The Creation of New Fronts Between Russia and the West in the South Caucasus

Abstract

The brief war over South Ossetia and Abkhazia between Georgia and Russia at the beginning of August 2008 again demonstrated the belligerent nature and explosive international force of local “frozen conflicts”. It dramatically changed the political situation in the Caucasus, triggered renewed ethnic expulsions and for a time considerably impaired relations between Russia and the west, with talk of a new “cold war”. After Russia had during the course of the war restored and recognised the territorial unity of the two de facto states within the borders that had been determined by the former Soviet power during the 1920s, a new front line threatened to emerge between the west and Russia. However, plans to include Georgia in NATO were then shelved after all. Otherwise, western and Russian troops would have been stationed immediately adjacent to each other in this region, too. The new border is particularly precarious, since the west insists on the territorial integrity of Georgia, does not recognise the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and would therefore have to address an illegal presence of Russian troops on NATO territory if it had included Georgia in NATO.

Russia had warned long before the anticipated recognition of the independence of Kosovo by most western states, which was followed by the formal declaration of independence by the Kosovo parliament on 17 February 2008, that it could for its part react with a recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. While the western recognition of the separation of Kosovo violated international law, it said, recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was conformant with it. However, during the months that followed, Russia hesitated before taking this step.

It was only when Georgia attacked South Ossetia on 7 August that Russia took military retaliation, recognised the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and accepted an invitation for a stronger troop presence in both territories after the EU had brokered a ceasefire between Russia and Georgia. Now the following questions arise. Will the west and Russia be prepared in the longer term to mutually recognise the independence of “their” de facto states of Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia? Will both sides be willing to prevent these three acts of recognition from becoming precedents for the other de facto states in Europe and the world? Are both states capable of developing compromises for these other cases? And what are the consequences of the new situation for Armenia, which is now permanently isolated politically?