Abstract
The following tables contain probabilities of unequal rankings of two candidates obtained by two methods: by majority voting and by the candidates’ total numerical scores assigned by the voters.
The test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in mind at the same time and still retain the ability to function.
Francis Scott Fitzgerald (1896–1940)
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2014 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Tangian, A. (2014). Probabilities of Unequal Choices by Vote and by Candidate Scores. In: Mathematical Theory of Democracy. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38724-1_16
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38724-1_16
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-38723-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-38724-1
eBook Packages: Business and EconomicsEconomics and Finance (R0)