Abstract
Antonio Nunziante tells us that the doctrine of natural machines, of organisms, and of composite substances assumes a marked consistency in Leibniz throughout his mature years. Thus for a full explanation of the conceptual content of Leibniz’s reflections on the nature of living substances we must turn to the “classic” places where it took form: to the letters to De Volder and Lady Masham, to the Nouveaux Essais, to the Animadversiones against Stahl, and to the Principes de la Nature et de la Grace and to the Monadologie. Nunziante asks: what connection is there between the proto-theory of living beings of the 1680s and that of the mature years? To approach the problem in reverse fashion: what elements of discontinuity suddenly break into Leibniz’s reflections from the second half of the 1690s, in contrast with the immediately preceding phases of his thought? Certainly, there are the monads. But Nunziante wishes to know whether it is possible to find certain finer-grained changes. After a decade of intense theoretical debate on the nature of corporeal substances, on organisms, on machines of nature, Nunziante wishes to sketch a historical picture that accounts in a coherent manner for the development of Leibniz’s thought.
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Notes
- 1.
Studies dedicated to these topics gradually became more and more numerous, so much so that it is more than ever necessary today to proceed also to a work of summarizing in order to take stock of the situation regarding the critical acquisitions attained and shared. The bibliography on the theme here attached is not complete, but indicates several titles which seem to me to be particularly important for reconstructing the status quaestionis of the subject. See Schneider (1985); Pasini (1996), (2006); Duchesneau (1996, 1998); Ishiguro (1998, 2001); Smith (1998); Fichant (2003, 2004); Phemister (1999, 2005); Look (2002); Nunziante (2002, 2004); Carvallo (2004); Hartz and Wilson (2005); Hartz (2007)
- 2.
See Ishiguro (1998, 547).
- 3.
Regarding the definition of “living”, among other places, see Introductio ad Encyclopaediam arcanam (1683–1685 (?)), A VI 4 A, 531; Genera terminorum. Substantiae (1683–1685 (?)), A VI 4 A, 566–568; and Tabula notionum praeparanda (1685–1686 (?)), A VI 4 A, 633. With regard, on the other hand, to the distinction between “natural” and “artificial”, it could be interesting to quote this passage from De machina animata (1685 (?)): “A body perfectly like the human one cannot be manufactured by anyone, if not by he who is able to keep the order of division into infinity. So it is not possible for any angel to form a man or any animal, if not from the seed that in some way already exists. He could build a machine that could perhaps deceive with its outward appearance a man who did not examine it in sufficient depth, but again, this would be neither a man, nor an animal.” (A VI 4 B, 1801)
- 4.
A VI 4 A, 633.
- 5.
“Functio hominis primaria est perceptio, at secundaria (quae prioris gratia est) perceptionis est procuratio”. Thus writes Leibniz in De scribendis novis medicinae elementis (1680–1682). And he continues: “Perceptionis gratia sunt organa sensuum; procurandae perceptionis sive actionis gratia sunt organa Motus”. The text can be found in Pasini (1996, 212).
- 6.
Ibid., 214.
- 7.
On the difficult question of the relationship between “unity” and “union”, as well as the reasons for their distinction, see Pasini (2006).
- 8.
Letter to Arnauld of 30 April 1687: GP II, 100.
- 9.
According to Mugnai (2001, 127), the image of the “magnet” could be misleading because it reminds of the atomistic doctrine which Leibniz never embraced. On this point see infra.
- 10.
Rightly speaking, the expression “domination” is almost never used by Leibniz in its abstract meaning: he usually refers to an entity which is “dominans”. This point has been highlighted by J. Roland: see the paper included in this volume.
- 11.
The subjects that follow are taken up in Nunziante (2006).
- 12.
GP II, 252.
- 13.
De ipsa natura, GP IV, 512; NE, A VI, 6, 220; GP III, 347; Monad. § 70.
- 14.
This letter reads “dans un corps organique il n’y a qu’une seule Unité dominante et principale, qui est son ame.” See GP VII, 553.
- 15.
Dutens, II, 2, 157.
- 16.
GP VII, 302.
- 17.
Look (2002, 380).
- 18.
GP II, 193.
- 19.
See De substantia simplici ac composita, in (Pasini 1996, 208). Of course, the composition of this text could be later, but what I am attempting to recollect here is a circumstantial framework.
- 20.
Op. cit. 196–197.
- 21.
See Histoire comique des États et Empires du Soleil, in Cyrano de Bergerac, Histoire comique des États et Empires de la Lune et du Soleil, Nouvelle Edition par P.L. Jacob, Paris 1962, 269–270 and 272.
- 22.
Ibid., 273.
- 23.
See NE, in A VI 6, 220; 235; 356; 472.
- 24.
NE, A VI 6, 222.
- 25.
The question of weight, as is known, was debated especially in the physics of the time, so much that in 1669 the Académie des Sciences of Paris organized an animated debate on the question. Huygens participated fully, both presenting a Memoria and – interestingly for us – publishing in Leiden in 1690 his fundamental Traité de la lumière which contained also a Discours de la cause de la pesanteur. Still in 1690 Nicolas Fatio De Duillier and Pierre Varignon had also published works on the subject, entitled respectively De la cause de la pesanteur and Nouvelles conjectures sur la pesanteur. These are works that Leibniz knew well, to the point that he discussed them directly with their authors. But perhaps the most interesting thing of all to note regards the uncertainty shown by Leibniz himself on the subject and amply testified to by his correspondence. Thus, 8 May 1694 Leibniz writes, through Wilhelm De Beyrie, a letter to Nicolas Fatio De Duillier, affirming the following: “Quant à la pesanteur ou attraction en general, j’ay temoigné autre fois dans une dispute que j’avois avec M. Papin que j’estois encor en suspens sur la cause de la pesanteur, et quoyque ce que M. Hugens en dit, en employant la force centrifuge soit extremement beau et plausible” (A III 6, A 85; italics mine). And in fact, confirming his uncertainty, on 26 April 1694 (some days earlier), he replied to Huygens reaffirming the same considerations and declaring: “je me trouve comme suspendu entre ces deux sentimens” (A III 6, 72).
- 26.
Leibniz writes thus in the letter to Huygens of 10/20 March 1693: “Mais je reponds, qu’il n’y a point de dernier petit corps, et je conçois, qu’une particelle de la matiere, quelque petite qu’elle soit, est comme un monde entier, plein d’une infnité de Creatures encor plus petites; et cela à proportion d’un autre corps fut il aussi grand, que le globe de la terre. Comme il semble qu’on ne sçauroit rendre aucune raison, pourquoy les parties d’un atome sont inseparables, que parce quelles se touchent une fois parfaitement par leur surfaces, durant quelque temps; c’est pour cela que, j’ay dit, que dans l’Hypothese des Atomes l’attouchement fait l’office d’un gluten. Il semble aussi que si l’attouchement par surfaces fait une connexion infiniment forte; l’attouchement par lignes et par points deuvroit aussi faire des connexions, mais surmontables, en sorte que deux corps se touchant par des lignes plus grandes seroient plus aisés à separer, et des corps se touchant par plus de points auroient plus de connexion, que ceux qui se toucheroient par moins de poincts caeteris paribus. Et mêmes, point contre point, et ligne contre ligne, il semble que contactus osculi deuvroit donner plus de connexion, que simplex contactus. De plus, si un attouchement superficiel durable faict un attachement insurmontable, il semble qu’un attouchement momentanée feroit une connexion surmontable, mais plus forte, selon que le corps, qui rase l’autre en le touchant, a moins de vistesse. Enfin quoy que j’aye parlé cy dessus des fermetés ou consistences primitives; j’ay tousjours du panchant à croire, qu’il n’y en a aucune primitive, et que le seul mouvement fait de la diversité dans la matiere, et par consequent la cohesion. Et tant que le contraire n’est pas encor demonstré, il me semble, qu’on doit eviter la supposition d’une telle nouvelle qualité inexplicable, laquelle estant accordée, on passeroit bien tost à d’autres suppositions semblables, comme à la pesanteur d’Aristote, à l’attraction de Mons. Neuton, à des sympathies ou antipathies et à mille autres attributs semblables.” (A III 5, 520–521; italics in the text).
- 27.
Duchesneau (1998, 329) in this regard observes: “Par suite de la régression à l’infini dans la recherche du constituant “materiel” de l’être vivant, la limite de l’organisation ne peut être fixée dans la nature. Il faudrait pour y parvenir se rendre infiniment au delà de l’animal spermatique, pour prendre cet exemple. Par ailleurs, les limites de l’organisation sont proprement inassignables.”
- 28.
- 29.
I assume this suggestion, although indirectly, from Ishiguro (2001, 535–537).
- 30.
The text speaks of a “αρμονια consentientium vibrationum motuumve intestinorum” (De secretione animali, ad P.A. Michelottum, D II, 2, 90).
- 31.
As has been observed: “In the picture of the consideration of the artistic phenomena, as the examples frequently used show, music occupies for Leibniz a position of real importance, if not pre-eminence.” (Luppi 1989, 125)
- 32.
Again Luppi observes that “in music one perceives a system of relationships immediately given.” That is, one sensibly perceives an infinite in progress, made of infinite sub-vibrations that interact according to an order. There is a profound analogy, according to Luppi, between the laws of music and the organization of the universe. See Ibid., 127–128 and 130–131. But on the importance of musical reflection in Leibniz, as well as its possible ontological reverberations, at least in the ethical ambit, see Erle (2005).
- 33.
To clarify any possible ambiguity: in his writings of musical theory Leibniz does not use the term “dominant” in the sense in which we mean it. In his correspondence with Henfling and with Goldbach he always expresses himself in terms of “intervalla” and “rationes” and, in one specific case, “quinta” (see e.g. A.P. Juschkewitsch, A.P., and Kopelewitsch, Ju. Ch. 1988. La correspondance de Leibniz avec Goldbach. Studia Leibnitiana 20: 182). The term “dominant” already existed in the theories of the “Gregorian” modes, and was, as such, in common use in the seventeenth century (S. de Caus – 1615 – attributes it to the 5th degree of the “authentic modes” and Brossard – 1703 – uses it as a synonym of repercussa). It was only with Rameau that, as is known, “dominant” came to mean a specific harmonic function that from then on was to become “classical”. On these subjects, see. Erle (2005, 36–44).
- 34.
See the letter to Nicolas Remond of 4 November 1715 in which the distinction unum per se – unum per accidens is clearly reaffirmed: “Et la materie seconde (comme par exemple le corps organique) n’est pas une substance, mais par une autre raison; c’est qu’elle est un amas de plusieurs substances, comme un étang plein de poissons, ou comme un trouppeau de brebis, et par consequent elle est ce qu’on appele Unum per accidens, en un mot, un phenomene. Une veritable substance (telle qu’un animal) est composée d’une ame immaterielle et d’un corps organique, et c’est le Composé et ces deux qu’on appele Unum per se” (GP III, 657).
- 35.
“If, then, everything moved is moved by something, and the first mover is moved, but not by another, it must be moved by itself”. See Aristotle, Phys., VIII, 5, 256 a 20–22 in Aristotle Physics. Book VIII, trasl. with a commentary by Daniel W. Graham, Clarendon Press – Oxford: New York 1999, 13.
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Nunziante, A.M. (2011). Continuity or Discontinuity? Some Remarks on Leibniz’s Concepts of “Substantia Vivens” and “Organism”. In: Smith, J., Nachtomy, O. (eds) Machines of Nature and Corporeal Substances in Leibniz. The New Synthese Historical Library, vol 67. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0041-3_9
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