Abstract
In a general equilibrium model, we allow for households with several, typically heterogeneous, members; households that make (efficient) collective consumption decisions where different households may use different collective decision mechanisms; yet households that operate within a competitive market environment. While raising other main issues like the optimality and decentralization properties of the corresponding equilibria, this paper deals primarily with the existence of competitive equilibria among multi-member households and with core allocations for economies with multi-member households.
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Gersbach, H., Haller, H. (1999). Allocation among multi-member households: issues, cores and equilibria. In: Alkan, A., Aliprantis, C.D., Yannelis, N.C. (eds) Current Trends in Economics. Studies in Economic Theory, vol 8. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-03750-8_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-03750-8_11
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