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Institutionelle Investoren — Element eines innovationsförderlichen Corporate Governance Systems?

Eine Meta-Analyse empirischer Studien zum Einfluss institutioneller Investoren auf die Innovationstätigkeit börsennotierter Unternehmen

  • Chapter
Corporate Governance

Zusammenfassung

Ausgangspunkt der Betrachtungen ist die häufig formulierte These, dass die Beteiligung institutioneller Finanzinvestoren einer für die langfristige Wertsteigerung des Unternehmens notwendigen Innovationstätigkeit entgegenstehen könnten. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird die empirische Forschung zur Frage des Einflusses von institutionellen Investoren auf die Innovationstätigkeit von Unternehmen zusammengefasst und übergreifend analysiert, um gegensätzliche Argumentationen abzuwägen und ihre empirische Aussage und Gültigkeit herauszuarbeiten. An diesen empirischen Ergebnissen werden die von anderen Autoren skizzierten Anforderungen an ein innovationsförderliches Corporate Governance System gespiegelt und eine entsprechende Beurteilung vorgenommen. Diese Beurteilung beantwortet die Fragen, ob institutionelle Investoren ein Element eines innovationsförderlichen Corporate Governance Systems sein können und ob innovative Unternehmen sich im Rahmen ihrer Finanzierungspolitik gezielt um diese Investorengruppe bemühen sollten.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Technische Universität Bergakademie, Freiberg, Deutschland

    Kerstin Petzold

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  1. Kerstin Petzold
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Technische Universität · Bergakademie Freiberg, Lessingstraße 45, 09596, Freiberg, Deutschland

    Michael Nippa  & Kerstin Petzold  & 

  2. Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Carl-Zeiss-Straße53, 07743, Jena, Deutschland

    Wolfgang Kürsten

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Petzold, K. (2002). Institutionelle Investoren — Element eines innovationsförderlichen Corporate Governance Systems?. In: Nippa, M., Petzold, K., Kürsten, W. (eds) Corporate Governance. Physica-Verlag HD. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-86010-2_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-86010-2_8

  • Publisher Name: Physica-Verlag HD

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-7908-1483-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-86010-2

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