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Part of the book series: Advances in Animal Welfare Science ((AAWS,volume 1))

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Abstract

What we know about whales is sufficient for ascribing to them the analogues of human rights, including the fundamental right to be treated with respect. Once we recognize their possession of this right, it follows that whales are not to be used or exploited by us for the promotion of our ends, however “benign” they may appear. In the case of humans, to refrain from killing them is to discharge only a small part of our total duties. We must also refrain from exploiting them, whether “consumptively” or “nonconsumptively.” Having come as far as we have in our understanding of the moral ties that binds humans and whales, we must now go further in our deeds. Just as whales are not here for us to kill for our purposes, so they are not here for us “to study,” or “to watch,” or “to play with.” The moral task before us is the most difficult. It is to let whales alone.

In 1946 representatives of fourteen governments met in Washington to sign the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling. This was the meeting that established the International Whaling Commission. The declared purpose of the Convention was to safeguard the “great natural resources represented by whale stocks” in order to “make possible the orderly development of the whaling industry” (International Whaling Commission 1946).

Since 1946 attitudes towards whales have changed enormously both within the IWC and among the general world population. Public opinion surveys have indicated that in most countries, including Japan, opposition to whaling is the majority sentiment. The IWC, and especially its Scientific Committee, has reflected this shift in opinion, as well as playing a role in bringing it about. The Commission has contributed to our knowledge of whales by supporting the collection and collation of scientific data. This in turn has focused attention on the plight of the planet’s largest mammals. In its 1980 Washington conference the IWC even began to explore tentatively the ethical issues involved in killing cetaceans. Today it seems to many that the IWC is as involved in protecting whales as in protecting the whaling industry. There seem to be at least two sources for this shift in attitudes towards whales.

First, recent research has suggested that whales are remarkably intelligent and sensitive creatures. Exactly how sensitive and intelligent, and how exactly these terms are to be applied to whales, is difficult to say, however. There are serious problems involved in studying whales. They live in very different environments than we do. The course of their evolutionary history has been very different, and there are also significant variations among species. Still, some things are known. Whales have extraordinarily large brains. Some have about 30 billion neurons in their neo-cortex compared to about 10 billion in humans. With brain to body ratios that are similar to those of the higher primates, their brains are also highly differentiated and exhibit a high degree of folding of the cortical surface. For these reasons one of the leading researchers in the field, P.J. Morgane, has claimed:

...only the brain of whales and men have the amount and quality of neocortex making both appear at the pinnacle of the animal kingdom... (Frost 1979).

In addition, whales have extremely rich behavioral repertoires, sophisticated communication systems, and complex forms of social organization. Whatever finally may be decided about the exact nature of whale intelligence and sensitivity, it has become increasingly clear that whales are comparable to the higher primates and perhaps even to humans. For this reason it has seemed to many that killing whales for their blubber and oil is a moral crime akin or even equivalent to wanton murder.

A second reason why attitudes towards whales have changed is due to the apparent harmony in which whales live with their environment. Millions of years before our ancestors came out of the trees whales had already evolved to about their present state, and they were living lives very much like the ones they live today. For millions of years they were clearly the most intelligent beings on the planet. Seen from this perspective, we are evolutionary upstarts. In an incredibly short period of time we have become masters of the planet. And what do we do? We devote ourselves to destroying all other intelligent forms of life. But at least we are consistent. We seem just as willing to destroy ourselves as well. For people who despair at the havoc humans have wrought, whales are role models. They are symbols of how intelligent beings can live joyful, peaceful lives in harmony with their environment. From this point of view, whales are the teachers, we the students, about the things that really matter.

Whether or not we are willing to fully accept either of these lines of thought doesn’t really matter. It is clear that we have all come a long way since 1946 in our attitudes towards whales. To some degree this Conference marks the progress we have made. Instead of talking about “maximum sustainable yields” we are now talking about “whales alive” and the “nonconsumptive utilization of cetacean resources.”

In the light of the progress we have made it would be nice to say that we have gone far enough, that we are on the verge of a new era in which we give the whales their due. If this were the case, this Conference would be the occasion for a double celebration: one for the whales, and one for us for celebrating them. We shall argue, however, that although we have freed ourselves from the worst aspects of the anthropocentric ethic, which holds that everything on the planet only has value insofar as it has value to us—our ends, our purposes, our interests—we have not yet fully liberated ourselves from its lingering vestiges.

Not everyone will be willing to accept what we say. But whatever beliefs we finally come to, it is important that we be willing from time to time to reconsider them, and to scrutinize honestly the fundamental presuppositions and commitments on which they are based. We hope that this paper will be a contribution to such a reconsideration.

First we shall argue that what we know about whales is sufficient for ascribing to them the analogues of human rights, including a right to life, a right that is violated by those whaling practices that we are beginning to put behind us. We shall argue further that this right is undergirded by a more fundamental right that whales share with humans: a right to be treated with respect. It is this right which would be violated by allowing, for instance, exploitative benign research on humans. And it is this right that is violated when we treat whales as “cetacean resources.” Next we shall discuss some of the implications of our view for the concerns of this Conference.

Presented to WHALES ALIVE: A Global Conference on the Nonconsumptive Utilization of Cetacean Resources, Boston, MA, 6 June 1983.

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References

  • Frost, Sir Sidney 1979. The Whaling Question (The Inquiry by Sidney Frost of Australia), San Francisco: Friends of the Earth, p. 152.

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© 1985 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht

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Jamieson, D., Regan, T. (1985). Whales are Not Cetacean Resources. In: Fox, M.W., Mickley, L.D. (eds) Advances in Animal Welfare Science 1984. Advances in Animal Welfare Science, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4998-0_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4998-0_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-8713-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-4998-0

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