Abstract
Of the three points made by L.J. Cohen, I shall consider two: his refutation of irrealism and his argument that van Fraassen’s version of irrealism is subject to the same difficulties van Fraassen has found with realism.
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© 1988 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Zemach, E.M. (1988). Epistemic and Semantic Reflections on Scientific Realism. In: Ullmann-Margalit, E. (eds) Science in Reflection. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 110. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2957-9_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2957-9_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-277-2713-8
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-2957-9
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