Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Improved Algebraic Fault Analysis: A Case Study on Piccolo and Applications to Other Lightweight Block Ciphers

  • Conference paper
Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design (COSADE 2013)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 7864))

Abstract

This paper proposes some techniques to improve algebraic fault analysis (AFA). First, we show that building the equation set for the decryption of a cipher can accelerate the solving procedure. Second, we propose a method to represent the injected faults with algebraic equations when the accurate fault location is unknown. We take Piccolo as an example to illustrate our AFA and compare it with differential fault analysis (DFA). Only one fault injection is required to break Piccolo with the improved AFA. Finally, we extend the proposed AFA to other lightweight block ciphers, such as MIBS, LED, and DES. For the first time, the full secret key of DES can be recovered with only a single fault injection.

This work was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under the grants 60772082, 61173191, 61272491, and US National Science Foundation under the grant CNS-0644188.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 49.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Ali, S., Mukhopadhyay, D., Tunstall, M.: Differential fault analysis of AES: towards reaching its limits. Journal of Cryptographic Engineering (2012), doi:10.1007/s13389-012-0046-y.

    Google Scholar 

  2. Agoyan, M., Dutertre, J.-M., Naccache, D., Robisson, B., Tria, A.: When clocks fail: On critical paths and clock faults. In: Gollmann, D., Lanet, J.-L., Iguchi-Cartigny, J. (eds.) CARDIS 2010. LNCS, vol. 6035, pp. 182–193. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  3. Bar-El, H., Choukri, H., Naccache, D., Tunstall, M., Whelan, C.: The Sorcerers Apprentice Guide to Fault Attacks. In: IEEE 1994, pp. 370–382 (2006)

    Google Scholar 

  4. Barenghi, A., Breveglieri, L., Koren, I., Naccache, D.: Fault injection attacks on cryptographic devices: Theory, practice and countermeasures. Politecnico di Milano, Milan, Italy, Tech. Rep. (2012)

    Google Scholar 

  5. Biham, E., Shamir, A.: Differential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems. In: Kaliski Jr., B.S. (ed.) CRYPTO 1997. LNCS, vol. 1294, pp. 513–525. Springer, Heidelberg (1997)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  6. Bogdanov, A., Knudsen, L.R., Leander, G., Paar, C., Poschmann, A., Robshaw, M.J.B., Seurin, Y., Vikkelsoe, C.: PRESENT: An Ultra-Lightweight Block Cipher. In: Paillier, P., Verbauwhede, I. (eds.) CHES 2007. LNCS, vol. 4727, pp. 450–466. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  7. Boneh, D., DeMillo, R.A., Lipton, R.J.: On the Importance of Checking Cryptographic Protocols for Faults. In: Fumy, W. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1997. LNCS, vol. 1233, pp. 37–51. Springer, Heidelberg (1997)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  8. Bouillaguet, C., Derbez, P., Fouque, P.-A.: Automatic Search of Attacks on Round-Reduced AES and Applications. In: Rogaway, P. (ed.) CRYPTO 2011. LNCS, vol. 6841, pp. 169–187. Springer, Heidelberg (2011)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  9. Courtois, N.T., Pieprzyk, J.: Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers with Overdefined Systems of Equations. In: Zheng, Y. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2002. LNCS, vol. 2501, pp. 267–287. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  10. Courtois, N., Ware, D., Jackson, K.: Fault-Algebraic Attacks on Inner Rounds of DES. In: eSmart 2010, pp. 22–24 (2010)

    Google Scholar 

  11. Derbez, P., Fouque, P.-A., Leresteux, D.: Meet-in-the-Middle and Impossible Differential Fault Analysis on AES. In: Preneel, B., Takagi, T. (eds.) CHES 2011. LNCS, vol. 6917, pp. 274–291. Springer, Heidelberg (2011)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  12. Ding, J., Buchmann, J., Mohamed, M.S.E., et al.: MutantXL algorithm. In: Proceedings of the 1st International Conference in Symbolic Computation and Cryptography, pp. 16–22 (2008)

    Google Scholar 

  13. Faugère, J.C.: Gröbner Bases. Applications in Cryptology. In: FSE 2007, Invited Talk (2007), http://fse2007.uni.lu/slides/faugere.pdf

  14. Gregory, V.B.: Algebraic Cryptanalysis. Published by Springer (2009)

    Google Scholar 

  15. Gu, D., Li, J., Li, S., Guo, Z., Liu, J.: Differential Fault Analysis on Lightweight Blockciphers with Statistical Cryptanalysis Techniques. In: FDTC 2012, pp. 27–33 (2012)

    Google Scholar 

  16. Guo, J., Peyrin, T., Poschmann, A., Robshaw, M.: The LED Block Cipher. In: Preneel, B., Takagi, T. (eds.) CHES 2011. LNCS, vol. 6917, pp. 326–341. Springer, Heidelberg (2011)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  17. Hojsík, M., Rudolf, B.: Differential fault analysis of Trivium. In: Nyberg, K. (ed.) FSE 2008. LNCS, vol. 5086, pp. 158–172. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  18. Hojsík, M., Rudolf, B.: Floating fault analysis of trivium. In: Chowdhury, D.R., Rijmen, V., Das, A. (eds.) INDOCRYPT 2008. LNCS, vol. 5365, pp. 239–250. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  19. Izadi, M., Sadeghiyan, B., Sadeghian, S.S., et al.: MIBS: A New Lightweight Block Cipher. In: Garay, J.A., Miyaji, A., Otsuka, A. (eds.) CANS 2009. LNCS, vol. 5888, pp. 334–348. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  20. Jeong, K., Lee, C.: Differential Fault Analysis on Block Cipher LED-64. In (Jong Hyuk) Park, J.J., Leung, V.C.M., Wang, C.-L., Shon, T. (eds.) Future Information Technology, Application, and Service. LNEE, vol. 164, pp. 747–755. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  21. Jeong, K.: Differential Fault Analysis on Block Cipher Piccolo. Cryptology ePrint Archive (2012), http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/399.pdf

  22. Jovanovic, P., Kreuzer, M., Polian, I.: A Fault Attack on the LED Block Cipher. In: Schindler, W., Huss, S.A. (eds.) COSADE 2012. LNCS, vol. 7275, pp. 120–134. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  23. Jovanovic, P., Kreuzer, M., Polian, I.: An Algebraic Fault Attack on the LED Block Cipher. Cryptology ePrint Archive (2012), http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/400.pdf

  24. Knudsen, L.R., Miolane, C.V.: Counting equations in algebraic attacks on block ciphers. International Journal of Information Security 9(2), 127–135 (2010)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  25. Lim, C.H., Korkishko, T.: mCrypton – A Lightweight Block Cipher for Security of Low-Cost RFID Tags and Sensors. In: Song, J.-S., Kwon, T., Yung, M. (eds.) WISA 2005. LNCS, vol. 3786, pp. 243–258. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  26. Mohamed, M.S.E., Mohamed, W.S.A.E., Ding, J., Buchmann, J.: MXL2: Solving Polynomial Equations over GF(2) Using an Improved Mutant Strategy. In: Buchmann, J., Ding, J. (eds.) PQCrypto 2008. LNCS, vol. 5299, pp. 203–215. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  27. Mohamed, M., Bulygin, S., Buchmann, J.: Improved Differential Fault Analysis of Trivium. In: COSADE 2011, pp. 147–158 (2011)

    Google Scholar 

  28. Mohamed, M., Bulygin, S., Zohner, M., Heuser, A., Walter, M.: Improved Algebraic Side-Channel Attack on AES. Cryptology ePrint Archive (2011), http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/084.pdf

  29. Mukhopadhyay, D.: An Improved Fault Based Attack of the Advanced Encryption Standard. In: Preneel, B. (ed.) AFRICACRYPT 2009. LNCS, vol. 5580, pp. 421–434. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  30. National Bureau of Standards, Data Encryption Standard. U.S. Department of Commerce, FIPS PUB. 46 (January 1977)

    Google Scholar 

  31. Piret, G., Quisquater, J.-J.: A Differential Fault Attack Technique against SPN Structures, with Application to the AES and KHAZAD. In: Walter, C.D., Koç, Ç.K., Paar, C. (eds.) CHES 2003. LNCS, vol. 2779, pp. 77–88. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  32. Renauld, M., Standaert, F.-X.: Algebraic Side-Channel Attacks. In: Bao, F., Yung, M., Lin, D., Jing, J. (eds.) Inscrypt 2009. LNCS, vol. 6151, pp. 393–410. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  33. Rivain, M.: Differential Fault Analysis on DES Middle Rounds. In: Clavier, C., Gaj, K. (eds.) CHES 2009. LNCS, vol. 5747, pp. 457–469. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  34. SAT. Sat Race Competition, http://www.satcompetition.org/

  35. Shibutani, K., Isobe, T., Hiwatari, H., Mitsuda, A., Akishita, T., Shirai, T.: Piccolo: An Ultra-Lightweight Blockcipher. In: Preneel, B., Takagi, T. (eds.) CHES 2011. LNCS, vol. 6917, pp. 342–357. Springer, Heidelberg (2011)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  36. Soos, M., Nohl, K., Castelluccia, C.: Extending SAT Solvers to Cryptographic Problems. In: Kullmann, O. (ed.) SAT 2009. LNCS, vol. 5584, pp. 244–257. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  37. Takahashi, J., Fukunaga, T.: Improved Differential Fault Analysis on CLEFIA. In: FDTC 2008, pp. 25–34 (2008)

    Google Scholar 

  38. Tunstall, M., Mukhopadhyay, D., Ali, S.: Differential Fault Analysis of the Advanced Encryption Standard Using a Single Fault. In: Ardagna, C.A., Zhou, J. (eds.) WISTP 2011. LNCS, vol. 6633, pp. 224–233. Springer, Heidelberg (2011), http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/575

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  39. Zhao, X., Wang, T., Wang, S., Wu, Y.: Research on deep differential fault analysis against MIBS. Journal on Communications 31(12), 82–89 (2010)

    Google Scholar 

  40. Zhao, X., Zhang, F., Guo, S., Wang, T., Shi, Z., Liu, H., Ji, K.: MDASCA: An Enhanced Algebraic Side-Channel Attack for Error Tolerance and New Leakage Model Exploitation. In: Schindler, W., Huss, S.A. (eds.) COSADE 2012. LNCS, vol. 7275, pp. 231–248. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  41. Zhao, X., Guo, S., Zhang, F., et al.: Algebraic Differential Fault Attacks on LED using a Single Fault Injection. Cryptology ePrint Archive (2012), http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/347.pdf

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Connecticut, Storrs, Connecticut, USA

    Fan Zhang & Zhijie Shi

  2. Ordnance Engineering College, Shijiazhuang, Hebei, China

    Xinjie Zhao & Tao Wang

  3. The Institute of North Electronic Equipment, Beijing, China

    Xinjie Zhao & Shize Guo

Authors
  1. Fan Zhang
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Xinjie Zhao
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  3. Shize Guo
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  4. Tao Wang
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  5. Zhijie Shi
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. ANSSI, 75007, Paris, France

    Emmanuel Prouff

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Zhang, F., Zhao, X., Guo, S., Wang, T., Shi, Z. (2013). Improved Algebraic Fault Analysis: A Case Study on Piccolo and Applications to Other Lightweight Block Ciphers. In: Prouff, E. (eds) Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design. COSADE 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7864. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40026-1_5

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40026-1_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-40025-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-40026-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation