The Identity Theory

Abstract

It could not be convincingly maintained that the mind is the brain, because a dead or inert brain (or a dead or inert body, for that matter) would exhibit no properties on the admission of which the ascription of mental properties could be justified at all. It is surely only when the brain or body is functioning in some appropriate way, that is, in a way suitably linked to the behavior of a sentient or intelligent creature, that we can speak of the mind. The concession draws attention at once to the problem of avoiding a circular account of the mind, which, because it touches on the ascription ofany mental attribute, is even more profound than the so-called problem of other minds (Wisdom [1952]). It also suggests the impossibility of ascribing mental attributes without trading on the conceptual linkages between one kind of mental attribute and another (say, between intentions and beliefs or beliefs and desires). But, resisting that issue for the time being, the best that we can expect, in attempting to view the mind as part of the body, is to determine that mental states (or processes or events) will prove to be brain states or neural states (or processes or events). What are the realistic prospects of such a theory? The quick answer must be: nil.