Skip to main content

Generalizing the weights for normalized individual resistances

  • Chapter
Unique Solutions for Strategic Games

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ((LNE,volume 328))

  • 44 Accesses

Abstract

In the following we will first illustrate by an example that weighting the normalized individual resistance levels ri(sk’,sk)/ri(sk,sk’) simply by Pi according to (I.2.9) may yield counterintuitive results. This will inspire us to define generalized weights for the individual resistance levels. Since not all other players necessarily suffer if a player deviates from a given solution candidate these generalized weights take into account whether a deviation of a given player is harmful for his opponents or not. Again we will analyse several examples to illustrate the selection properties of the generalized ESBORA-concept as well as the differences between the preliminary and the generalized concept of resistance avoidance.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1989 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Güth, W., Kalkofen, B. (1989). Generalizing the weights for normalized individual resistances. In: Unique Solutions for Strategic Games. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 328. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48367-7_4

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48367-7_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-50974-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-48367-7

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics