Abstract
In Chap. 5, I tested the emancipation theory of trust by analyzing the results of the USA–Japan comparative questionnaire study. The results generally supported the theory. However, a questionnaire survey is not the most appropriate method for testing a theory that consists of a series of propositions. In this chapter, I present a series of experimental studies that we conducted to test the theory. Although most of the experiments presented in this chapter were conducted in both the USA and Japan, the purpose was not to claim that there is a so-called “cultural difference” between the USA and Japan. Rather, the purpose was to test the validity of the theory, on the premise that any “cultural differences” would disappear once we controlled the variables that play critical roles in the theory. More detailed discussion of this point will appear later in this chapter.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
The “cultural difference” has been explained as follows. The illusion occurs in cultures where there are many objects that have straight lines in everyday life (e.g., buildings, streets, etc.). In other words, it occurs among people who have grown up in an environment that has artifacts with sharp edges, but does not occur among people such as native Africans who live in an environment that does not have artificial objects that have sharp edges. However, various questions have been raised about the validity of this explanation, and no agreed-upon answer has been provided.
- 3.
The extortion chance was not actually provided either to C or to F during the last 10 periods even in the high uncertainty condition. Participants in the high uncertainty condition expected extortion chances but never actually faced them. (This footnote was missing in the Japanese edition).
- 4.
See Kiyonari and Yamagishi (1996) for details.
- 5.
A multiple regression analysis was used to derive this conclusion. I used society (Japan or US), social uncertainty (high or low), the level of general trust (high or low), and precommitment (the number of periods that one bought from seller C during the first 20 periods) as independent variables (the first three of which were dummy coded), and the number of periods that one bought from C during the last 10 periods as the dependent variable. The negative effect of precommitment was significant.
- 6.
This experiment was similar to the “trust game” that has been studied by Dasgupta (1988), Snijders (1996), and others. However, there was an important difference in that the recipient’s choice did not affect the allocator’s profit at all, and thus altruism toward the partner had no role in the faith game, while it could be an important factor in the trust game.
- 7.
Footnote to the English edition. Allocators in the faith game were given a chance to divide the money ($15) regardless of the choice of the recipient. This feature made the faith game distinct from the trust game.
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Yamagishi, T. (2011). Trust and Commitment Formation. In: Trust. The Science of the Mind. Springer, Tokyo. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-53936-0_6
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