Zusammenfassung
In this contribution we analyze how the actions of rational agents feed back on their beliefs. We present two agent-based computer simulations studying complex social interactions in which agents that follow utility maximizing strategies thereby deteriorate their own long-term quality of beliefs. We take these results as a starting point to discuss the complex relationship between rational action couched in terms of maximizing utility and the emergence of informational inequalities.
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Klein, D., Marx, J., Scheller, S. (2019). Rational Choice and Asymmetric Learning in Iterated Social Interactions – Some Lessons from Agent-Based Modeling. In: Marker, K., Schmitt, A., Sirsch, J. (eds) Demokratie und Entscheidung. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-24529-0_18
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-24529-0_18
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