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Galileo and the Phenomena: On Making the Evidence Visible

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Physical Sciences and History of Physics

Part of the book series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science ((BSPS,volume 82))

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Abstract

The history of the history of science reveals changing styles; for the late nineteenth century Galileo was the model of the empirical and positivistic scientist, formulating general laws à la Mach, as summaries of experimental data. For more recent writers such as Koyre and Burtt, Galileo was a Platonist whose revolutionary work sprang almost full-grown from his head and who did not do the experiments described in his dialogues — fortunately, for they would not have worked if he had done them. I do not propose to take up the issue of the Platonism or non-Platonism of Galileos mathematical science; the issue here is that these writers argue that Galileo did thought-experiments in the course of developing his theories, and referred to experience primarily as a final check in order to be sure that he hadnt gone wildly astray.1 This rationalist picture of Galileo has been thoroughly criticized recently by Drake, Settle, and others,2 who have shown that Galileo’s notebooks give ample evidence that he did do experiments at the time when he was probably developing the analysis of freely falling bodies, and that these were reasonably accurate. Furthermore, even some of the experiments described in his dialogues give good results when done today. I shall argue for another, related point, that in any event, Galileo’s own writings, particularly the Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems and the Two New Sciences, give ample evidence that he considered experience essential for the foundation of his science and not only as a check on the results.

An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science in january, 1977. I wish to thank the commentator, Professor John V. Strong of boston College, and Professors Robert S. Cohen and Marx Wartofsky for their criticisms. I am also grateful to Professors Stillman Drake, William wallace, and Winifred L. Wisan for their suggestions. The Collection of essays by R. E. Butts and J. C. Pitt, New Perspectives on Galileo, Western Ontario Series, Vol. 14 (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1978), has several essays which are realated to this paper, particularly those by Wisan and McMullin, but it appeared too late for me to use it.

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References

  • For instance, “For it is thought, pure unadulterated thought, and not experience or sense-perception, as until then, that gives the basis for the ‘new science’ of Galileo Galilei”, Alexandre Koyre, Metaphysics and Measurement (London: Chapman and Hall, 1968), p. 13. See also Giorgio de Santillana, Reflections on Men and Ideas (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1968), p. 175, Galileo uses facts only as a check, as a discriminator between necessary and wishful arrangement.

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  • Thomas Settle, An Experiment in the History of Science, Science 133 (1961), pp. 19-23; Galileos Use of Experiment as a Tool of Investigation, in E. McMullin (ed.), Galileo, Man of Science (New York: Basic Books, 1967), pp. 315-337; Stillman Drake, Galileos Experimental Confirmation of Horizontal Inertia. Unpublished Manu¬scripts, Isis 64 (1973), pp. 290 - 305.

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  • I discuss this in Experience and Its Idealizations in Modern Science (Proceedings of the Ohio Philosophical Association, 1980, pp. 25-36), in which I take up the question of how the idealizations of mathematical science are related to manifest experience; this issue has also been discussed by Edmund Husserl in The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans, by D. Carr (Evanston: Northwestern Univer¬sity Press, 1970 ), Part II.

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Hemmendinger, D. (1984). Galileo and the Phenomena: On Making the Evidence Visible. In: Cohen, R.S., Wartofsky, M.W. (eds) Physical Sciences and History of Physics. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 82. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-7178-3_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-7178-3_7

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