2012), p. 101.

  188. 188.

    In fact it only allows a small zone of safety around it, which might not exceed 500 m from the outer edge, Gagain (2012), p. 106.

  189. 189.

    Gagain (2012), p. 82.

  190. 190.

    And this is recognised by some commentators, such as Gagain (2012). Here the author proposes a modification to UNCLOS to “Expand the Legal Status of Artificial Islands for the Purpose of Maintaining Maritime Claims and Statehood. However, it is not really clear whether there is much international appetite for any modifications of the UNCLOS.

  191. 191.

    Kench et al. (2009), pp. 180–213, and Fritz et al. (2006), pp. S137–S154

  192. 192.

    Schmetzer (2000) http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20000227&slug=4007063.

  193. 193.

    This is well documented in coastal engineering literature and practice. For a good historical overview of coastlines in various countries at different stages of development see Shibayama (2009).

  194. 194.

    Tsaltas et al. (2010), p. 12.

  195. 195.

    Soons (1990), p. 222.

  196. 196.

    As according to Art 121 of UNCLOS an island is a “naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide”.

  197. 197.

    However, it would not be possible to do so if the island had not been “naturally formed”, as Art. 11 of the LOSC states how “Off-shore installations and artificial islands shall not be considered as permanent harbour works”.

  198. 198.

    As reported by the Geospatial Information Authority of Japan.

  199. 199.

    Grote (2011), p. 278.

  200. 200.

    As explained before some countries already have the financial ability to carry it out, such as the Maldives. However for others such as Tuvalu it would probably by financially ruinous.

  201. 201.

    Maas and Carius (2012), p. 657.

  202. 202.

    Grote (2011), p. 277.

  203. 203.

    Although much effort can be made to attempt to minimize environmental effects, the sensitive nature of corals and the complexity of atolls makes it difficult to entirely remove these effects.

  204. 204.

    Lusthaus (2010), pp. 115–116.

  205. 205.

    By increasing its turbidity, for example.

  206. 206.

    Caron (1990), pp. 639–640.

  207. 207.

    A number of futuristic solutions are listed in Vidal (2011) http://ourworld.unu.edu/en/artificial-island-could-be-solution-for-rising-pacific-sea-levels/.

  208. 208.

    Such as for example Joysxee next to Isla Mujeres in Cancun, Mexico, as reported by Mader (2011) http://www.kickstarter.com/projects/scottmader/grand-launch-recycled-plastic-bottle-ecological-ar.

  209. 209.

    In fact the idea of these structures is not realistically contemplated by many, as highlighted in the closing statement of Vidal (2011) http://ourworld.unu.edu/en/artificial-island-could-be-solution-for-rising-pacific-sea-levels/.

  210. 210.

    And for example Joysxee is considered by the Mexican government as a boat, according to Mader (2011) http://www.kickstarter.com/projects/scottmader/grand-launch-recycled-plastic-bottle-ecological-ar.

  211. 211.

    See for example Grote (2011).

  212. 212.

    Soons (1990), p. 230.

  213. 213.

    UN High Commissioner for Refugees 2011, p. 18, Soons (1990), p. 230 and Caron (1990), p. 350.

  214. 214.

    Rayfuse (2010), p. 10 including application of the United Nations International Trusteeship system in order to create an ex-situ nation which would consist of a de-territorialized State, see Burkett (2011).

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Yamamoto, L., Esteban, M. (2014). Future Atoll Scenarios: Adaptation Strategies and Their Implication Under UNCLOS. In: Atoll Island States and International Law. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38186-7_5

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