Abstract
From the considerations set forth in the preceding section, we learn that a full insight into the nature of concepts can be obtained only if we first explore the nature of judgments. For, implicit definitions determine concepts by virtue of the fact that certain axioms — which themselves are judgments — hold with regard to these concepts; thus such definitions make concepts depend on judgments. All other types of definitions likewise consist of judgments. At the same time, concepts appear in all judgments, so that judgments in turn seem to be composed of and to presuppose concepts. Concepts and judgments are thus correlative. They imply one another; the one cannot exist without the other.
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References
J. S. Mill, Logic, Book I, Chapter V, §1.
J. S. Mill in a footnote to J. Mill, Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, 2nd edition, I, p. 162, note 48.
It is from this aspect that existential statements have been treated by C. Sigwart, Logik, 3rd edition, 1904, pp. 93 ff.; and J. Cohn, Voraussetzungen und Ziele des Erkennens, pp. 78 ff.
Beiträge zur Logik, 2nd edition, 1911, pp. 13 f.
Cf., for example, L. Couturat, Die philosophischen Prinzipien der Mathematik, 1908, pp. 7 f. (German translation of Les principes des mathématiques, 1905.)
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Schlick, M. (1974). The Nature of Judgments. In: General Theory of Knowledge. LEP Library of Exact Philosophy, vol 11. Springer, Vienna. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7091-3099-5_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7091-3099-5_8
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