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Signaling and Forward Induction in a Market Entry Context

  • Conference paper
Papers of the 18th Annual Meeting / Vorträge der 18. Jahrestagung

Part of the book series: Operations Research Proceedings ((ORP,volume 1989))

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Abstract

Recent developments in noncooperative game theory (especially those dealing with information transmission and equilibrium refinements) are illustrated by means of variations on a simple market entry game.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. CentER for Economic Research, Tilburg University, The Netherlands

    Eric van Damme

Authors
  1. Eric van Damme
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenchaften, Universität Bielefeld, Postfach 8640, D-4800, Bielefeld 1, Germany

    Klaus-Peter Kistner

  2. Mathematisches Seminar, Universität Kiel, Ludewig-Meyn-Str.4, D-2300, Kiel 1, Germany

    Joachim H. Ahrens

  3. Institut für Ökonometrie, Operations Reasearch u. Systemtheorie, Technische Universität Wien, Argentinierstr. 8/119, A-1040, Wien, Germany

    Gustav Feichtinger

  4. Westdeutsche Landesband-Girozentrale, Herzogstr. 15, D-4000, Düsseldorf 1, Germany

    Joachim Minnemann

  5. Transatlantische Lebensversicherungs-AG, Schwarzer Weg 28, D-2000, Hamburg 60, Germany

    Lothar Streitferdt

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© 1990 Springer-Verlag Heidelberg

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van Damme, E. (1990). Signaling and Forward Induction in a Market Entry Context. In: Kistner, KP., Ahrens, J.H., Feichtinger, G., Minnemann, J., Streitferdt, L. (eds) Papers of the 18th Annual Meeting / Vorträge der 18. Jahrestagung. Operations Research Proceedings, vol 1989. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-75639-9_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-75639-9_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-52489-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-75639-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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