Abstract
It is the aim of this paper to develop a new way to model reciprocal cooperation. Hitherto reciprocity has counted merely as a form of cooperation, which has mainly been treated in the context of the well-known Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game. I will try to show that it is necessary to turn to a different game structure for a satisfactory account of reciprocal cooperation, involving features of a number of cooperation forms that are out of reach of the old structure. In the end I hope to have introduced a tool for the structural analysis of real phenomena, which allows a better appreciation of its richness and complexity than the standard PD.
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© 1986 Physica-Verlag Heidelberg Wien
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Schüßler, R.A. (1986). The Evolution of Reciprocal Cooperation. In: Diekmann, A., Mitter, P. (eds) Paradoxical Effects of Social Behavior. Physica-Verlag HD. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-95874-8_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-95874-8_8
Publisher Name: Physica-Verlag HD
Print ISBN: 978-3-7908-0350-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-95874-8
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