A Reply to Ordeshook and Rae

Abstract

Both my critics agree that, under majority rule, individual values are likely to be in social disequilibrium-barring such rare events as unanimity on a complete ordering of all possible alternatives, etc. From this admitted potentiality of disequilibrium, two kinds of inferences can be drawn:

• 1. In the realm of political philosophy, the inference that social decisions under majority rule cannot usually be defended as logically coherent or as the work of some anthropomorphized entity like the “society” or “the people.” Given that a winning platform or motion or candidate exists, the fact of disequilibrium means that, at the time of the choice of the winner, there existed potentially a platform or motion or candidate that could beat the winner. Furthermore, potentially another alternative could beat the potential victor over the actual winner, and so forth around a cycle. This fact in turn means that the products of majority rule are probably seldom defensible as consistent or as the “true” choice of the voting body. Indeed, with a slightly different turn of events, some other alternative could have been the choice of a (differently composed) majority, though not necessarily a more coherent choice than the alternative actually chosen.

• 2. In the realm of political theory (i.e., description as distinct from prescription), the inference that social decisions cannot be predicted simply from a knowledge of individual orderings of values. Given a set of individual tastes, what comes out of majority rules is a function not only of the tastes of persons, but also of the political institutions surrounding the process of voting, of the skill with which individuals manipulate the selection process of alternatives and the statement of issues, and indeed even of the intelligence and character of the voters. Consequently, the prediction of social outcomes is rendered difficult.