Abstract
The most important anti-psychologistic thesis that Husserl wished to defend in the Prolegomena is that logic, as an a priori science, is not a real science but an ideal science. In this work he already observed that a proper conception of the distinction between these two kinds of sciences is only possible when the empiricist theory of abstraction is given up.1 The question of abstraction is indeed the central problem in the founding of the ideal sciences. Therefore I will begin this chapter by taking up the new theory of abstraction. Then, in Chapters 4 and 5, I will deal with the question of the task of the philosophical analysis of origins in connection with the formal a priori sciences.
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References
I 178.
‘Bericht über deutsche Schriften zur Logik aus dem Jahre 1894,’ 225 note 1; Compare II, 201. In the foreword to the second edition, Husserl says that the Prolegomena goes back to lectures of the year 1896, I (ed. 2) XII.
See below 241.
See above 154ff; Entwurf 335.
II 122, 137, 143, 144, 151.
II 100, 113, 116. Compare PA, 108, where Husserl expounds his early standpoint with regard to similarity and identity.
II 109, 112, 113, 211ff.; Compare Id I 27 on the extension as “ideal total aggregate.”
II 110, 113, 114, 115, 117. It is noteworthy that Husserl refers to PA without mentioning his critique of his earlier standpoint (114).
II 120, 145, 153, 216.
I 101, 128, 129; II 106, 107, 100.
II 157, 158, 180.
II 137, 151, 153, 158, 216.
‘Dr. E.G. Husserl: Philosophie der Arithmetik’ 324, 326, 329, 216, 318. See above 32 note.
Grundgesetze der Arithmetik XIX.
II 164, 216.
II 114, 130, 128.
II 157.
II 134, 136, see also 221, 151.
I 99 et passim.
II (ed. 1) 72 (compare ed. 2, 72, where the text is somewhat clearer).
Id I 39, see also LU II 108. See also Husserl’s critique of the old rationalism in Id III 56, 70: Entwurf 320; Krisis 14, 337 (E 16, 290).
Id I 35, 36.
PSW 315.
Id I 35, 36.
PSW 336.
Id I 38; PSW 340.
PSW 304, 305; see also Id I 301.
Entwurf 328, see also 112, 115, 333, 334.
E. Fink, ‘Die Phänomenologische Philosophie Edmund Husserls in der gegenwärtigen Kritik’ 379, see below 327/8.
II (ed. 1) 675 (see also III ed. 2, 203).
Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Einleitung II and IV.
Vier Phasen 20; VE 27: Vom Dasein Gottes 82.
See below 251.
See above 236.
II (ed. I) 235 (ed. 2, 239).
I 91.
II 100.
I 101, 128, 190.
I 183, 185.
I (ed. 1) 190 (compare the somewhat different text of the second edition); III 123, 144.
175.
WE 157; see also Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement 96 note 1; for Marty’s critique, see Entwurf 120.
II 125, 111.
II 140.
II 125/6.
See below 264.
II no; III 104.
I 71, 74; II 87, 94, 101; III 103, 105, 106. Against the misconception that he attributed actual existence to ideas, Husserl defended himself two years later; see his Literaturbericht Palàgyi, 287–294.
II 135f, 87, 94; compare further Id III 47 en 82.
This term is first used in Id I 4.
II 100, 106; see also I 101, 128, 129. We will see in Chapter 5 that this comparison is particularly important for the relation between pure logic and descriptive psychology.
I 71, 74, 101, 186, 229; II 39, 43, 103, 104, 106, 94, 100, 150, 183.
II 103, 140. Both can be called the “concept.” See above 241.
II 103, 106, 111, 112, 141, 136, 222.
I 171, 243, 244; II 163; III 184.
III 184, 141, 142, 144, 147, 162. See aboye 151.
II 251.
II 44; see also II 93, 95, 150, 217; I 100, 216; Literaturbericht Palàgyi 290.
II 42, 43, 45, 46; On the individual act of meaning over against the identical meaning, that is, on the act of meaning in concreto, see II 417, 421, 433, 435, 492.
II 94, 95, 146.
Literaturbericht Palàgyi 291.
The logical judgment is given in concreto in the psychological judgment 166, 71, 101, 119, 132, 139, 142, 143, 150, 176 note 1, 216, 237; II 42, 43, 52, 96, 97.
I 134, 135; II 8, 9, 10, 52, 77, 95, 143, 146; compare 150 and 181 with regard to the catégorie of meaning; see Referat Marty, 1108.
I 190. See further I 77, 117, 128, 187, 229, 231 note 1; II 50; III 123, 125. The correlate of this “truth in itself” is “being in itself,” I 228; II 90, 125; III 5, 118, 122.
II (ed. 1) 8, compare II 141 and I, VII.
See above 26. Ryle also interprets ideal meanings as intentional objects (accusatives), The Theory of Meaning,’ 260.
See below 290.
II 109, 118.
II 111
I 76, 77, 121; II 102, 103; see above 251.
III 26, 29, 31. The same is true of ideal fulfilling meaning with regard to the many perceptions of the same individual object II 51; see also 158f; compare Id I 257, 259, 261.
I 100, 132, 150, 175; II 42, 43, 97, 98.
I 99, 171, 216; II 44, 102, 123, 141; III 133, 144, 187.
II 411, 420, 426, 427, 442, 453, 462, 465, 467, 487; III 18.
II 155, 418.
II 343, see also 312.
II 417, 421, 433, 435, 492; III 2, 95. See above 144.
III 85, 87, 35.
Literaturbericht Palàgyi 298, 290.
I 74, 172; see also II 215; III 198; Id I 20, 23. This is the basis of synthetic and analytic a priori judgments about facts, Id I 38.
I 231, 323; II 255.
I 149, 156 note 2, 251, 232.
See above 206.
On Newton’s law, see I 63, 72, 127/8, 149, 150, 179, 145, 234, 255; see above 52f.
I 91, 99ff, 107, 129, 167f, 187 compare the definition of the concept of truth in II 122ff.
I 89, 183, 185ff, 239; II 293 (ed. 2).
I 236ff; II 471; III 187–199; see also below 277.
See below 260ff.
EU 398, 409; see also PP 72, where the difference between empirical generalization and ideation is already worked out.
See above 256 note 17.
See above 235.
See I. Kern, Husserl und Kant, 142ff. See also U. Claesges, Edmund Husserls Theorie der Raumkonstitution, 15 and my article ‘Edmund Husserl.’ 99.
P. Thévenaz speaks of a “realism of ideal essences,” ‘Qu’est ce que la phénoménologie,’ 1952, 13, 21. See also R. Ingarden, On the Motives which led Husserl to Transcendental Idealisme, 4ff.
See above 162, 166.
This certainly does not apply to Edith Stein, who did not go through the transition to idealism with Husserl but did see the connections with his previous work La Phénoménologie, Juvisy 1932, 102ff. See below 376.
Fink writes that the realist ontologists fell into the same mistake as the neo-Kantians, op. cit. 237. They interpreted LU as a “turn toward the object” and considered the later Husserl to be under the influence of neo-Kantianism. They would have preferred the reverse development. According to Fink, both the realist ontologists and the neo-Kantians make the mistake of interpreting ideal being ontologically, as a thing in itself; see also 325. See further H.L. van Breda, ‘La Réduction phénoménologique’ 1959, 312 and the discussion on this point with Ingarden, 329ff.
Literaturbericht Palàgyi, 291.
See above 253, 256.
II 92, 104.
II 94, 100.
II 44.
II 105.
I 117, see also 116 note I, 121, 128, 232, 238.
II 123, 133, see also 118.
Id I 41, 43, 117, 195.
Id I 40, 117.
II 108.
II 155, 44, 119, 141, 148.
II 121, 122.
II 119, 135, 136.
II 123, 110.
II 101, 110, 121ff.
II 115, 123, 133.
II 109, Zusatz, 142, 145, 175. 181, 188; III 161.
II 45, 106, 181.
See above 154, 236 and 238.
See above 175. Here I would point to the introduction, where Husserl appears to mean the acts when he speaks of the “things themselves,” Einleitung II 6.
II 412.
II 425.
II 133, 141, 148.
See below 314.
I 190.
I 143.
I 121.
See above 170.
FTL 150.
See below 487ff.
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De Boer, T. (1978). The New Theory of Abstraction. In: The Development of Husserl’s Thought. Phaenomenologica, vol 76. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9691-5_9
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