Some ‘Moments’ of Hegel’s Relation to the Sciences

Abstract

Hegel’s dialectic seems to possess the property of provoking again and again either adherence or vehement rejection. In this the question whether the philosopher had a troubled relation to the exact sciences, or, on the contrary, exercised a stimulating influence, remains just as much at issue as the possibility of reaching an adequate understanding of his intentions. At the 15th World Congress of Philosophy in 1973 at Varna, at least four positions emerged in the sessions of the Institut Internationale de Philosophie alone. Mario Bunge assured the meeting, in essence, that science was present only where the last vestige of dialectics had been eradicated in order that the principles of exact philosophy might be complied with. Paul Ricoeur related dialectics solely to human practice, differing in this evaluation from Mihailo Markovic. In an interpretation drawn from Marx and Engels, I. S. Narski accepted the validity of objective and subjective dialectics, to be interpreted materialistically. Under these circumstances, it seems advisable to consult Hegel’s texts on the various points in order to recall to memory how his ideas, which refer mainly polemically to Kant, are to be understood. That it is worthwhile to seek to complete Hegel’s methodological and epistemological structure at this late date results from a fact that simply cannot be neglected: in recent times a turning back to Hegel’s ideas has begun within predominantly empirical disciplines, which has confirmed an unmistakable relationship to the most modern problems.