Abstract
How are we to account for social norms and their normativity? Why do we believe that in certain situations that we ought to act honestly or politely or that we ought to cooperate with others? The phenomenon of social norms represents a serious challenge for individualistic social theories. Trying to cope with the weaknesses of these accounts, alternative proposals have been offered. This paper evaluates Margaret Gilbert’s theory of social norms. Focusing on the social rationality of individuals, Gilbert tries to explain the normativity of social norms in the ways individuals are part of a social setting. Her account has been considered as a promising alternative to rational-choice approaches (see, for example, Elisabeth Anderson 2000). Nevertheless, while Gilbert’s general account of social phenomena has been widely discussed, her account of social norms has not been analysed thoroughly. In the following, I argue that Gilbert does not adequately capture the phenomena of social norms and their normativity.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Gilbert (1987: 199–200) argues on these lines when it comes to attibuting collecive beliefs: when we say “the United States believes that the invasion of Afghanistan was an unconscionable act” based on the acceptance of this judgment by the government and despite the fact that most people of the United States have no idea of the invasion of Afghanistan, we assume that the citizens of the United States have endorsed the idea that they may be regarded as jointly accepting whatever proposition the government itself accepts.
- 2.
References
Anderson E (2000) Beyond homo economicus: new developments in theories of social norms. Philos Public Aff 29(2):170–200
Baltzer U (2002) Joint action of large groups. In: Georg M (ed) Social facts and collective intentionality. Dr. Hänsel-Hohenhausen AG, Frankfurt
Bittner R (2002) An action for two. In: Georg M (ed) Social facts and collective intentionality. Dr. Hänsel-Hohenhausen AG, Frankfurt
Elster J (1991) Rationality and social norms. Archives européens de sociologie 32:109–129
Gilbert M (1983) Notes on the concept of a social convention. New Literary Hist 14(2):225–251
Gilbert M (1987) Modelling collective beliefs. Synthese 73:185–204
Gilbert M (1989) On social facts. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ
Gilbert M (1998) Social norms. In: Edward C (ed) Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy. Retrieved online on October 18, 2006, from http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/R029
Gilbert M (2002a). Acting together. In: Georg M (ed) Social facts and collective intentionality. Dr. Hänsel-Hohenhausen AG, Frankfurt
Gilbert M (2002b) Considerations on joint commitment: responses to various comments. Social facts and collective intentionality. In: Georg M (ed) Social facts and collective intentionality. Dr. Hänsel-Hohenhausen AG, Frankfurt
Gilbert M (2003) The structure of the social atom: joint commitment as the foundation of human social behavior. In: Frederick FS (ed) Socializing metaphysics. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, MD
Gilbert M (2007) Collective intentions, commitment, and collective action problems. In: Fabienne P, Hans Bernhard S (eds) Rationality and commitment. Oxford University Press, New York
Lewis DK (1969) Convention: a philosophical study. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Rawls J (1955) Two concepts of rules. Philos Rev 64(1):3–32
Searle JR (1964) How to derive “ought” from “is”. Philos Rev 73(1):43–58
Searle JR (1995) The construction of social reality. Penguin Books, London
Sugden R (2000) Team preferences. Economics and Philosophy 16:175–204
Tollefsen DP (2002) Collective intentionality and the social sciences. Philos Soc Sci 32(1):25–50
Tollefsen DP (2004) Collective intentionality. The internet encyclopedia of philosophy. Retrieved on October 1, 2007, from http://www.iep.utm.edu/c/coll-int.htm
Tuomela R (1992) Group beliefs. Synthese 91:285–318
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2009 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Baumann, C.M. (2009). Reconsidering Gilbert’s Account of Social Norms. In: Suárez, M., Dorato, M., Rédei, M. (eds) EPSA Epistemology and Methodology of Science. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3263-8_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3263-8_2
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-3262-1
Online ISBN: 978-90-481-3263-8
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)