Abstract
¶ The first chapter is of an introductory nature. Whereas all later chapters deal with the technical problems, the limitations, and in particular the methods of the protection of people against the dangers precipitated by a nuclear war, this chapter is devoted to the rationale thereof. It tries to assess the effect of civil defense preparations on the likelihood of the outbreak of a war, on the social structure in peace time, and their effect on the morale and the confidence of the people in their government in case of a war.
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Notes
This is what actually happened to France and was one of the bases of Hitler’s expectation that he would be victorious in the Second World War.
The alternative of complete surrender—though it has also been proposed as a choice to be considered seriously (cf. e.f., A. Rapoport, Strategy and Conscience [New York: Harper & Row, 1964], p. XX), and even advocated (e.g., Erich Fromm, Daedalus, 89, 1,015 [1960])—is not discussed here. It is questionable that it would bring peace to this country; more likely, the United States would become the staging area for a conflict between the conquering and another government. In addition, it is, of course, deeply repugnant to most of us to see the precedent established that the more humane governments are replaced by less humane ones because the former are unwilling to assert themselves.
Eugene Rabinowitch said in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (VI, 266 [1950]) that “The fourth (i.e., civil defense) was-and remains—the only fully effective means of reducing the consequences—and thus the likelihood—of an atomic attack if rational attempts to make it impossible prove futile,” thus linking the unlikelihood of an attack to the reduction of its consequences.
It is not very pleasant to quote such statements nor it is easy to make a choice. The Sunday, June 27, 1965, New York Times describes the propaganda to which children in China are exposed. The article starts, “Recommended reading for children in Communist China today centers on stories stained with blood and tears.” The article contains a lurid description of the kind of literature which Chinese children are given to read. The intensity of the hatred which shows in some of the Chinese propaganda is nearlv incomprehensible to the average American. As compared with it, the USSR hate propaganda is relatively mild. For this writer, the most memorable remark dates from the zenith of coexistence. It is Khrushchev’s praise of certain authors for their “irreconcilable hatred” of the West, ironically enough in his address on culture (see Encounter pamphlet 9; London: Society for Cultural Freedom, 1964). A more recent statement in a similar vein was made by Leonid I. Brezhnev on July 3, 1968: “The social and political order which engenders political banditry arouses contempt and revulsion throughout the world. The rotten society, the degrading society, the decomposing society—this is the United States called even by those who recently lauded the American way of life.” However, one can also find much more conciliatory utterances. The pronouncements of the satellite regimes are somewhat in between those of the Chinese and USSR leaders. “Boundless hatred for the enemies of the German Democratic Republic is an indispensable qualification for the socialist soldier.”—Admiral Verner, Deputy Minister of Defense of GDR (East Germany). “The mere existence of imperialist states is a menace to peace.”—Czinege, Minister of Defense of Hungary. “Imperialist” in official pronouncements in communist countries means “Western.” “The flame of retribution must not be limited to urban buildings and centers but the countryside must go up in smoke also. Remember the forests, the fields, the crops. Remember the pipelines and oil storage tanks.”—Havana Radio. This is not to say that the propaganda is fully effective—at least not yet—nor that the people of the East hate the West (some time ago a man, freshly arrived from Hungary, inquired whether there really had been a McCarthy). However, the propaganda does show what the leaders want their people to believe and the purpose, if possibly distant, is not really doubtful. 5a See J. Levey, Survive, Vol. 2, No. 2, (1969), 2.
According toThomas C. Schelling (Daedalus 89, 896 [1961]), “We both have—unless the Russians have already determined to launch an attack and are preparing for it—a common interest in reducing the advantage of striking first, simply because that very advantage, even if common to both sides, increases the likelihood of war.” Civil defense decreases the disparity between offensive and defensive weapons and hence decreases the advantage of striking first. It may be remarked that it also renders disarmament easier by the same token: the possession of a few nuclear weapons does not assure a dominant position. Hence, the control of the possession of such weapons need not be absolute.
Dean D. F. Cavers of the Harvard Law School during the Panel Discussion on Civil Defense, organized by the American Nuclear Society. The verbatim report of the discussion appeared as a report (Panel Discussion on Civil Defense [ORNL—3865; Gatlinburg, Tenn., 1965], p. 34), issued by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and obtainable from the Clearinghouse for Federal and Technical Information, U.S. Department of Commerce, Springfield, Va.
This point of view has been eloquently stated in E. Teller’s The Reluctant Revolutionary (University of Missouri Press, 1964).
This point is well illustrated by the discussion about the effect of fires on shelters in connection with the Harbor Report (Publication 1237; Washington, D.C., National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, 1964) conducted in Scientist and Citizen for May and August 1965, and February 1966. Scientist and Citizen is a publication of the St. Louis Citizens’ Committee for Nuclear Information, an organization strongly opposed to civil defense. There are eight physicists on Scientist and Citizen’ s Advisory Board who should be able to make calculations on heat conductivity. However, similarly erroneous views on technical questions, made in authoritative tone by nontechnical people, are too numerous to quote.
It may be of some interest to note that there are conditions under which pacifist Einstein observed: “I consider military preparedness in these countries (the democracies) the most effective means, in times such as these, of making progress toward the goals of pacifism.” (Einstein on Peace; His Diaries and Letters, eds. O. Nathan and H. Norden [New York: Simon & Shuster, 1960], p. 247.)
In a form which appears to me somewhat exaggerated, this argument was particularly espoused by L. Festinger, under the title, “Cognitive Dissonance.” The dissonant elements are the defense against possible aggression and the striving for true friendship.
The dual uses of shelters are discussed in some detail in Chapter 9. Another “dual” use refers to the whole civil defense organization, not to the shelters. It is to cope with natural disasters, such as floods, earthquakes, etc. The civil defense organization has not always been successful in this regard. However, it has earned high praise for its activities during and after the earthquake in Alaska. During the Arizona flood, January 1966, the mayor of Phoenix (M. Graham) said: “Phoenix pays $29,000 per year for civil defense; it is worth $29,000 per hour today.”
See, e.g., On the Beach, Fail Safe, Seven Days in May. These books depict the hopelessness of the survivors, their will power completely paralyzed. Actually, every evidence points in the opposite direction: adversities stimulate people to greater effort and inventiveness toward self-preservation. This was the experience also during the siege of Budapest, to be described in Chapter 4. There are, of course, also books depicting the terrible suffering of conquered people, for instance, John R. Hersey’s The White Lotus (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1965).
See, e.g., “Medical Aspects of Civil Defense,” Victor Sidel’s contribution to the symposium sponsored by the American Association for the Advancement of Science in Berkeley, December 1965 (Publication 82; Washington, D.C.: AAAS, 1966).
Civil Defense; Project Harbor Summary Report (Publication 1237; Washington, D.C.: National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, 1964). This report was updated recently. The “Little Harbor Report” is obtainable from the Division of Technical Information, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C.
88th Cong., 1st sess., House of Representatives Report 715, p. 3.
P. I-1 of the Report of the PSAC panel on civil defense.
A. Rapoport, Moderator’s Remarks at the meeting on n. 13.
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Wigner, E.P. (1998). The Objectives of Civil Defense. In: Mehra, J. (eds) Socio-Political Reflections and Civil Defense. The Collected Works of Eugene Paul Wigner, vol B / 8. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58862-4_17
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