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16.1 Introduction

Israel’s major natural water sources are hydrologically shared with several of its neighbours: the Jordan Basin with Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and the Palestinians and the mountain and the coastal aquifers with the Palestinians. Understanding the water sector management system requires a thorough analysis of Israel’s international hydro-political interactions.

The new (2011) master plan for Israel’s water sector states that the responsibilities of Israel’s Water Authority are to ensure water supply, sewerage services, the quality and discharge area of effluents and runoff and drainage management. The goals are to ensure quality, quantity and reliability of the water supply, economic efficiency and the health of consumers. The master plan states unambiguously that the quantity of water which will be supplied to the Palestinian Authority (PA) is subject to future political agreement and is unknown at the moment (Israel Water Sector Master Plan 2011, 20). It follows then that achieving the national water goals of the master plan involves a great deal of uncertainty.

Kissinger’s (almost cliché) statement that Israel has no foreign policy but only internal policy (Mizrahi et al. 2001) was reflected in Israel’s water policy arena. It was symbolized by the fact that the Political Division for Water Issues was established within the Peace Process Department in the Israeli Ministry for Foreign Affairs only in 1996. It was then that Israel chose to join many other foreign ministries which had already recognized the importance of ‘water diplomacy’ as a key component of their foreign missions (Kjellen 2007).

The variables which determine the international dimensions of Israel’s policies are heavily influenced by changes in domestic demand and supply which, as explained in other chapters of this book, depend on many factors – from population increase and the expansion of Israel’s economy and concomitant consumer demands to climate change and technological developments and potential changes concerning water allocations to agriculture. As this list of variables continues to grow, Israel’s efforts to ensure its portion of its internationally shared water resources need to be adjusted within the context of its geostrategic interests and positions, its international commitments and the growing global concern with water issues.

This chapter highlights the main characteristics of Israel’s foreign policies in the water sector, how they have evolved, and present conclusions which point to possible future trends.

16.2 Setting the Scene

Four factors affect the overall shaping of the international hydro-political policies of Israel: dependence on trans-boundary sources, institutional changes, new and additional sources and a changing international agenda.

16.2.1 Dependence on International Sources

The dependence of Israel on shared resources both in terms of quantity and quality is a major element in determining its policies (Map 1 refers to all sources mentioned in this chapter). The Upper Jordan River and its tributaries, which flow from the North to the Sea of Galilee, supplied the Israeli water system between 1973 and 2009 an average of 626 MCM/year, representing between 25 and 33% of the total average consumption of fresh water in Israel (Israel Water Authority 2012). Since 2004, this quantity has been reduced owing to a long cycle of drought. In 2008–2009 the overall contribution of this source was down to 312 MCM (Hydrology Service Report 2011). It is understood that in supplying such a large percentage of the country’s water, the Upper Jordan River system is an essential source of significant quantities of fresh water (Map 16.1).

Fig. 16.1
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The relationship between institutional arrangements and types of engagement

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Map 16.1
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Hydro-political setting

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The Sea of Galilee is important in its role as one of the strategic water storage sources which allow management of a unified national system to overcome seasonal and yearly precipitation variables.

Israel currently controls some 80% of the sources of the Upper Jordan River following its conquest of the Golan Heights in 1967. Lebanon is an upstream riparian for the rest of the Jordan’s water. The Yarmouk River is the main year round tributary that feeds the Lower Jordan River. Since the 1994 agreement with Jordan, Israel receives around 25 MCM/year and occasional flood waters. The Lower Jordan River flows out of the southern tip of the Sea of Galilee, just north of the Yarmouk River, on its route to the Dead Sea. Israel uses the western tributaries to the river, while Jordan uses almost all eastern streams flowing into this part of the Jordan River. The reduction in the water flows in the lower Jordan is a result of a gradually increasing extraction of water from the river’s various sources over the past 50 years by the riparians. The Lower Jordan is left with less than 100 MCM/year, more than a billion cubic meters less than its historical average natural flow (Tal and Abed-Rabo 2010, 318). The significance of these sources is in the quantities they contribute to the supply side. Israel shares it with Syria and Jordan which are upstream and uses the River extensively. There is an ongoing dispute with the Palestinians over their right to the Lower Jordan River.

The Mountain Aquifer is a very significant water supply source of Israel and the only one for the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank. It is divided into three sub-aquifers, each with its own hydro-political characteristic: the Western (Yarkon-Taninim) Aquifer – the PA contends that the recharge area within its border is the major source of the aquifer and consequently determines their water rights for most of the aquifer, while Israel, being downstream, emphasizes the natural historical outlets and the storage capacity of the aquifer as the decisive element, historic prior use going back some one hundred years. In the Eastern and Northeastern (Nablus-Gilboa) sub-aquifers, Israel is again located downstream.

In the Coastal Aquifer, the water flows mainly from east to west in a way which weakens the connections between Israel and Gaza. Israel is considered upstream for the groundwater and floods in Nahal Besor.

As a consequence of this sharing of its fresh water resources and its upstream riparian’s (Syria and Lebanon) refusal to recognize its existence as a State, Israel is forced to pursue an international agenda aiming at protecting its fresh water resources, with certain flexibility, in terms of both quantity and quality – thus its very basic interest of water security. The environmental security approach to resources expands the perception of ‘security’ beyond simple military power to economic and social strength and, finally, to the environment and water resources (Frerks 2007; Feitelson 2002).

16.2.2 Institutional Changes

The Madrid Framework for a peace process, which started in 1991 (Eran 2002), marked a beginning of an overall strategic change in the relations between Israel and the other co-riparians including issues related to water sources. Within this framework two parallel negotiation processes were conducted, both involving water issues: a bilateral process between Israel and each of its neighbours and a multilateral one in which the main players were Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians.

The bilateral talks led to two agreements, one between Israel and Jordan and the other between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Thenegotiations with Syria have not culminated in an agreement, but water issues played a significant role in the agenda of these talks (Sagie 2011). These negotiations have brought about a shift from indirect interactions such as the Johnston process (Lowi 1993) or other, limited in scope, business contacts such as the ‘picnic table talks’ with Jordan, mentioned later in this chapter (Wolf 2001a, b), to direct negotiations and full-scope agreements. It also altered Israel’s hydro-political arena, moving away from formal ‘isolation’ to active ‘interaction’, and most importantly Israel has made official international commitments and forged institutions to deal with some of its co-riparians.

Bilateral agreements on water are much more common and easier to reach than multilateral (Wolf 1998). This is particularly the case in the Middle East where Israel’s relations with Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinians are not on the same level that it now enjoys with Jordan. Israel prefers that each water agreement stands on its own, be as comprehensive as possible and, where feasible, not be connected to agreements with other co-riparians.

16.2.3 New and Additional Resources

In the last three decades, Israel has developed two major strategic resources which are independent of its neighbours – reuse of reclaimed effluence for agriculture and desalination. Those resources are significant contributors to the overall water balance of Israel. Israel now uses about 75% of its sewage effluent potential (around 355 MCM/year) for irrigation, which represent around 30% of the country’s irrigation supply (Friedler 2001; Israel Water Authority 2012). In 2002, Israel embarked on a strategic plan of sea water desalination for domestic use. Desalinated water has become the second most important source of water and in 2010 supplied around 300 MCM which represent 25% of Israel’s domestic needs (Israel Water Authority 2012). The plan aims at supplying up to 700 MCM by 2020, which would consist of about 70% of the projected domestic needs (Dreizin et al. 2007). For Israel’s central water management, which was based almost exclusively on the storage capacity of one surface lake and two aquifers and nearly total dependency on fresh water resources, this is a revolutionary development, as discussed in other chapters. From the international hydro-political point of view, its significance is threefold:

  • Large-scale desalination has given Israel an independent source, which is not shared with any of its neighbours.

  • Israel is moving away from patterns of supply and demand which characterize those of its co-riparian neighbours; this may change the nature of the interactions, negotiations and agreements over water.

  • The cost of water has fiscal dimensions which previously were not part of the international water equation.

16.2.4 Changing International Agendas

The international water world touches Israel’s water foreign relations in a number of ways. The most important is the development of international water law. The official position of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs to international law development is ‘Israel is obliged to conform to the Helsinki Rules issued by the International Law Association in 1966 which reflects the International Customary Law…’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009). However, officials in the Water Authority have stated publically that they do not feel that Israel will ever give up any of the shared waters it presently uses. Israel did not sign the 1997 UN Convention for Non-Navigable Uses of International Watercourses, in contrast to Jordan, Syria and Lebanon which are signatories. In any event, the convention is not yet officially in force or binding since it has not received the required number of signatories. In practice Israel does not find it useful to use this convention in its international interactions (Shamir 2004). Israel’s position is that ‘water rights’ is an issue which can only be achieved through practical understandings. As stipulated in the Treaty of Peace with Jordan: ‘The Parties, recognizing the necessity to find a practical, just and agreed solution to their water problems…’ (Treaty of Peace 6, 2). Moreover, the Israeli negotiation team were working under the understanding that the various international documents suggest a set of criteria for allocation of water between international riparians but leave it to the parties to prioritize them and provide no specific algorithm for their quantification.

Other environmental issues are much higher on the diplomatic world’s agenda, for example, the world is paying more attention to neglected resources such as ground water (i.e. the Law of Transboundary Aquifers (United Nations 2009)) and there is a growing role for NGOs in addressing global water issues. All these developments have changed the international hydro-political scene by expanding regional dimensions into more global ones.

A number of important efforts have been made by Israeli–Palestinian NGOs such as the Geneva Initiative and Friends of the Earth Middle East to formulate comprehensive final drafts of Israel-Palestine Water Agreements to be included, hopefully, in a final peace agreement. Both of which have been based on the concept of ‘equitable sharing of common water resources’ in the spirit of international customary law.

16.3 From Unilateralism to Engagement

‘Contention over water has proved to be subordinate to symbolic and territorial issues such as peace, Jerusalem, borders, settlements, and the return of refugees…’ (Allan 2002, 260). Indeed water policies are subordinate to overall political relations and only very rarely determine them.

Thus, Israel’s international hydro-political policies reflect its international relations. Different policy approaches are exercised in the Jordan basin – with Jordan, a full peace including a water treaty; with the Palestinians, an Interim Agreement and an anticipated permanent agreement within the context of the ongoing occupation; with Syria, which remains in a formal state of war, no agreement but with a few rounds of direct negotiations which include a significant element of water arrangements; and with Lebanon no agreement and hostile relations.

This approach is demonstrated, for instance, by Israel’s rejection of the policy which calls for ‘management by basin’ – claiming it is impossible to look at the Jordan River basin as a management unit while two major players do not recognize Israel’s very existence. Syria continues to act unilaterally with respect to the tributaries of the Yarmouk River, while absence of a permanent agreement with the Palestinians also precludes a unified policy towards the basin. Therefore, while Israel’s basic policies which treat water resources as a key element in building the State in a sustainable manner remain intact, the international hydro-politics of Israel can be understood by looking at the evolution from unilateralism and limited ‘tacit understandings’ to an era of engagement.

16.3.1 The Era of Unilateralism

Since the beginning of the twentieth century during the early period of Zionism until October 1991 and the outset of the Madrid process with direct face-to-face negotiations for comprehensive peace agreements, the leading tone of the Israel’s policy was unilateralism.

Unilateral designs for the utilization of the waters were common during the first six decades of the twentieth century – during the rule of the Ottoman Empire and the British and French mandates.Footnote 1 The plans differed and conflicted with each other; details of these various plans can be found in studies by Kliot (1994), Kliot (2000), Haddadin (2002) and Soffer (1999).

International initiatives to conduct indirect coordination within this period did not lead to agreement. The Johnston missions during the 1950s, which were the first and, to date, only integrative effort to include all five riparians, were conducted under heavy clouds of mistrust. They ended without an agreement mainly due to lack of Arab incentive to conclude, as they feared conclusion would imply indirect recognition of Israel.

During this period Israel conducted its policy within a narrow environmental security framework while managing its water resources without or with very limited coordination with any of its co-riparians. The overriding perception of various Israeli Governments was that any water project by a neighbouring entity that affected Israel negatively was casus belli.

The actions which characterized this period are Israel’s skirmishes with the Syrians over the Arab League plan to divert the sources of the Jordan River. The actions by Israel should be seen in the context of the water-security discourse which prevailed in Israel (see, e.g. Zeitoun et al. 2012.) but also against the background of lack of trust, absence of lines of communication and the overall perception of the aim of the Arab countries to eliminate Israel – this time by ‘taking away’ its water resources.

Involvement of the United States was primarily limited to the support of two unilateral projects: the building of Israel’s National Water Carrier and of Jordan’s King Abdullah Canal (KAC).

Through Israel’s victory in the 1967 War, it gained physical control over most of its current water resources. These included the sources of the Jordan River on the Golan, the lengthy occupation of south Lebanon which provided control over the Hazbani-Wazzani Springs and the full control over the Mountain Aquifer. All those, coupled with military superiority and lack of serious diplomatic efforts to improve general relations with its neighbours, made Israeli’s unilateral era nearly monolithic.

The connections with Jordan were somewhat more complicated and an exception. During the period before 1967 when Jordan controlled the West Bank, no particular incidents were registered over the Mountain Aquifer. This can be attributed to lack of attention to groundwater in general, poor supply systems and the relations within Jordan between the two banks of the River Jordan. After the Johnston rounds of mediation, Israel and Jordan complied, without formal agreement, with its conclusions.

The most significant ad hoc and tacit coordination occurred from the mid-1980s until the signing of the Treaty of Peace between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 1994 (referred to also as the Israel-Jordan Treaty of 1994 (or IJ 1994)). The two sides met discreetly to coordinate allocation of water of the Yarmouk River. To affect this, a temporary ‘dam’ made of sandbags was constructed just downstream of the diversion point to KAC in order to regulate the quantities diverted. These actions were approved by the governments of both sides and kept secret. A sense of mutual trust and personal relations developed among the participants during the talks. At the same time, each side stood firmly by its interests. Two of the negotiating principals were later designated after the Madrid Conference to lead the formal negotiations on water between the two countries: Munther Haddadin on the Jordanian side and Noah Kinarti on the Israeli side (Haddadin 2002; Wolf 2001a, b; Shamir and Haddadin 2003).

16.3.2 The Era of Engagement

The agreement with Jordan (1994) and the manner of its implementation, the agreements with the Palestinians (1993, 1995) and their implementation and the activities of the Multilateral Middle East Working Group on Water Resources have one common denominator – an institutional framework within which most of the issues were addressed. This is qualified by the limited role and capabilities of the institutions and their positions in the overall relations (both will be dealt with hereafter) – but their establishment signalled a turning point.

When acting within this new framework, Israel developed a more sophisticated approach which views cooperation and coordination over water security as meeting much broader interests such as international legitimacy, strengthening strategic relations with Jordan, maintaining relative quiet on the Lebanese border and, in general, avoiding steps that would disrupt stability within its neighbours’ political systems.

The negotiations with Syria challenged Israel’s policy makers in a different way by demanding that they prioritize their interests. Israel has two vital interests: the first is to strengthen its water security by maintaining full control over the water sources of the Golan and the second is to eliminate the water-security threat posed by Syria to Israel’s most cherished strategic source – the Sea of Galilee. On the other hand, these interests had to be weighed within the context of the benefits of a full peace agreement with Syria. Although nothing has come of these negotiations and the outcome of the current revolt against Assad in Syria puts all negotiations between the two countries on hold, during those early negotiations, the voices which preferred institutional arrangements which would enable the realization of both interests were not marginal (Sagie 2011).

With respect to Lebanon, Israel’s approach was to maintain stability. This was put to the test when Lebanon took unilateral action in building a relatively small pumping station on the Hazbani-Wazzani Springs in 2002. Constructed on tributaries of the Jordan River, it was perceived in Israel as a strategic water-security threat, if only as a precedent, as the rhetoric of its leaders expressed (Zeitoun et al. 2012). In the era of unilateralism, this probably would have provoked Israeli military retaliation. With Israel’s policy of engagement, the station was allowed to remain.

The evolution of the policies in this era is also the result of the development of other water sources in Israel such as desalination and reused water for irrigation, which reduce weather and political uncertainties and, to a certain extent, allow more flexibility in the management of water resources. Water has become a tool to achieve its broader interests (Feitelson and Rosenthal 2012).

16.4 Hydro-Political Policies in Practice

The following section will highlight some of the most significant hydro-political interactions with each co-riparian. For each the hydro-interaction framework is set forth, followed by institutional agreements and the main hydro-political interests for Jordan and the Palestinians, and, in lieu of institutional agreements, the patterns of interactions and the hydro-political interests for Syria and Lebanon.

16.4.1 Jordan: A Full Agreement

The relations in the water sphere between Israel and Jordan, organized within the Israel-Jordan Treaty of 1994, were the outcome of negotiations between two sovereign states.

The Israeli supremacy in military and economic powers was balanced with its strong desire to engage Jordan in a peace treaty (recognition, strategic relations with an Arab state) and created a relatively equal geopolitical leverage. Relatively symmetrical negotiations led to a more balanced agreement that would be of mutual benefit to both sides. Since the signing of the treaty, there has been continuous cooperation between the two parties and no substantive problems have arisen that have not been addressed amicably (Shamir 2004). It is a comprehensive bilateral agreement as stated in Article 6: ‘With the view to achieving a comprehensive and lasting settlement of all the water problems between them…’ (IJ, Article 6).

16.4.1.1 The Institutional Agreement

Two geographical areas are embraced within the Israel-Jordan water agreement. The Northern area consists of two sections – southeast of the Sea of Galilee where the Yarmouk River forms the common border between the two countries until it enters the Jordan River at Naharayim and the Jordan River from Naharayim south to the point at which Wadi Yabis enters the Jordan River opposite the Israeli settlement of Tirat Zvi. The part of the treaty dealing with the Southern area focuses on the groundwater of the Araba/Arava Valley (all names appear in the treaty in their Arabic and Hebrew forms).

Article 6 of the treaty signed on October 26, 1994, deals with shared water resources, including ‘rightful allocation’ of the waters of the Lower Jordan-Yarmouk Rivers and the ground waters of Wadi Araba-Arava. In recognition of the water insufficiency, Israel and Jordan agree to work cooperatively so as not to harm each other’s water resources and to develop mechanisms that facilitate cooperation including trans-boundary water transfers. Provisions include minimizing waste, preventing contamination, and mutual assistance in alleviating water shortages, transfer of information and joint research (IJ 1994).

According to the treaty, Jordan is entitled to water from the Jordan River, including an extra up to 20 MCM from Israel in the summer period in return for the additional water that Jordan concedes to Israel in winter (paragraph I.1.b of the Annex II, Water-Related Matters of the Israel-Jordan (IJ) Treaty).Footnote 2 The summer transfer to Jordan is from the Jordan River directly upstream of the Deganya gates on the river (IJ I.2.a). The agreement included a unique arrangement in which Jordan owns the pipeline which was constructed in Israel to carry the water from the Jordan River to the King Abdullah Canal (KAC), and Israel owns the wells in the Arava Valley located under the Treaty in Jordan.

Jordan takes its share of Yarmouk water from Adassiya/Point 121. A dam across the Yarmouk is designed to ensure the allocation between the countries according to the agreement – Israel’s share of 13 and 12 MCM from the Yarmouk in summer and winter (the seasons are defined by specific dates), while Jordan is entitled to all the rest (IJ I.1).

The treaty stipulates that all wastewater released into the waterways must be treated to a quality suitable for unrestricted agricultural use. This proviso, together with one for the removal of the saline waters from the Jordan River, is designed to restore the river’s environmental quality.

As part of the peace treaty, the border in the Arava Valley was moved westward, giving Jordan additional land and marked in a way which leaves the above-mentioned 14 wells that Israel had drilled in this area are now in Jordanian territory. Under the treaty, Israel continues to operate these wells, drawing water at the same rates as before. Israel is also entitled to explore for additional groundwater, up to 10 MCM/year, provided that this is hydro-geologically feasible and does no harm to existing Jordanian uses (IJ IV.3).

A Joint Water Committee (JWC) comprised of three members from each country was set up as the implementation mechanism. It sets up schedules and procedures, has established subcommittees for the North (the Jordan River) and the South (the Arava) and may invite experts or advisors.

16.4.1.2 Hydro-Political Interests

Within this framework Israel satisfies a number of its interests:

Supremacy of Geopolitics: ‘…the peace with Jordan is of critical importance for us … the late King Hussein and King Abdullah were true partners for peace. This peace serves the strategic interests of both countries and encourages stability in our region…’ (Prime Minister Netanyahu 7 February 2011).

This policy has been pursued by consecutive Israeli governments for decades. The relatively narrow interest of how much water Israel would obtain was subordinate to the overriding interest of preserving the peace.

This prime interest is demonstrated by the terms of the agreement and by its implementation. The treaty has certain built-in ambiguities which have allowed Jordan to present the allocation as a dramatic increase in quantities (225–295 MCM/year, (Fishhendler 2008)) of water it will receive from the rivers. In the same spirit most of the financial issues are either not mentioned (financial sources for additional water) or are ambiguous (financing the desalinated water). But what is more important in this context is implementation. During years of drought, in the framework of the articles dealing with mutual concessions, Israel continued supplying Jordan during summer time with higher quantities than it actually abstracted during the winter. Perhaps the most significant act which demonstrates Israel’s use of the water to enhance its relations with Jordan is the May 1997 decision of then Minister of Infrastructure Ariel Sharon to supply Jordan with 25 MCM/year. This was justified as part of the implementation of the treaty in which the sides agreed to look together for additional 50 MCM/year and Sharon’s decision refers to Israel’s commitment. The decision was taken against the background of a long cycle of drought to ameliorate Jordan’s urgent need for drinking water.

Overcoming Downstream Position: As a downstream riparian on the Yarmouk, Israel strives to overcome uncertainties resulting from upstream uses and development projects by Syria, Jordan or both. This interest is secured by a commitment in the agreement with Jordan for a fixed quantity of water to Israel (12 MCM/year in summers and 13 MCM/year in winters).

Recognizing the Overall Regional Water Scarcity: As Israel wishes to refrain from the image of the ‘rich water nation’, it is important that the agreement recognizes the overall water scarcity and the need for both sides to look for additional resources.

Preventing Inclusion of a Foreign Partner from Having a Direct Interest in the Sea of Galilee and Separating the Upper and the Lower Jordan River: Israel wished to address Jordan’s need for storage capacity. The agreement says, ‘Jordan concedes to Israel pumping an additional (20) MCM from the Yarmouk in winter in return for Israel conceding to transferring to Jordan during the summer period the quantity specified in paragraphs (2.a) below from the Jordan River…’ (Annex II, I, 2). Paragraph 2.a stipulates the same 20 MCM/year. The way it is phrased does not allow Jordan any interest in the Sea of Galilee. The Sea of Galilee is not mentioned by name in the entire treaty.

New and Additional Sources and Hydro-economic Aspects: Since it embarked on its own large-scale sea water desalination, Israel wishes to share the fiscal burden with its co-riparian. Israel and Jordan are involved in at least one large-scale project – the Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project. Israel participated in the pre-feasibility study which was done by the World Bank between 2007 and 2011 even though it was fully aware that the desalinated water would mainly serve Jordan. Water price is an issue which is constantly on the agenda between the two countries. While Israel generally tries to avoid water trade with its neighbours, the ability to value the desalinated water in a more price-effective way softens its position. In this context it reached an understanding with Jordan in 2011 to supply additional small quantities of water for a higher price than the water, which is supplied according to their original agreement, but cheaper than the price of desalinated seawater. This understanding was not made public except as it appeared in some press reports (see, e.g. Piskin 2011).

16.4.2 Palestinians: An Interim Agreement

The relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority are unstable and since 1993 have experienced many crises, the worst of which was the Second Intifada between 2000 and 2005. Change in international borders and consequently change in sovereignty is one of the most common causes for conflict over shared water resources. In 1967 Israel seized control of the water resources of the West Bank and Gaza. With the 1994 signing of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement between the PLO and Israel and Israel’s 2005 ‘disengagement’ from Gaza, all of Gaza’s water resources (including the distribution systems) were transferred to the Palestinian Authority (PA). When the Interim Agreement was signed in 1995, the PA gained partial control over the water supply systems to the Palestinian population (further details below). The PA and Israel are territorially intertwined on the West Bank. The boundaries between them are yet to be determined. The PA has some jurisdiction over the resources within Area A and Area B. Area C, including water resources, remained under Israeli administration. Thus, Israel and the PA both depend on groundwater from the Mountain Aquifer.

16.4.2.1 The Institutional Agreements

The Declaration of Principles (Oslo 1993): Annex 3 stated that there will be cooperation on water-related research and programmes which would discuss the ‘water rights’ of both sides. Annex 4 refers to more practical aspects such as open water infrastructure, desalination projects and overall regional initiatives.

Gaza-Jericho (1994): The agreement included transfer of the water supply system in Gaza to the Palestinians, who were to become responsible for the management, development and maintenance of water and sewage systems (except for Israeli settlements). In 2005, as part of the ‘disengagement’, the water systems which served the Israeli settlements which had been disbanded were transferred to the Palestinians. At the end of the disengagement, all water and sewage systems in the Gaza Strip were placed under exclusive Palestinian control.

Interim Agreement (1995): This agreement states that Israel recognizes the Palestinians’ water rights in the West Bank and that these are to be finalized in the permanent settlement. It also states that the Palestinians would receive a set amount of water while protecting existing uses. The future needs of Palestinians were defined as an addition of 70–80 MCM per year on top of the existing uses when the agreement was signed (118 MCM per year). Of this supplement, 28.6 MCM will be provided to the West Bank during the interim period (Israeli–Palestinian Interim Agreement 1995 Annex III article 40, 6, 7).

It was emphasized that these additions will be supplied from the hitherto underutilized eastern sub-aquifer. Finally, it was agreed to create a joint committee to implement the management of the aquifer.

The last signed declaration on the issue of water was a joint statement by the heads of the Joint Committee (Kinarati and Sharif) on 31 January 2001, calling for both sides not to damage the infrastructure of water during the violence of the Second Intifada (International Water Law Project 2001).

As the overall relations are unbalanced in terms of sovereignty, military power, economy, etc., the water sphere is unbalanced as well. A significant example of this imbalance is the Joint Water Committee (JWC) which was established to conduct ‘coordinated management’. The committee deals almost entirely with Palestinian issues inasmuch as major Israeli water development projects are connected to the Israeli settlements which the PA oppose and perceive as illegal. Selby (2003) has argued that the Interim Agreement water accord has dressed up domination as cooperation. Throughout the years of its work, the JWC has continued meeting and the water supply systems in the West Bank have been improved significantly, yet in some areas they do not meet the needs of basic services and in other cases of economic development.

The Western or Yarkon-Taninim aquifer is a major source of Israel’s high-quality drinking water. Its recharge area and surface flows are on the West Bank, while the augmentation portion is largely to the west of the 1967 border (Green Line). As a consequence, the Agreement on Water and Sewage (Article 40 of Annex III in Oslo II) is highly detailed in its emphasis on quality issues.

In the Gaza Strip the situation is more geographically clear-cut. Gaza is perched over the southern part of the Coastal Aquifer, to the south of the Israeli portion. Both surface and underground waters flow perpendicular to the coastline so that there is little mixing of the Israeli and Palestinian portions of the aquifer. However, some of the aquifer also extends eastward and inland into southern Israel. In this area, therefore, the Gaza portion of the aquifer is affected by the quantity of water drawn by the Israel side and by the pollutants that affect its quality.

The geopolitical imbalance between the two parties made the water negotiations and the implementation inevitably asymmetrical. In the Interim Agreement negotiations, water policy, including steps towards implementation, was considered by Israel to be a central part of the overall peace process and not subordinate to other negotiating tracks. Nonetheless, once the permanent borders were to be agreed upon there would have to be a more focused negotiation process on water issues. For example, the issue of the Palestinians as riparian to the Jordan River would have to be faced.

The political environment following the Second Intifada and the subsequent breakdown of trust brought a halt to the Oslo process. Since then, conflicting views have emerged within Israeli decision-making circles as to the types of water management structures which should be sought and secured. The rounds of talks within the last decades between Israel and the PA did not change the daily water relations but did expand the hydro-political discourse.

16.4.2.2 Hydro-Political Interests

In 2012 Israel and the PA continue to act in accordance with the same hydro-political conceptual frameworks: (a) they both wish to maintain a supply system under the partial agreement which, by its nature, entails many difficulties (the division of the land into various jurisdictions is one example); (b) the fact that the agreement was signed for a period of 5 years and almost 13 years have passed since this expiration date, but absent a new agreement, the old one remains the law (thus, there has been no adjustment for population growth and the need for change in allocation); and (c) the two sides are constantly anticipating permanent status negotiations and a formal agreement; their main aim is to avoid creating a precedent which may be used by the other side for ‘gains’ in the water sphere but as or more importantly reflect on other issues such as borders or settlements. At the same time they are constantly engaged in a political public relations battle in the international arena: for example, the constant claim by Israel over the non-treated sewage by the PA as a mark of ‘irresponsibility’ and the claims by the PA over the unequal allocation of water as the characteristic approach of a hegemonic power. In response, the Palestinians point out the extensive flow of sewage from Israeli cities and settlements into Palestinian areas such as the massive flow of raw sewage from the eastern areas of Jerusalem to the West Bank and Jordon Valley and from Kiryat Arbah. It is the hydro-political climate that leads the two sides to ‘play’ the game in arenas other than the purely bilateral one and to emphasize the need for international legitimacy to support their positions.

The Point of Departure: The Interim Agreement states: ‘Israel recognizes the Palestinian water rights in the West Bank. These will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations and settled in the Permanent Status Agreement relating to the various water resources’ (Israeli–Palestinian Interim Agreement 1995 Annex III article 40, 1). Israel’s position is that ‘water rights’ are the outcome of a practical understanding (as was the case with Jordan) while the Palestinians insist on looking for some ‘objective’ source for determining their ‘rights’ such as customary international law.

With regard to the Jordan River basin, Israel’s position is to leave this discussion to the time when the borders are marked and agreed upon. During the interim period Israel has done its utmost to avoid any precedent in which the Palestinians would even implicitly be accepted as a riparian to the basin. For example, in the context of the World Bank feasibility study on the Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project (2005), the trilateral agreement (including Jordan) gives the Palestinians the standing of ‘beneficiary party’.

Quantity: While Israel understands the need to establish a reallocation procedure within an agreement, it wishes to do so within the parameter mentioned in the Interim Agreement concerning the future needs of the Palestinians, namely, 70–80 MCM/year. The data gathered within the interim period concerning the Eastern Aquifer may change the estimated capacity of the water resources. The Palestinian position is based on the argument that current uses were achieved as part of an illegal occupation and as such cannot be recognized. Their demands are as follows: a redistribution of the water resources of the whole of the Eastern, Western and Northeastern aquifer systems, on the basis of equitable and reasonable distribution principles (Barghouthi 2004).

Israel prefers, within a permanent agreement, to agree to a fixed quantity for the Palestinians in order not to be responsible for future shortages that may result from economic development activities or from the uncertainties concerning the size of the Palestinian population in the future. It has been pointed out that the fixed allocation formulation presents certain problems in an area of highly variable rainfall. The Geneva Initiative draft water agreement solves this problem by enabling a degree of variation in water allocations to the partners based on changes in the hydrological conditions. The return of Palestinian refugees anywhere between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River would change current predictions of water needs.

Quality: As noted previously, Israel is a downstream riparian in the Mountain Aquifer. Feeling vulnerable, Israel will first and foremost focus on quality issues which are connected both to amount pumped out of the aquifer and the treatment of all sewage effluent. Feitelson (2002) has pointed out that the internal Israeli discourse is beginning to shift to concerns over water quality and therefore recognition of the need for joint management of shared aquifers (Feitelson and Haddad 2000; Feitelson 2000; Mizyed 2000).

New and Additional Sources: While all sides recognize that the available quantities will not be sufficient and that there is a need for new and additional water resources, the argument will focus on the point at which Palestinians should opt for desalination and who shall bear the costs. Israel has suggested to the Palestinians a possibility of building desalination plants for the West Bank on the Mediterranean coast, promising an exterritorial passage to the future border. There is a question of the economic viability of such a scheme, bearing in mind the differences in altitude between sea level and major Palestinian urban areas. The Palestinians also claim that once they are allocated their ‘water rights’, they will need to desalinate for the West Bank. The need in Gaza is acknowledged, and the PA is promoting a desalination plant of about 55 MCM/year in Gaza – Israel supports this initiative (Union for the Mediterranean 2012).

16.4.3 Syria Nonactive War and Negotiations

Israel and Syria have been in a formal state of war since the establishment of the State of Israel. The most significant event in terms of control over territory was Israel’s conquest of the Golan Heights in 1967. Since the 1973 war and the subsequent disengagement agreement, the overall relations between Israel with Syria have stagnated. From 1991 onwards, a few rounds of negotiations have taken place; however, none have culminated in a peace agreement. Meanwhile, Syria has strengthened its alliance with the radical anti-Israeli axis of Iran and Hezbollah. How the success or failure of the current revolt against Assad may affect Syria’s relations with Israel remains to be seen.

16.4.3.1 Patterns of Hydro-Political Interactions

Perception of Existential Threat: Mutual suspicion and lack of trust characterize the interactions between the countries. The water-security interest of Israel in the headwaters of the Upper Jordan River has been the dominant motive for its policies. Israel perceives the threat to the water resources as part of the overall war aimed at its elimination, as Syria continues to reject the very existence of Israel and Israel reacts accordingly. It is against this background that the borders and water nexus played a major role in the discourse between the countries.

Diplomacy and Military Power: During Israel’s first two decades of existence, disputes over trans-boundary water issues between Israel and Syria escalated into violent incidents. In the 1950s and 1960s, both sides tried to block the other’s unilateral water projects (Wolf 1995). Although conquest of the Golan (in 1967) was not driven by water issues, but it resulted in Israel’s acquiring physical control over the watershed of the Sea of Galilee.

Unilateral Actions: The absence of joint institutions or any other method of direct, or even indirect, communication on trans-boundary water management has added to the mistrust between the countries with respect to water issues. The hydro-political arena became subordinate to the overall geopolitical relationships – and both sides opted for unilateral actions.

Israel uses its physical control over the Golan Heights in order to maintain its almost full usage of the Upper Jordan River and to build projects such as storage dams on the Heights. Syria uses its control over the tributaries of the Yarmouk River (which is the part of the Jordan Basin to which Israel is a riparian) to exploit it for the most part unilaterally with only partial coordination with Jordan.

Direct Negotiations: During several rounds of negotiations from 1991 to the present, no agreement has been reached. How much of this can be attributed to Israel’s water interest can be gleaned from examining how negotiators treated the water issue in the event that the Golan were to be returned to Syrian sovereignty. The chief Israeli negotiator, Uri Sagie (Sagie 2011, 154), reported that a detailed plan was prepared by the Israeli negotiation team based on a specific interpretation of the ‘June 1967 lines’ and a set of understandings that Israel sought. For example, the water quantity interest focused on Syria’s agreeing to allocate the bulk of the water to Israel’s needs while using the rest for future civilian Syrian settlement on the Golan. The quality of water streaming to the Sea of Galilee would be addressed through the limitation over future Syrian agricultural activities west of the watershed line on the Golan. Even the question of the Sea of Galilee, of importance for Israel, was addressed by a set of possible solutions which included the option of Syria’s ‘touching the waters but not using them’. At the end of the day, the negotiations in 1999 failed in a meeting between Assad and US President Clinton over Assad’s understanding that his demand for full Israeli withdrawal ‘from all the territories it conquered in 1967 including the North-Eastern part of the Sea of Galilee would not be fulfilled’ (Sagie 2011, 167–168). Since the water issue has been perceived as a security issue, we can expect that as long as the political differences and the climate of mistrust between the parties continue, the water issues will be treated accordingly.

16.4.4 Lebanon: A Hostile Environment

The relations between Israel and Lebanon have been marked by continuing violent hostilities over the last 40 years. In the years 1976, 1982 and 2000, Israel occupied parts of southern Lebanon for long periods of time. In 2000, it withdrew to the internationally recognized borders as marked and recognized by the UN. A relatively small area (Shabaa farms and the village of Ghajar) remained in Israeli hands due to the uncertainty of the border in those places between Syria and Lebanon. Those areas bear some significance as to the sources of the Jordan River.

Lebanon’s position towards Israel is subordinate to the Syrian position either at times due to a strong military presence of Syria in Lebanon or through the strong Syrian support of Hezbollah, a dominant political and military group within Lebanon which calls for the destruction of Israel. The Iranian involvement through the Hezbollah is another issue at hand. While Israel is considered the hegemonic power in an unbalanced overall power struggle, the Hezbollah claims to possess deterrence capabilities against Israel.

16.4.4.1 Patterns of Hydro-interactions

As opposed to the other co-riparians, Israel has no institutional or ongoing interactions with Lebanon over water resources – the last indirect communications were in 2002 in the context of Lebanon’s construction of its pumping station.

Perception and Images: The Lebanese believe that Israel seeks to take the water sources by force. For example, Lebanese newspapers claim that Israel is diverting the water from the Litany in some ‘magical’ way and that the use of the Hazbani is unfair due to Israel’s powerful methods of protecting its use of this source (Zeitoun et al. 2012).

On the other hand, given Lebanon’s interest in Israel’s destruction or causing it heavy damage, Israel perceives hydro-politics from a security perspective. Dependence on the tributaries of the Jordan River requires the maintenance of the quantities and quality of this source.

Unilateral Acts: While both sides have refrained from taking unilateral actions related to small water projects, thereby avoiding rounds of conflict, mutual distrust continues to block any form of cooperation.

16.5 A Regional Approach

There are multiple common issues in the water sphere shared by Israel and the co-riparians and also with the wider circle of countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). By jointly tackling common issues, there are gains for all participants. The Middle East Multilateral Water Working Group was established within the framework of the Madrid Conference. It continues to function, albeit to a lesser degree than when it operated in the 1990s. The group includes Jordanians, Palestinians, Israelis and members from the MENA region such as Morocco and Oman. Syria and Lebanon refused to take part in the working group – once again a missed opportunity to work closer in the wider basin forum. A number of international donors are involved as project leaders. In a wider circle, the groups have worked on some common issues, such as sharing know-how in the context of water resources management.

For the smaller group (the Core Parties) consisting of representatives from Jordan, the PA and Israel, in which all three parties were equal by the power of veto, the multilateral track has offered an opportunity to (1) reduce the intensity of conflict over water by advancing win-win solutions in the water sector and (2) make use of the process of reducing conflict over water as confidence building measures between the parties, which were intended to have an impact on the wider political conflict. The action strategy was based on creating a large number of projects, varying in scale and areas of concern. Projects included a comparison of legal systems within the Jordan River basin, data banks and capacity building projects and the establishment of the Middle East Desalination Research Center (MEDRC). Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority are members of the governing body of MEDRC, which decided on a few special programmes aimed at capacity building in the desalination sector for the Palestinians.

Within the multilateral framework, attention has also been given to development of new and additional water resources. A joint declaration for the development of new and additional water resources (Declaration of Principles 1996) was signed among the parties. In several projects sea water desalination was the ultimate proposed solution for the long run – for example, the ‘Survey on Demand and Supply in the Core Parties’ (1998) (Middle East Regional Study 2001). However, the activities within this multilateral framework, as pioneering as they were at the time, did not dramatically alter the overall hydro-political relations. Moreover, the anticipated trust-building spillover effects on the relations among the parties in other realms of conflict did not occur. This highlights our conclusion that it is the overall international relations which determine the hydro-political agenda and not vice versa.

16.6 Conclusions

Israel water management is characterized by a long struggle with scarcity. It has demonstrated its willingness to do the utmost in efficient water management steps from pricing policies to the use of reused water for irrigation to a large-scale, relatively expensive sea water desalination scheme. Since it shares most of its resources with its neighbours, a primary concern of its management is ‘water security’.

As long as there was no recognition of its right to exist as a State by all of its co-riparians, Israel perceived the water issues as part of the overall attempt to eliminate it. While no lines of communication existed, Israel’s approach to water conflicts was unilateral, applying hegemonic, military power to the conflict. This was an era marked by unilateralism. Once the way was open for institutional arrangements through agreements with Jordan and the Palestinian Authority, water issues policies were addressed within the broader geopolitical security framework that took into account military strategic, economic and international political considerations.

Combined with other strategic interests Israel is opting towards establishing institutions and agreements, replacing power methods with trust and cooperation. As can be seen in the chart using the Sadoff and Grey scale, water cooperation goes hand in hand with the overall improvement of the relations (Sadoff and Grey 2005; Fig. 16.1).

The current water relations with the Palestinians is dominated by the nature of occupation and the asymmetric balance between occupiers and occupied. When Israelis and Palestinians sit down at the peace table, the pressures on both peoples will frame the discussion. In such circumstances, Israel’s environmental security concern will become subordinate to the broader geopolitical issues, and the negotiations on water are likely to be more balanced.

An Israeli–Palestinian peace agreement would require modification of the Israel-Jordan Water Treaty should the western bank of the Jordan in the lower part of the River, now held by Israel, become part of the Palestinian State or be put under long-term international supervision. Under such circumstances, a bilateral agreement between a Palestinian State and Jordan would complicate the situation.

Should Israel and Syria arrive at a peace agreement, a new Quadrilateral Accord would have to be developed, inasmuch as Syria will control the Jordan River headwaters. This will demand very detailed understandings and verification methodologies. This suggests that the complex water resource system in this part of the Levant will require an accord which makes provision for the interests of all the concerned parties.

All parties will have to make long-term capital commitments to developing new sources and abating pollution. Sea water desalination is emerging as the only viable large-scale source of supply. As part of a broader solution to the water problem, there are three desalination programmes: the Israeli scheme, which has already been implemented in part; the Jordanian plan to either desalinate water of the Gulf of Aqaba as a stand-alone or as part of the Red Sea-Dead Sea Canal regional project; and the Palestinian plan to build a large-scale desalination plant in Gaza, which would also serve the West Bank and depend on an agreement with Israel. Introduction of desalination to the region will have much wider ramifications including (a) the exploitation of cheaper resources such as reused water, (b) significant economic reforms which will reduce agricultural sector uses and (c) wider forms of ‘water trade’ based on the ability to desalinate on the seashore the high economic cost of transferring water for long distances and the ability to produce water as an industrial product with a price tag.

Water has historically been a source of both conflict and peaceful relations among states. It is to be hoped that a strategy of accommodation and sharing will lead the way, not only in the Israeli–Palestinian peace process, but as a guide to the peaceful resolution of other conflicts between Israel and its neighbours.