Abstract
If scientific language must not be detached in any way from the general conditions of the exercise of language without taking precautions, it nevertheless constitutes an original and highly differentiated aspect of this exercise. As I insisted above (2.13 and 2.14) it must be viewed as a vehicle of information; on the other hand we should now make clear its resources and special functions, in order to understand better the role and the nature of forms in scientific thought.
“ … the patriotic archbishop of Canterbury, found it advisable — ” “Found what?” said the Duck. “Found it”, the Mouse replied rather crossly: “of course you know what “it” means. ”
“I know what “it” means well enough, when I find a thing”, said the Duck: “it’s generally a frog or a worm. The question is, what did the archbishop find?”
Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland
(Carroll 1963, p. 26)
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© 1983 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Granger, GG. (1983). Scientific Languages and Formalisms. In: Formal Thought and the Sciences of Man. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 75. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-7037-3_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-7037-3_3
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