Abstract
The relationship between the Court of Justice and national supreme courts has been discussed and analysed from different angles for many years. While some of the controversies constitute evergreens in doctrinal analysis, others have been revealed in the case-law of national supreme courts. In some—admittedly rare—decisions of national supreme courts, the authority of the Court of Justice—as the supreme jurisdiction for the interpretation of EU law—has been challenged.
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Notes
- 1.
I use the term “multicentric” following publications of the renowned Polish scholar Łętowska (2002), p. 1127.
- 2.
Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, judgment of 29 May 1974, Solange I (BVerfGE 37, 271); Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, judgment of 22 October 1986, Solange II (BVerfGE 73, 339).
- 3.
Opinion of 14 December 1991, EU:C:1991:490.
- 4.
Opinion of 8 March 2011, EU:C:2011:123.
- 5.
Opinion of 18 December 2014, EU:C:2014:2454.
- 6.
Judgment of 6 March 2018, Achmea, C-284/16, EU:C:2018:158.
- 7.
See e.g. Safjan and Miklaszewicz (2010), p. 479. These authors correctly point out that “According to the dominant opinion formulated in the constitutional doctrine, the nature of the fundamental rights and freedoms is strongly differentiated. Certain fundamental rights cannot, by virtue of their very nature, produce horizontal effects at least in a narrower meaning limited to the direct effect.”
- 8.
See Prechal and de Vries (2009), p. 12 et seq.
- 9.
Judgments of 10 November 1982, Rau Lebensmittelwerke, 261/81, EU:C:1982:382, and of 4 November 1997, Parfums Christian Dior, C-337/95, EU:C:1997:517.
- 10.
The notion of direct effect in its classical meaning cannot be confused with the doctrinal proposal of distinguishing between the so called ‘invocability of exclusion’ (fr. ‘invocabilité d’exclusion’) and ‘invocability of substitution’ (fr. invocabilité de substitution’). This distinction was initially proposed by AG Léger in his opinion in the case Linster (C-287/98, paras 57 et seq.) and, then developed further in legal writings. In his analysis, AG Léger relied, in particular, on the publication of Galmot and Bonichot (1988), p. 10 et seq. In my view this distinction, even though attractive from the doctrinal point of view, should not have any influence on the application of EU law in practice.
- 11.
It is debated in legal writings to what extent this provision of the Charter can be understood as having the same consequences as the Treaty provision (Art. 288(3) TFEU) excluding the horizontal direct effect of directives—see: Leczykiewicz (2013), pp. 485–486.
- 12.
Judgment of 26 February 2013, Åkerberg Fransson, C-617/10, EU:C:2013:105.
- 13.
This is also very well explained by Advocate General Trstenjak in her Opinion in Domínguez, C-282/10, EU:C:2011:559, paras 80–83; see also Trstenjak and Beysen (2013), p. (293) 308. It has to be emphasised, however, that the recent judgment of the Court in the case Egenberger, C-414/16, did not refer to Article 51 of the Charter while discussing the horizontal direct effect of Articles 21 and 47 of the Charter. Nevertheless one must bear in mind that at the same time the Court considered that the prohibition of discrimination based on religion or belief constitutes a general principle of EU law (para 76 of this judgment).
- 14.
Judgment of 15 January 2014, Association de médiation sociale, C-176/12, EU:C:2014:2.
- 15.
Para 75 of the Egenberger decision.
- 16.
Judgment of 25 May 1971, Defrenne, 80/70, EU:C:1971:55.
- 17.
Judgment of 6 June 2000, Angonese, C-281/98, EU:C:2000:296.
- 18.
Judgment of 22 November 2005, Mangold, C-144/04, EU:C:2005:709.
- 19.
Judgment of 19 January 2010, Kücükdeveci, C-555/07, EU:C:2010:21.
- 20.
Judgment of 19 April 2016, DI, C-441/14, EU:C:2016:278.
- 21.
Judgment of 17 April 2018, Egenberger, C-414/16, para 77.
- 22.
- 23.
- 24.
I am not speaking here about ‘principles’ enshrined into the Charter itself. The distinction between rights and principles of the Charter is another story. In the latter context see Safjan and Miklaszewicz (2010), p. 480 who claim that: “[t]he Charter distinguishes between rights and principles. In particular, principles should be ‘judicially cognizable only in the interpretation’ of EU acts and national acts implementing European Union law and ‘in the ruling on their legality’ (Article 52(5) of the Charter). This provision seems, at first glance, to exclude any direct effect of the principles enshrined in the Charter”.
- 25.
Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in Fenoll, C-316/13, EU:C:2014:1753, paras 59–60.
- 26.
- 27.
Para 75.
- 28.
Para 76.
- 29.
This can be inferred from para 77 of the judgment.
- 30.
Basedow (2016), pp. 345–346.
- 31.
This cautious view is shared e.g. by Basedow (2016), p. 349; Leczykiewicz (2013), p. 486; Muir (2011), p. 47—“Either the Court opts for the unitary approach, thus supporting a very ambitious understanding of the process of European integration, or it opts for the more humble dual approach and consequently ought to justify giving direct effect to provisions of EU law on a case-by case basis”.
- 32.
Para 34.
- 33.
See also para 73 of the judgment in Egenberger.
- 34.
Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak in Domínguez, C-282/10, EU:C:2011:559.
- 35.
Timmermans (2016), p. 676 “Direct intervention of EU law in private law relationshipsraisesdelicate questions of legal certainty. It also raises questions of legitimacy in cases where Treaty law does not explicitly allow EU law directly to grant rights to and impose obligations on private parties”.
- 36.
See Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak in Domínguez, C-282/10, EU:C:2011:559, para 164.
- 37.
Judgment of 16 June 2005, Pupino, C-105/03, EU:C:2005:386.
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Szpunar, M. (2019). The authority of EU law: The case of horizontal application of fundamental rights. In: Heusel, W., Rageade, JP. (eds) The Authority of EU Law. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-58841-3_10
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