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Permanent Legal Emergencies and the Derogation Clause in International Human Rights Treaties: A Contradiction?

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Post 9/11 and the State of Permanent Legal Emergency

Part of the book series: Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice ((IUSGENT,volume 14))

Abstract

This chapter examines the derogation clauses in key international human rights treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. It provides an overview of the derogation clauses and relevant interpretations and case law which have developed on the issue before 9/11. The analysis then concentrates on the derogation rules in post-9/11 case law focusing, in particular, on the Belmarsh detainees decision of the House of Lords and the subsequent judgment on the same matter of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. The central aim of the chapter is to assess whether, and to what extent, the derogation clauses remain adequate in an era of international terrorism and in the context of a state of permanent legal emergency.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See, e.g.: P. R. Neumann, Old and New Terrorism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009); M. Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-first Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); G. T. Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New York: Times Books/Henry Holt, 2004).

  2. 2.

    Assessing Damage, Urging Action, Report of the Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights, International Commission of Jurists, Geneva, 2009, at 2.

  3. 3.

    See, e.g., J. Alter, “Time to Think About Torture,” Newsweek 138 (2001): 45, quoting U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson in Terminiello v City of Chicago (1949): ‘There is the danger that, if the court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact’; 337 U.S. 1, 13 (1949) (Jackson, J, dissenting).

  4. 4.

    See, e.g.: R. A. Posner, “Security Versus Civil Liberties,” The Atlantic Monthly 288 (2001): 46; V. D. Dinh, “Freedom and Security after September 11,” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 25 (2002): 399.

  5. 5.

    See, e.g.: D. Cole and J. X. Dempsey, Terrorism and the Constitution: Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the Name of National Security (Los Angeles: The New Press, 2002); see also: C. Brown, Lost Liberties: Ashcroft and the Assault on Personal Freedom (New York: The New Press, 2003).

  6. 6.

    E. Gross, “Legal Aspects of Tackling Terrorism: The Balance Between the Right of a Democracy to Defend Itself and the Protection of Human Rights,” UCLA Journal of International Law & Foreign Affairs 6 (2001): 167–168.

  7. 7.

    See, e.g.: the statement by Wisconsin democrat Russell Feingold, the only US senator to vote against the USA Patriot Act, who has pointed out at the time that ‘[p]reserving our freedom is one of the main reasons we are now engaged in this new war on terrorism. We will lose that war without firing a shot if we sacrifice the liberties of the American people’. Senator Russell Feingold (D–WI), Statement on the Anti-Terrorism Bill, U.S. Senate, 25 October 2001. See also: UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Statement to Conference ‘Fighting Terrorism for Humanity: A Conference on the Roots of Evil’, 22 September 2003.

  8. 8.

    U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001), at para. 2 (e).

  9. 9.

    There is only a passing reference to human rights in para. 3 (f) of the resolution which concerns the granting of refugee status to asylum-seekers.

  10. 10.

    U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1456 (2003), at para. 6.

  11. 11.

    See, e.g.: C. Michaelsen, “International Human Rights on Trial: The United Kingdom’s and Australia’s Legal Response to 9/11,” Sydney Law Review 25 (2003): 275–303.

  12. 12.

    Derogations under international human rights law can be distinguished from similar mechanisms in domestic (constitutional) law. For a discussion of domestic derogations in U.S. and Canadian law, se, e.g.: K. Roach, “Ordinary Laws for Emergencies and Democratic Derogations from Rights,” in Emergencies and the Limits of Legality, ed. V. V. Ramraj (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

  13. 13.

    A and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56; [2005] 2 W.L.R. 87; A and others v United Kingdom, App 3455/05 (19 February 2009), (2009) 49 EHRR 29.

  14. 14.

    See generally: R. Higgins, “Derogations under Human Rights Treaties,” The British Yearbook of International Law 48 (1976–77): 281; T. Buergenthal, “To Respect and to Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible Derogations,” in The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ed. L. Henkin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 72; J. F. Hartman, “Working Paper for the Committee of Experts on the Article 4 Derogation Provision,” Human Rights Quarterly 7 (1985): 89; D. J. Harris, M. O’Boyle, and C. Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (London: Butterworths, 1995) at 489–507; A. -L. Svensson-McCarthy, The International Law of Human Rights and States of Exception: With Special Reference to Travaux Préparatoires and Case-Law of the International Monitoring Organs (Dordrecht/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1998).

  15. 15.

    Svensson-McCarthy, The International Law of Human Rights and States of Exception, at 281.

  16. 16.

    S. Tierney, “Determining the State of Exception: What Role for Parliament and the Courts?,” Modern Law Review 68 (2005): 668.

  17. 17.

    Lawless v Ireland (No 3) (1961) 1 EHRR 15.

  18. 18.

    Ibidem at para. 31.

  19. 19.

    Ibidem at para. 28.

  20. 20.

    Ibidem.

  21. 21.

    Ibidem.

  22. 22.

    Greek Case (1969) 12 Yearbook ECHR 1.

  23. 23.

    The relevant part of the Merits judgment in French reads: ‘Une situation de crise ou de danger public exceptionnelle et imminente’.

  24. 24.

    Greek Case, para 153.

  25. 25.

    Some members of the Commission argued that when the organs of the State are functioning normally, there is no grave threat to the life of the nation and, therefore, emergency measures are not legitimate. However, the majority in the Commission did not follow this reasoning.

  26. 26.

    Ireland v United Kingdom (1978) Series A No 35, at paras. 205 and 212.

  27. 27.

    Ireland v United Kingdom, App 5310/71, ECtHR, Series B, Vol. 23-I (1976–1978), at 117.

  28. 28.

    Brannigan and McBride v United Kingdom, (1993) 17 EHRR 539.

  29. 29.

    Aksoy v Turkey, App 21987/93 (18 December 1996), (1997) 23 EHRR 553, paras. 67–70.

  30. 30.

    Landinelli Silva v Uruguay (1981) HRC Comm No 34/1978; Weinberger v Uruguay (1980) HRC Comm No 28/1978; Salgar de Montejo v Colombia (1982) HRC Comm No 64/1979.

  31. 31.

    Human Rights Committee, General Comment 29, States of Emergency (Article 4), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001).

  32. 32.

    Ibidem at para. 2.

  33. 33.

    Ibidem at para. 3.

  34. 34.

    Ibidem at para. 2. Emphasis added.

  35. 35.

    “The Paris Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a State of Emergency,” American Journal of International Law 79 (1985): 1072.

  36. 36.

    “Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly 7 (1985): 3.

  37. 37.

    O. Gross and F. Ni Aoláin, Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 251–252.

  38. 38.

    Ibidem at 252.

  39. 39.

    Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737, at para. 48.

  40. 40.

    McCann and Others v United Kingdom (1995) 21 EHRR 97, at para 149.

  41. 41.

    Human Rights Committee, General Comment 29, States of Emergency (Article 4), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001), paras 4 and 5.

  42. 42.

    R. St. J. Macdonald, “The Margin of Appreciation,” in The European System for the Protection of Human, ed. R. St. J. Macdonald, F. Matscher, and H. Petzold (Dordrecht/Boston: Kluwer, 1993) at 83.

  43. 43.

    Ibidem.

  44. 44.

    See, e.g.: T. A. O’Donnell, “The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Standards in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly 4 (1982): 474.

  45. 45.

    Ireland v United Kingdom, at para. 78–9.

  46. 46.

    Brannigan and McBride v United Kingdom, (1993) 17 EHRR 539, at para 41.

  47. 47.

    Human Rights Committee, General Comment 29, McCann and Others v United Kingdom (1995), para.4.

  48. 48.

    Ibidem.

  49. 49.

    Landinelli Silva v Uruguay (1981) HRC Comm No 34/1978 at para 8.3.

  50. 50.

    See also: No 54 and 57 of the Siracusa Principles.

  51. 51.

    See, e.g.: P. Kelly, “How 9/11 Changed the World,” The Australian (Sydney), September 8, 2006; R. W. Stevenson, “Cheney Says 9/11 Changed the Rules,” New York Times (New York), December 21, 2005. For thoughtful analysis see, e.g.: R. Jervis, “An Interim Assessment of September 11: What Has Changed and What Has Not?,” Political Science Quarterly 117 (2002): 37.

  52. 52.

    See generally: A. Tomkins, “Legislating Against Terror: The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001,” Public Law (summer 2002): 205; H. Fenwick, “The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001: A Proportionate Response?,” Modern Law Review 65 (2002): 724.

  53. 53.

    Section 23 was repealed in the wake of the House of Lord’s decision in A and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department.

  54. 54.

    Human Rights Act 1998 (Designated Derogation) Order 2001, No. 3644, which came into force on 13 November 2001.

  55. 55.

    A and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, para. 73 (Lord Bingham).

  56. 56.

    Ibidem at para 118 (Lord Hope).

  57. 57.

    Ibidem at paras. 94–96 (Lord Hoffmann).

  58. 58.

    A and others v United Kingdom, App 3455/05 (19 February 2009), (2009) 49 EHRR 29. For a broader analysis of the impact of this decision, see, e.g.: H. Fenwick, “Recalibrating ECHR Rights, and the Role of the Human Rights Act Post 9/11: Reasserting International Human Rights Norms in the “War on Terror”?,” Current Legal Problems 63 (2010): 153.

  59. 59.

    A and others v United Kingdom, para. 177.

  60. 60.

    Ibidem at para. 179.

  61. 61.

    Ibidem at para 178.

  62. 62.

    S. Stephen, “Terrorism: Governments Fuel Fear,” in Terrorism, ed. J. Healey (Balmain: Spinney Press, 2004) at 39.

  63. 63.

    J. E. Mueller, “Terrorism, Overreaction and Globalization,” in No More States?: Globalization, National Self-determination, and Terrorism, ed. R. N. Rosecrance and A. A. Stein (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007) at 48. The 3572 people who died in terrorist attacks in 2001 were three times more likely to die from being hit by lightning.

  64. 64.

    R. Hardin, “Civil Liberties in the Era of Mass Terrorism,” Journal of Ethics 8 (2004): 79.

  65. 65.

    R. Jackson, Writing the War on Terror: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005) at 93.

  66. 66.

    B. M. Jenkins, Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy and Strengthening Ourselves (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2006), 179–184; A. H. Cordesman, The Challenge of Biological Weapons (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005), 29–31.

  67. 67.

    J. Stossel, Give Me a Break (New York: HarperCollins, 2004) at 77.

  68. 68.

    A. O’Neil, “Keeping the Contemporary Threat Environment in Perspective,” Australian Review of Public Affairs (2004). http://www.australianreview.net/digest/2004/05/oneil.html.

  69. 69.

    See, e.g.: A. Roberts, “The “War on Terror” in Historical Perspective,” Survival 47 (2005): 101. It is essential to differentiate between stable democracies and fragile states. While terrorist attacks may have the potential to destabilise fragile states and states experiencing civil strife, the same cannot be said in relation to stable Western democracies.

  70. 70.

    G. Makinen, The Economic Effects of 9/11: A Retrospective Assessment. Report for Congress, 27 September 2002 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 2002).

  71. 71.

    Ibidem.

  72. 72.

    Ibidem. See also: O. A. Jackson, “The Impact of the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks on the US Economy,” March 3, 2008. http://www.journalof911studies.com/volume/2008/OliviaJackson911andUS-Economy.pdf; “How Has September 11 Influenced the Global Economy,” in the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook Reports, Chapter II, December 2001; http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wed/2001/03/index.htm.

  73. 73.

    J. Bram, A. Haughwout, and J. Orr, “Has September 11 Affected New York City’s Growth Potential?,” Economic Policy Review 8 (2002) at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/02v08n2/0211bram/0211bram.html.

  74. 74.

    Ibidem.

  75. 75.

    See, e.g.: H. Chernick, ed., Resilient City: The Economic Impact of 9/11 (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2005); H. W. Richardson, P. Gordon, and J. E. Moore II, eds., The Economic Impacts of Terrorist Attacks (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2005).

  76. 76.

    R. B. Johnson and O. M. Nedelescu, “The Impact of Terrorism on Financial Markets” (International Monetary Fund, working paper WP/05/60, March 2005). http://www.internationalmonetaryfund.com/external/pubs/ft/wp/2005/wp0560.pdf.

  77. 77.

    D. Lawrence, “U.S. Stocks Rise, Erasing Losses on London Bombings, Gap Rises,” Bloomberg News (Online), July 7, 2005, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000103&sid=aflPCIrU37Ns&refer=us.

  78. 78.

    Ibidem.

  79. 79.

    Ibidem.

  80. 80.

    A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department, para. 28 (Lord Bingham).

  81. 81.

    T. R. Hickman, “Between Human Rights and the Rule of Law: Indefinite Detention and the Derogation Model of Constitutionalism,” Modern Law Review 68 (2005): 655.

  82. 82.

    A and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, para 29 (Lord Bingham).

  83. 83.

    Ibidem.

  84. 84.

    Hickman, “Between Human Rights and the Rule of Law…,” at 663. See generally: T. Hickman, Public Law After the Human Rights Act (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), especially Chapter 11 (Derogation and Emergency).

  85. 85.

    Human Rights Committee, General Comment 29, States of Emergency (Article 4), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001), paras 4 and 5.

  86. 86.

    A and others v United Kingdom, paras 180–81.

  87. 87.

    Ireland v United Kingdom, at para. 214.

  88. 88.

    See, e.g.: J. G. Merrills, The Development of International Law by the European Court of Human Rights (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), 37.

  89. 89.

    Ibidem.

  90. 90.

    O. Gross and F. Ní Aoláin, “From Discretion to Scrutiny: Revisiting the Application of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Context of Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly 23 (2001): 638–639.

  91. 91.

    Ibidem.

  92. 92.

    Ibidem.

  93. 93.

    M. Nolan, “Measuring Support for Australian Counter-Terrorism Initiatives and Human Rights: The Impact of Offence Construal, Perpetrator Motive and Siege Mentality,” in Fresh Perspectives on the “War on Terror”, ed. P. Mathew and M. Gani (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2008).

  94. 94.

    Ireland v United Kingdom, at 207.

  95. 95.

    Lawless v Ireland, at 32.

  96. 96.

    See also: O. Gross, ““Once More unto the Breach”: The Systemic Failure of Applying the European Convention on Human Rights to Entrenched Emergencies,” Yale Journal of International Law 23 (1998): 437.

  97. 97.

    I wish to acknowledge the research assistance of Angela Kintominas in reviewing the notifications on the UN Treaty Collection database at http://treaties.un.org/.

  98. 98.

    A. Downer, “Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia,” (Speech to launch the White Paper on International Terrorism, National Press Club, Canberra, 15 July 2004). http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2004/040715_tt.html.

  99. 99.

    M. O’Boyle, “Torture and Emergency Powers under the European Convention on Human Rights: Ireland v the United Kingdom,” American Journal of International Law 71 (1977): 705.

  100. 100.

    It is interesting to note in this context that the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights does not regulate states of emergency, nor does it contain a derogation provision. See generally: F. Ouguergouz, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. A Comprehensive Agenda for Human Dignity and Sustainable Democracy in Africa (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 2003).

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Correspondence to Christopher Michaelsen .

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© 2012 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.

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Michaelsen, C. (2012). Permanent Legal Emergencies and the Derogation Clause in International Human Rights Treaties: A Contradiction?. In: Masferrer, A. (eds) Post 9/11 and the State of Permanent Legal Emergency. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 14. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4062-4_13

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