Abstract
One recurrent theme of Western metaphysics is the thesis Arthur Lovejoy called the Principle of Plenitude: no genuine possibility can remain forever unrealized. Another traditional idea is the claim that probability is degree of possibility. This equation is by no means unproblematic, since probability and possibility can be interpreted in a variety of ways. Still, it suggests that it is interesting to study what consequences alternative theories of probability may have concerning the validity of the Principle of Plenitude. The aim of this paper is to make such historical and systematic remarks on this question that serve to highlight the subtle differences between the frequency and propensity interpretations of probability.
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Niiniluoto, I. (1988). Probability, Possibility, and Plenitude. In: Fetzer, J.H. (eds) Probability and Causality. Synthese Library, vol 192. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3997-4_4
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