Abstract
In Kant’s moral theory we find a close connection between the concept of human dignity and the prohibition to use people merely as means. My chapter follows Kant in tracing this connection. But in contrast to Kant, for whom the prohibition to use people covers the whole range of perfect duties, I present an account of using people that seems to be closer to our common sense understanding in that it only covers a limited range of such duties. I will argue that, nevertheless, we need the concept of human dignity to explain why it is at least prima facie wrong to use people merely as means. The peculiar work that the concept of human dignity fulfills in explaining the wrongness of these acts does not consist in making them wrong directly. The concept of human dignity is rather necessary to explain how certain other properties can make acts wrong. By applying the concept of human dignity to the case of using people, we not only become able to explain the wrongness of using, but we also see that the concept of human dignity does play an important role in moral philosophy as a whole.
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Notes
- 1.
Different conceptions of dignity may for example be drawn from expressions such as “to live under undignified circumstances” or “to be bereft of one’s dignity.” In the following, I will not address these conceptions and their relation with the conception I am presenting.
- 2.
For the definition of dignity as a virtue, see Beyleveld and Brownsword (2001: 58–60).
- 3.
There are of course other accounts of human dignity that are less speciesist than this one.
- 4.
See Kant (1902: IV.437): “[…] so wird der Zweck hier nicht als ein zu bewirkender, sondern selbstständiger Zweck, mithin nur negativ, gedacht werden müssen, d.i. dem niemals zuwider gehandelt […] werden muss.”
- 5.
- 6.
Here I disagree with Robert Nozick, for example, who seems to suggest that we use a person whenever we violate a constraint that the properties of this person impose on us (Nozick 1974: 31–32).
- 7.
A goal essentially refers to a person if it cannot be spelled out without linguistically referring in any way to the person in question, be it by using proper names or definite descriptions.
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.
With “justification” I do not mean moral but only epistemic justification. A similar idea is expressed by Kerstein (2009).
- 11.
There might of course be other proposals than the one I am presenting: namely, the proposal to obtain a similar prohibition by presupposing the capacity to set and follow ends to be valuable in itself. I here assume that any proposal that does not refer to this capacity at all would be even less capable of capturing our intuitions with regard to the constraint on merely using people.
- 12.
The same consideration does not apply to the claim that some particular beings are valuable in themselves.
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Kaufmann, P. (2011). Instrumentalization: What Does It Mean to Use a Person?. In: Kaufmann, P., Kuch, H., Neuhaeuser, C., Webster, E. (eds) Humiliation, Degradation, Dehumanization. Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, vol 24. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9661-6_5
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