Abstract
The present work is motivated by a specific issue related to the institutionalized Swiss system of retirement provision. This chapter serves as a foundation of the analysis by confining a context for the discussion and by describing the economic problem at hand. More specifically, it first lays out the fundamentals of the current Swiss old-age provision scheme (section 2.1) and thereby introduces the reader to the mechanics of this system. It then justifies more closely the motivation underlying the present work (section 2.2) by exposing the most contested issues of the Swiss retirement provision scheme and the nature of the respective arguments. Finally, the specific research objectives of this work are defined (section 2.3).
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References
The Swiss system of old-age provision has been reviewed on various occassions with different objectives and emphases. See e.g. Scherer (1996), Queisser/Vittas (2000), Gerber (2002), Sousa-Poza/Van Dam (2002), Zimmermann/Bubb (2002), Queisser/Whitehouse (2003), Ott et al (2005) and Pittet/Pittet (2005). As distinct from these generic and partly overlapping treatments, the exposition to follow focuses on the technical aspects needed to establish this work’s research objectives and for the contents of chapter 7.
See also Lindenmann et al. (2003).
The details of this credit are not further specified here, see e.g. Lindenmann et al. (2003), pp. 54–60.
See W.A. (2006).
See e.g. Lindenmann et al. (2003), pp 47–48, or W.A. (2005), p. 2 and 5.
In the case of women born between 1942 and 1947, the corresponding rates are 3.4% for early retirement by one year and 6.8% for early retirement by two years. See W.A. (2005), p. 2.
See W.A. (2005), p. 2 and 5.
See Lindenmann et al. (2003), p. 16 or Queisser/Vittas (2000), p. 25.
See Lindenmann et al. (2003), p. 24, Queisser/Vittas (2000), pp. 25–26.
See Queisser/ Vittas (2000), p. 28.
See e.g. SFOS (2006a), p. 10.
See SFOS (2006a), p. 24.
See SFOS (2004), p. 43.
See BSV (2006), p. 7.
See Queisser/ Whitehouse (2003), p. 11, or Zimmermann/Bubb (2002), p. 20.
See Queisser/ Whitehouse (2003), p. 11.
Queisser/ Vittas (2000), pp. 28 and 40.
See, e.g., Sousa-Poza/ Van Dam (2002), p. 24.
See art 14 BVG and BSV (2006), p. 22 or BSV (2004), p. 11.
See e.g. Queisser/ Vittas (2000), p. 41.
See e.g. Queisser/ Vittas (2000), p. 28.
See SFOS (2004), p. 11.
See SFOS (2004), p. 12.
See SFOS (2004), p. 59.
See SFOS (2006b).
See SFOS (2004), p. 11.
See SFOS (2004), pp. 10 and 12.
See e.g. Scherer (1996), Queisser/Vittas (2000), Gerber (2002), Ott et al. (2005), Pittet/Pittet (2005), Sousa-Poza/Van Dam (2002), Zimmermann/Bubb (2002) and Queisser/Whitehouse (2003) for further information on BV pension fund governance.
See also Queisser/ Vittas (2000), p 34.
See e.g. Beck et al. (2003), p. 7, Pittet/Pittet (2005), p. 2, or Lindenmann et al. (2003), p. 11.
See SFOS (2004), p. 31 and SFOS (2005), p. 30.
See Zimmermann/ Bubb (2002), Beck et al. (2003) or Gerber (2002), part I, chapter 3 for more elaborate expositions of the challenges faced by the second pillar We make use of these sources when reflecting the principal arguments of the discussion within the following.
See e.g. Zimmermann/ Bubb (2002), pp. 31-33 or Beck et al. (2003), p. 13.
See Zimmermann/ Bubb (2002), p. 33 and 99.
See e.g. Beck et al. (2003), p. 10.
See e.g. Zimmermann/ Bubb (2002), p. 103 and Beck et al. (2003), p. 13.
See Beck et al. (2003), p 10 and Zimmnermann/Bubb (2002), pp. 69 and 100.
See Scherer (1996) and Frauenlob (1998) and the references cited there for comprehensive treatments of these issues. Part of the BV pension fund asset allocation discussion has been carried out in papers published by the two Swiss journals ‘Der Schweizer Treukänder’ and ‘Financial Markets and Portfolio Management’ See e.g. Odier et al. (1991), Meier (1993), or Bickel (2003) for representative contributions.
See Beck et al (2003), pp. 11–13.
See e.g. Wydler (1992), p. 175 for an early critique. See also Beck et al. (2003), p. 9 and Zimmermann/Bubb (2002), pp 106–107.
See Gerber (2002), pp. 98–114.
See e.g. BSV (2006), p. 22, for the reduction scheme
See e.g. Gerber (2002), p. 88 for the old and BSV (2006), p. 3 for the new age structure of minimum old-age credits for women.
See Gerber (2002), pp. 311–317.
See Gerber (2002), pp. 211–236, 347–359 and Beck et al. (2003), pp. 20–21.
See Queisser/ Whitehouse (2003), pp. 14–40
See Gerber (2002), pp. 326–327.
See Gerber (2002), pp. 328.
See EDI (2006).
See e.g. Pittet/ Pittet (2005).
In the study by Gerber (2002) 46% of the interviewees had supported a free choice of pension fund. See also Pittet/Pittet (2005).
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(2008). Institutional framework, motivation and objectives. In: Life Cycle Investing and Occupational Old-Age Provision in Switzerland. Gabler. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8349-9818-7_2
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