Abstract
Since its early formulation, non-relativistic quantum mechanics (QM) has been the source of sustained controversy about its foundation. Despite its impressive empirical success, several foundational issues have not been settled by the theory: What exactly happens with the observables when a quantum system is not being measured? And what exactly happens during measurement? What is the nature of quantum particles? In particular, are they individuals or not? And can identity be applied to these particles? Not surprisingly, a variety of interpretations of QM have been developed in the attempt to address these and other foundational questions. Perhaps also not surprisingly, so far there has been no agreement as to which of these interpretations (if any) should be preferred.
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Notes
- 1.
What the Copenhagen interpretation exactly is and who is responsible for its formulation turn out to be complex issues, which unfortunately we cannot discuss here (see Howard, 2004).
- 2.
This is rough since, in principle, realists can adopt both the ontological and the epistemological readings of the two principles. In any case, anti-realists are more likely to deny the corresponding ontological versions.
- 3.
Everett’s formulation of the many-worlds interpretation is not committed to the splitting of worlds. Roughly speaking, all the worlds exist independently of measurement, and they instantiate the relevant quantum states.
- 4.
For a response to this objection within the many-worlds framework, by invoking the concept of a “measure of existence of worlds”, see Vaidman, 1998.
- 5.
The partiality of partial relations and structures is due to the incompleteness of our knowledge about the domain under investigation. With additional information, a partial relation can become a full relation. Thus, the partialness examined here is not ontological, but epistemic.
- 6.
It is not clear that the suggestion that worlds literally split in measurement is coherent, since it seems to conflict with several physical assumptions (see Albert and Loewer, 1988; Barrett, 1999). So the coherence point does not seem to apply to the splitting worlds version of the many-worlds interpretation.
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da Costa, N.C., Bueno, O. (2011). Quasi-truth and Quantum Mechanics. In: Krause, D., Videira, A. (eds) Brazilian Studies in Philosophy and History of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 290. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9422-3_23
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