Skip to main content

Cultures and Transformations of Vulnerability

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Human Being @ Risk

Part of the book series: Philosophy of Engineering and Technology ((POET,volume 12))

  • 1469 Accesses

Abstract

The attitude we take towards vulnerability depends on our representations and imaginations of it. In this section, the question is not only ‘how do I imagine myself being hurt by this or that particular object’, or ‘how do I imagine the possibility of that particular event’, which is the imaginative dimension of being vulnerable which I explained in the previous chapter, but also what kind of attitude we take towards existential vulnerability in general. The conscious experience of vulnerability is not a single happening, but occurs frequently at many different times. As a result, we discern patterns of vulnerability. Moreover, we are the kind of beings to whom things do not just happen: we take an attitude towards what happens and try to give meaning to those experiences and find meaning in those experiences. These imaginative-representational, cognitive, meaning-giving, and meaning-finding processes can be called cultures of vulnerability. I write ‘cultures’ rather than ‘culture’, since these processes vary with time, place, and the people involved. Cultures of vulnerability, then, are shaped by attempts to imagine, understand, and give meaning to human vulnerability. This can take place at various levels: persons, groups, organisations, professions, societies, and ‘civilisations’. Going beyond particular experiences of vulnerability, a culture of vulnerability reaches a certain level of abstraction and distance and generates ideas—for instance, ideas about death. Representations, too, start leading their own lives in the form of art. But at the same time, these ideas and representations do not stand alone from experiences of vulnerability; they colour subsequent experiences, forming a feedback loop. Cultures of vulnerability—at various levels—co-constitute our vulnerability experiences. We live in cultures of vulnerability. I already suggested above that our imaginative and emotional vulnerability experience is mediated by our ‘mental’ life. But this mental life does not stand alone, separate from the culture in which we live. Our imaginative and emotional experience of vulnerability is culturally mediated. For instance, not only our personal history but also the history of our society is relevant to vulnerability experiences. In addition, cultures shape our experiences as well as our practices. In the previous chapter, I argued that vulnerability cannot be understood apart from action. What we do makes us vulnerable. But action is not just about single actions. Just as there are patterns in our experience of vulnerability, there are also patterns in our actions, usually called habits. And actions and habits are part of a constellation of actions, objects, and ideas. Let us call them practices. Practices of vulnerability, then, are intertwined with experiences of vulnerability.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 149.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 199.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 199.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Epicurus famously argued in his Letter to Menoeceus that since death is deprivation of sensation, there is nothing terrible in death and it should therefore not concern us.

  2. 2.

    Medicalisation of a practice means that problems in that practice come to be defined as medical problems.

  3. 3.

    See, for example, (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/art/3672813/Artist-Gregor-Schneider-plans-to-put-dying-person-on-show.html)

  4. 4.

    Perhaps there are not only qualitative transformations; maybe they also have a quantitative direction. Is there a ‘dialectic’ of culture at work (in the sense Adorno and Horkheimer used the term), by which I mean that the very strategies to overcome vulnerability only increase it? Does the cumulative accretion of layers of vulnerability, or extensions of vulnerability, alter the human way of being and human existence?

  5. 5.

    Note, however, that Girard even sees all individual death as a way of keeping up the community: ‘The death of the individual has something of the quality of a tribute levied for the continued existence of the collective. A human being dies, and the solidarity of the survivors is enhanced by his death’ (Girard 1972, p. 255).

  6. 6.

    Note the not so common relational dimension of vulnerability in this formulation. Turner writes that technology and culture can be seen as mediations between the scarcity of natural resources and the vulnerable human body (Turner 2007). But this approach wrongly understands vulnerability as a feature of the body, rather than as a feature of the relation between us and the world.

  7. 7.

    Note that language too is such a building, a ‘house’ in which we live and in which we hope to be protected from danger.

  8. 8.

    The Hindu tradition already understood the human condition as one of suffering due to desire: many desires are never met, which leaves us frustrated, and if they are met, new desires take their place. Schopenhauer was also influenced by this kind of view of the self.

  9. 9.

    My summary of Kierkegaard on this theme has benefited from Dreyfus and Rubin (1991), who did a good job at explaining the progression through different stages or spheres.

  10. 10.

    Note that by commitment Kierkegaard does not mean a choice, then we would remain in the ethical sphere—this seems to be the case for Sartre’s idea of radical choice. Rather, commitment seems to have the mixture between activity and passivity Kierkegaard has tried to retrieve from the ancient world. But its precise meaning remains somewhat unclear.

References

  • Beck, Ulrich. 1992. Risk society: Towards a new modernity. Trans. M. Ritter. London: Sage Publications.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bostrom, Nick. 2005. The fable of the dragon tyrant. Journal of Medical Ethics 31(5): 273–277.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bourdieu, Pierre. 1990. The logic of practice. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • De Mul, Jos. 2006. De domesticatie van het noodlot: De wedergeboorte van de tragedie uit de geest van de technologie. Kampen: Klement.

    Google Scholar 

  • Descartes, René. 1637. Discours de la méthode. Trans. L.J. Lafleur. Discourse on method. In Discourse on method and meditations. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dewey, John. 1929/1951. Experience and nature. In The later works 1925–1953, vol. 1: 1925, ed. J.A. Boydston. Carbondale/Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dreyfus, Hubert L., and Jane Rubin. 1991. Kierkegaard, division II, and the Later Heidegger. In Being-in-the-world: A commentary on Heidegger’s being and time, division I. Cambridge, MA/London: The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Foucault, Michel. 1976. La volonté du savoir. Trans. R. Hurley. The history of sexuality, vol. I. London: Pelican Books, 1981.

    Google Scholar 

  • Foucault, Michel. 1977. Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Foucault, Michel. 1988. Technologies of the self. In Technologies of the self: A seminar with Michel Foucault, ed. L.H. Martin, H. Gutman, and P.H. Hutton. Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Girard, René. 1972. La Violence et le sacré. Paris: Bernard Grasset. Trans. P. Gregory. Violence and the sacred. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kierkegaard, Søren. 1843. Either/or: A fragment of life, vol. 1. Trans. D.F. Swenson and L.M. Swenson. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944.

    Google Scholar 

  • Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1945. Phénoménologie de la perception. Paris: Gallimard. Trans. C. Smith. Phenomenology of perception. Abingdon/New York: Routledge, 2002.

    Google Scholar 

  • Turner, Bryan S. 2001. The end(s) of humanity: Vulnerability and the metaphors of membership. The Hedgehog Review 3(2): 7–32.

    Google Scholar 

  • Turner, Bryan S. 2003. Biology, vulnerability and politics. In Debating biology: Sociological reflections on health, medicine and society, ed. S.J. Williams, L. Brike, and G.A. Bendelow. London/New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Turner, Bryan S. 2007. Culture, technologies and bodies: The technological Utopia of living forever. The Sociological Review 55: 19–36.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Turner, Bryan S. 2008. The body and society: Explorations in social theory. London: Sage.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Coeckelbergh, M. (2013). Cultures and Transformations of Vulnerability. In: Human Being @ Risk. Philosophy of Engineering and Technology, vol 12. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6025-7_4

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics