Abstract
The first part of our work was devoted to the new agent that we desired to consider in an economical and social situation. We then tried to define his behaviour, his rationality and the insertion of his decision in a larger social structure where he would be considered no more like a lone Robinson but just like one of the agents of the social decision. The intersection of both first chapters was the preference theory. Henceforth, to define equilibria inside a theory of fuzzy preferences, we introduce a new concept; the conflict. By trying to model it, we enter the domain of game theory.
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© 1992 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Billot, A. (1992). Fuzzy Games. In: Economic Theory of Fuzzy Equilibria. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 373. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-01050-1_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-01050-1_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-54982-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-662-01050-1
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