Rorty, Phenomenology and Transcendental Philosophy

Abstract

Richard Rorty’s book¹ bridges the gap, much talked about in the English-speaking philosophical world, between “Analytic philosophy” and “Continental philosophy” by showing, first, that they both inherited from Descartes, Locke and Kant, the same themes, concerns and ambitions and, second, that they both are on the verge of meeting the same fate. In fact, he does something more: he subsumes all, or most, recent analytical philosophical concerns under the rubric “Transcendental philosophy.” If some philosophers — or, better, some of their arguments — do not fall under it, then it is only because they are directed against it. Amongst “continental philosophers,” of course, a continuing concern with transcendental philosophy was almost a sufficient reason for regarding them as bad philosophers. If Rorty is right, then Russell, Quine, and a host of other minor luminaries come under the same genre; not unlike Heidegger and Derrida, Sellars, Quine and Davidson also fight transcendental philosophy, some from within, some from without. For having shown, with impressive historical scholarship, that this common concern runs through modern philosophy Rorty deserves congratulations.

Originally appeared in Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, XIV, 1983. Reprinted with permission.