Abstract
The history of philosophy can be described as a history of alternating inflations and deflations1: In order to solve certain problems philosophers introduce new concepts and new entities; their opponents (positivists or reductionists) then try to annihilate these new concepts and entities. Because of this situation, even in philosophy we must steer a middle course between waste and meanness, between dissipation and parsimony. Switzerland’s economy is a good example of such a middle course. On the occasion of the anniversary of Anton Marty’s death we should ask ourselves whether we should not take this Swiss philosopher (perhaps we should say: this Austrian philosopher from Switzerland) as an example of economy in philosophy.
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References
I borrow these terms from Richard L. Cartwright (‘Negative Existentials’, The Journal of Philosophy 57 (1960), 629–639), who in turn expresses his indebtedness to Isaiah Berlin (‘Logical Translation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 50 (1949–50), 157–188).
Richard L. Cartwright, ‘Propositions’, in: R. J. Butler (ed.), Analytical Philosophy — First Series (Oxford 1962, reprint: Oxford 1966), 81–103, cf. 92 ff.
Marty developed his doctrine of the judgement-contents step by step. There was an interesting reciprocal influence between Marty and Brentano in the development of this doctrine. From 1901 on Brentano held the view that grammatical abstracta like redness etc. are mere linguistic fictions. Marty agreed with Brentano and went even further by claiming that judgement-contents are also linguistic fictions, a view Brentano did not initially accept. Each of the two, Brentano as well as Marty, had convinced the other so that they had interchanged their positions by 1904: Brentano now took not only grammatical abstracta but also judgement-contents to be fictions, whereas Marty still considered abstracta, but no longer judgement-contents, as fictions. Cf. Anton Marty, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, Vol. I (Halle a. S. 1908, reprint: Hildesheim-New York 1976; from now on: U 336, 392 ff.; Anton Marty, Zur Sprachphilosophie — Die ‘logische’, ‘lokalistische’ und andere Kasustheorien (Halle a. S. 1910; from now on: Sprachphilosophie), 94 ff., 97; Anton Marty, Raum und Zeit, edited from the posthumous works by Josef Eisenmeier, Alfred Kastil, Oskar Kraus (Halle a. S. 1916), 49, 55 f.; Oskar Kraus in: Franz Brentano, Wahrheit und Evidenz (Leipzig 1930, reprint: Hamburg 1962), 209 f.; and in: Anton Marty, Gesammelte Schriften, edited by Josef Eisenmeier, Alfred Kastil, Oskar Kraus, Vol. I, Part 1 (Halle a. S. 1916), 36 f. (note 1). In the posthumous works of Marty there are hints of a return to his original position and to Brentano’s thesis that judgement-contents are mere fictions; cf. Anton Marty, Nachgelassene Schriften. Aus ‘Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie’ I: Psyche und Sprachstruktur, edited with an introduction and comments by Otto Funke (Bern 1940, 2nd edition: Bern 1965; from now on: Psyche), 223.
In part, these are Marty’s own examples; cf., e.g., U 309 f. and 329.
Marty was aware of this peculiarity of names for designating judgement-contents as becomes clear from (U 308.
Cf. U 292–296.
U 293 and Sprachphilosophie, 62 (note). Later on Marty revised this view; cf. Psyche, 149 ff. and the editor’s comment on p. 28 of the introduction.
U 293, 297, 301 (note 1) and Anton Marty, Nachgelassene Schriften. Aus ‘Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie’ II: Satz und Wort. Eine kritische Auseinandersetzung mit der üblichen grammatischen Lehre und ihren Begriffsbestimmungen, edited by Otto Funke (Reichenberg 1925, reprint: Bern 1950), 32.
U 295,312–317.
Cf. U 295–297, and 299, 324 and 360.
U 303, 304, 324, 360 f.
U 297; cf. also Psyche, 230. We can obtain neither the concept nor knowledge of the necessary without the concept and knowledge of the impossible according to Marty. We can only know what is necessary because its opposite is evidently impossible and because all immediate apodictic insights are negative in character; cf. U 314 (note 1). There are other passages, however, where Marty gives the definition: x is impossible if and only if necessarily x is not (U 317 and 321).
U 299 f. The ‘level’-terminology is not Marty’s, but he was aware of the distinction as emerges from U 308, 361 and 484 f.
This can be found, at least as a suggestion, in U 324, 360 and 425.
Cf. U 293, 361 and 391 (note 2) and Oskar Kraus in: Anton Marty, Gesammelte Schriften I/1, 33; the term ‘state of affairs’ (Sachverhalt) is sometimes used by Marty instead of ‘judgement-content’ (Urteilsinhalt), e.g., in U 234, 297, 403 and 405. Sometimes Marty also uses the term Sachlage as, e.g., in U 296, 298 (note 1), 324 and 432. Moreover, in analogy to Sachverhalt Marty also formed the term Wertverhalt for the content of emotions; cf. U 421.
U 294 (note 1) and 430; occasionally Marty also says Tatbestand instead of ‘fact’ (Tatsache), e.g., U 361.
Cf. U 293, 399, 426 f., 430, 432, 496 and Oskar Kraus in: Anton Marty, Gesammelte Schriften I/1, 33 and 36.
U 293 f., 418, 426 f. and 481.
U 292, also cf. 360, 374, 440 and 496. Marty had attributed this role to the judgement-contents already in 1884, in his paper ‘Über subjektlose Sätze und das Verhältnis der Grammatik zur Logik und Psychologie III’, Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie 8 (1884), 292–340, cf. 301.
U 303, 304, 360, Psyche, 230.
U 294.
U 308.
U 240, 361 and 426.
U 361 and 483 f.; cf. however the misleading formulation at U 240 that the being or non-being of A is the ‘object of assertion and denial’.
U 479–489; cf. 240, 244, 246, 298.
U 240 and 298.
U 295, 296, 369 f., 401, 402, 404.
U 404. It is because he accords the role of truth-makers but not that of truth-bearers to judgement-contents that Marty fails to understand Bolzano’s sentences-in-themselves. Marty completely misunderstands Bolzano’s sentences-in-themselves as contents of possible true judgements (U 361) and, on the basis of this misunderstanding, criticizes Bolzano unjustly. Marty, thinking of his own judgement-contents as truth-makers, objects that Bolzano should have accepted only true but no false sentences-in-themselves. But Bolzano’s sentences-in-themselves, unlike Marty’s judgement-contents, are not truth-makers, but truth-bearers. Unfortunately, this misinterpretation also influenced Marty’s pupil Hugo Bergmann and his — otherwise meritorious — book on Bolzano (Das philosophische Werk Bernard Bolzanos, Halle a. S. 1909, reprint: Hildesheim-New York 1970). Bergmann admitted his mistake later as is shown in the following passage from an unpublished letter of May 8, 1967: ‘Your criticism of my assertion in the book I wrote nearly 60 years ago now seems to me to be entirely correct. When I wrote the book I was under the influence of the polemic that was then going on between my esteemed teacher Anton Marty and Brentano. This polemic, as you are well aware, concerned the question whether the truth of our judgements has to be explained by postulating the existence of truths-in-themselves, as Marty held, a view Brentano in his second period completely rejected. This led me to apply to Bolzano’s doctrine an epistemological yardstick which was far removed from the concerns of this doctrine. Today I would completely accept the approach you set out in your letter.’ (I am grateful to the late Professor Bergmann for giving me permission, in a postscript to his letter, to publish it.)
E.g., U 329; cf. also 314, 484 f. and 496. According to Marty, the primary truth-bearers are acts of judgement; if one says of other things such as judgement-contents that they are true, one is using the word ‘true’ in the sense of ‘being’ or ‘real’ or ‘factual’, U 307–316 (especially 309–312) and 403.
Cf. U 294 (note 1). The object A is, according to Marty, not even a proper part of the being of A in the strong sense of the word.
U 392 and 401.
U 295, 392, 393 f., 401–405, 451, Gesammelte Schriften II/2, 117.
U 293, 295, 306, 312–315, 359, 360 and 400 f.
U 404 f.
U 321, 401, 480, Sprachphilosophie, 97.
U 319 f.
U 321, 358, Raum und Zeit, 99 f., 147.
U 320.
U 321.
U 328 f., 496, Raum und Zeit, 229, 241 ff.
U 329.
Cf. Alexius Meinong, Über Annahmen (Leipzig 1902), 189; in the second edition (Leipzig 1910) Meinong repeats this passage (64 f.) and answers Marty’s objections (66 ff.).
U 328 f.
U 401.
Sprachphilosophie, 97.
U 329.
U 9.
U 329: ‘And all this has of course nothing to do with that type of universal validity that one attributes to every true sentence, in opposition to the relativism that destroys the concept of truth. That something is true only for me and not for another person conflicts quite certainly with the nature of the true. But this has nothing to do with any alleged timelessness of truth.’ Cf. also U 393 f.
U 293 f., 426 f. Brentano and Marty got into the problem they wanted to solve as a result of their modification of the traditional correspondence theory of truth. They translated the word ‘res’ in the Latin formulation of the correspondence-theory simply as ‘object’ which is not the only possible translation of ‘res’ as a dip into a Latin dictionary will show.
U 295; cf. also 369 f. and 404.
U 404 (cf. also the other references in note 32).
U 329 (cf. the quotation in note 48).
Some such ‘bridge-principles’ are listed in Edgar Morscher & Peter Simons, ‘Objektivität und Evidenz’, in: Josef Seifert/Fritz Wenisch/Edgar Morscher (eds.), Vom Wahren und Guten — Festschrift für Balduin Schwarz zum 80. Geburtstag (Salzburg 1982), 205–220, cf. 216.
Cf., e.g., Jaakko Hintikka, The Intentions of Intentionality and other New Models for Modalities (Dordrecht 1975), 80.
Cf., e.g., Robert Stalnaker, ‘Propositions’, in: Alfred F. MacKay/Daniel D. Merrill (eds.), Issues in the Philosophy of Language (New Haven 1976), 79–91, cf. 80.
Cf. Stalnaker, ‘Propositions’, in: Alfred F. MacKay/Daniel D. Merrill (eds.), Issues in the Philosophy of Language (New Haven 1976), 79–91, cf. 80.
For the distinction between a function concept or a function in intension and a function in extension cf. Alonzo Church, Introduction to Mathematical Logic, Vol. I (Princeton, New Jersey, 1956), 16.
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Morscher, E. (1990). Judgement-Contents. In: Mulligan, K. (eds) Mind, Meaning and Metaphysics. Primary Sources in Phenomenology, vol 3. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0505-4_13
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