Abstract
The last fifteen years has seen the development of two independent but co-evolving ideas: (1) the idea that the mind can be functionally decomposed,and (2) the idea that cognition is computation.
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Notes
J. A. Fodor (1983) The Modularity of Mind, Bradford/MIT.
Some founding texts for this theory are D.C. Dennett (1978) Brainstorms, Bradford, and W.G. Lycan (1981) ‘Form, Function and Feel’, Journal of Philosophy LXXVIII, 24–50
For a particularly good exposition of this point see D.C. Dennett (1978) ‘Skinner Skinned’, Brainstorms, Bradford.
Lycan, in his 1981 (see op. cit.,note 1) discussion of ‘qualia’ objections, particularly emphasises this point.
A classic text on vision is D. Marr (1982) Vision, Freeman. On imagery, see S.N. Kosslyn (1980) Image and Mind, Harvard. Perhaps needless to say, both Marr’s and Kosslyn’s work is highly controversial.
D.C. Dennett (1986) ‘The Logical Geograph of Computational Approaches: A View from the East Pole’, The Representation of Knowledge and Belief, M. Brand and R.M. Harnish (eds. ), University of Arizona Press.
Patricia Churchland (1980) ‘A Perspective on Mind-Brain Research’, Journal of Philosophy LXXVII, pp. 185–207, and Paul Churchland (1981) ‘Propositional Attitudes and Eliminative Materialism’, Journal of Philosophy LXXVIII, pp. 147–170.
See especially J.A. Fodor (1980) ‘Methodological Solipsism as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology’, The Behavioural and Brain Sciences III, pp. 63–109.
This view is defended in P. Pettit and J. McDowell (1986) Subject, Thought and Context, Oxford, and in D.C. Dennett (1981) ‘Three Kinds of Intentional Psychology’, Reduction, Time and Reality, R.A. Healy (ed. ), Cambridge.
K. Sterelny (1985) ‘Critical Notice of S. Stich’s “From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science”’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy LXIII, pp. 510–519, P. Godfrey-Smith and K. Sterelny, op. cit. (note 10), and M. Devitt and K. Sterelny (forthcoming, ‘Fodor’s Nativism’.
Z. Pylyshyn (1984) Computation and Cognition,Bradford/MIT.
I. Rock (1983) The Logic of Perception, Bradford/MIT.
J. A. Fodor and Z. Pylyshyn (1981) ‘How Direct is Visual Perception: Some Reflections on Gibson’s “Ecological Approach:”’, Cognition IX, p. 173.
Stephen Jay Gould (1983) ‘Perfection and Imperfection’, The Panda’s Thumb, Pen-guin.
P.S. Churchland (1980) ‘Language, Thought and Information Processing’, Nous XIV, pp. 147–170.
J.A. Fodor (1975) The Language of Thought,Harvester, and J.A. Fodor (1988) in this volume. Also see M. Devitt and K. Sterelny (1987) Language and Reality, Bradford/ MIT for a more detailed response to this problem.
See J.A. Fodor (1981) RePresentations, Bradford/MIT, pp. 274–275.
These complications are very great. See K. Sterelny (1983) `Natural Kind Terms’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly LXIV, pp. 110–125, and M. Devitt and K. Sterelny, op. cit. (note 24), ch.5.
Barbara Von Eckardt (1984) ‘Cognitive Psychology and Principled Skepticism’, Journal of Philosophy LXXXI, pp. 67–88.
Patricia Kitcher (1984) `In Defense of Intentional Psychology’, ibid., pp. 89–106.
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© 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Sterelny, K. (1989). Computational Functional Psychology: Problems and Prospects. In: Slezak, P., Albury, W.R. (eds) Computers, Brains and Minds. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol 7. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1181-9_4
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