Abstract
The paper deals with the characterization problem of competitive allocations in economic equilibrium models. We introduce an abstract social choice problem in a convex compact set, given a status-quo point, agents’ preferences and their bargaining powers. A competitive allocation is a point whose image in the supporting linear utilities is just the Nash bargaining solution. Next, we give axiomatic characterizations. At the end a simple price-allocation Maskin mechanism is constructed for the Nash implementation of the Walrasian rule.
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Sotskov, A.I. (2003). Characterization of Competitive Allocations and the Nash Bargaining Problem. In: Sertel, M.R., Koray, S. (eds) Advances in Economic Design. Studies in Economic Design. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-05611-0_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-05611-0_11
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-05541-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-662-05611-0
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