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The Ecological Disaster of Bitterfeld and Chicken Games

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Mathematical Modelling in Economics

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Abstract

Environmental contamination is one limiting factor for privatization of the formerly state owned companies in the eastern part of Germany. The negotiations between the Treuhandanstalt (German Trusteeship Agency) and prospective investors are game-theoretically modelled. It is argued that the prisoner dilemma game is not appropriate to model the environmental contamination as a public good provision problem. The application of the Chicken game leads to more realistic results. Furthermore, the political implications of this situation are analysed.

We thank U. Blum and J. Mönius for helpful comments.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Public Affairs, Daimler Benz AG, Stuttgart, Germany

    Jürgen Morlok

  2. Department of Economics, Technical University of Dresden, Germany

    Jan Siegmund

Authors
  1. Jürgen Morlok
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  2. Jan Siegmund
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of British Columbia, #997-1873 East Mall, V6T 1W5, Vancouver, B.C., Canada

    W. Erwin Diewert

  2. University of Hong Kong, K.K. Leung Building, Hong Kong

    Klaus Spremann

  3. Department of Economics, University of Ulm, Helmholtzstraße 18, D-89069, Ulm/Donau, Germany

    Frank Stehling

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© 1993 Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelberg

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Morlok, J., Siegmund, J. (1993). The Ecological Disaster of Bitterfeld and Chicken Games. In: Diewert, W.E., Spremann, K., Stehling, F. (eds) Mathematical Modelling in Economics. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-78508-5_44

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-78508-5_44

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-78510-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-78508-5

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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