Abstract
Let me begin by suggesting that perhaps there is an original sin, or a primordial fault, in regarding practical reasoning as an inference. This in itself invites the various questions that immediately crowd in: Is the conclusion the action? Are the premisses propositions? Is truth the invariant? Does it preserve the classical distinction between judgments and performances (Pears’ terms) or, to use Hume’s terminology, between “representations” and “original existences”?
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© 1986 D. Reidel Publishing Company
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Ullmann-Margalit, E. (1986). Practical Reasoning — The Bottom Line: A Comment. In: Ullmann-Margalit, E. (eds) The Prism of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 95. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4566-1_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4566-1_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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