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A Narrow Representational Theory of the Mind

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Rerepresentation

Part of the book series: Philosophical Studies Series ((PSSP,volume 40))

Abstract

Cognitive science contains two sharply different lines of thought about thought. We might call them ‘the Folk Line’ and ‘the Revisionist Line’.

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Authors
  1. Michael Devitt
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Tilburg University, The Netherlands

    Stuart Silvers

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© 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Devitt, M. (1989). A Narrow Representational Theory of the Mind. In: Silvers, S. (eds) Rerepresentation. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 40. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2649-3_18

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2649-3_18

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7695-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-2649-3

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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