Abstract
It has been argued that philosophy of science in our time is basically of two types1 — speculative and analytic. Speculative philosophy of science constructs theories of the world based on the findings of the specific sciences and is continuous with science on the one hand and metaphysics on the other. Analytic philosophy of science analyzes the concepts and modes of reasoning characteristic of science and eschews speculation. However, Paul Feyerabend’s philosophy of science does not seem to fit easily into either category. For Feyerabend, philosophy of science has a rather different task than either speculation or analysis, namely to expound, criticize and defend large methodological programs for scientific progress and growth.
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References
But see May Brodbeck, The Nature and Function of the Philosophy of Science’, Readings in the Philosophy of Science, ed. H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck (Appleton- Century-Crofts, New York, 1953 ), pp. 3–7. Brodbeck distinguishes four meanings of ‘philosophy of science’: the socio-psychological study of science; the moral evaluation of the scientist’s role; the ‘philosophy of nature’; the logical analysis of science. Brodbeck rejects all but the last. However, it is difficult to fit Feyerabend into any of Brodbeck’s categories. Indeed, it is difficult to fit Bacon, Mill, and Popper into her categories. For Feyerabend as well as Bacon, Mill, and Popper are not merely logically analyzing science; they are recommending programs of scientific growth and procedure. Such recommendations could hardly be called metaphysical speculations, ethical evaluations or sociological investigations of science.
Richard M. Burian, ‘Scientific Realism and Incommensurability: Some Criticisms of Kuhn and Feyerabend’, this volume, pp. 1–31.
Richard M. Burian, ‘Scientific Realism, Commensurability and Conceptual Change: A Critique of Paul Feyerabend’s Philosophy of Science’, unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1971.
Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery ( Basic Books, New York, 1959 ).
For an illuminating extended discussion of this contrast, see Barry Hallen, ‘Boldness and Caution in the Methodology and Social Philosophy of Karl Popper’, unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Boston University, 1970.
341–349; reprinted in Michael Martin, Social Science and Philosophical Analysis ( University Press of America, Washington, D.C., 1978 ), pp. 101–109.
See Israel Scheffler, Science and Subjectivity (The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., Indianapolis, 1967 ), pp. 45–66.
See Michael Martin, ‘Referential Variance and Scientific Objectivity’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 22 (1971) 17–26.
See Michael Martin, ‘Ontological Variance and Scientific Objectivity’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23 (1972) 252–256.
Cf. Michael Martin, ‘Anomaly-Recognition and Research in Science Education’, Journal for Research in Science Teaching 7 (1970) 187–190.
See Marguerite Foster and Michael Martin, eds., Probability, Confirmation and Simplicity ( Odyssey Press, New York, 1966 ), pp. 233–249
Michael Martin, ‘The Falsifiability of Curve-Hypotheses’, Philosophical Studies, pp. 56–60 (1965).
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© 1984 D. Reidel Publishing Company
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Martin, M. (1984). How To Be A Good Philosopher Of Science: A Plea For Empiricism In Matters Methodological. In: Cohen, R.S., Wartofsky, M.W. (eds) Methodology, Metaphysics and the History of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 84. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6331-3_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6331-3_2
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