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What Does Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem Tell Us?

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Theory and Decision

Part of the book series: Theory and Decision Library ((TDLU,volume 50))

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Abstract

In the present paper we discuss several aspects of Arrow’s (1951, 1963) famous result which has deeply influenced the methodological attitude towards the formalization of social and economic theories. Instead of discussing more or less ad hoc procedures for the aggregation of individual preferences Arrow stated plausible properties which an aggregation procedure should satisfy and showed that for finite societies these properties are in conflict with one another. Loosely speaking we may say that there exists no satisfactory “democratic” aggregation procedure. For most social scientists this result was rather disappointing and the usual attitude was to criticize one (most often the so-called “independence of irrelevant alternatives”) or more of Arrow’s conditions as not appropriately reflecting our intuitive notions.

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© 1988 D. Reidel Publishing Company

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Skala, H.J. (1988). What Does Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem Tell Us?. In: Eberlein, G.L., Berghel, H. (eds) Theory and Decision. Theory and Decision Library, vol 50. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3895-3_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3895-3_14

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-8230-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-3895-3

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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