Abstract
Lehrer’s epistemology, as articulated, for example, inRational Consensus in Science and Society(Lehrer and Wagner 1981), has always emphasized that rational decision making must take account of the total available evidence. Yet dogmatic restrictions on the representation of uncertain judgment, or on the way in which such judgment may be revised, undermine the goal of faithfully representing the evidence. In this paper we discuss two such restrictionsdogmatic Bayesianismand thedogma of precisionand outline some ways in which probabilism has begun to be liberated from their grip.
Research supported by the National Science Foundation (SES-9984005)
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Wagner, C.G. (2003). Two Dogmas of Probabilism. In: Olsson, E.J. (eds) The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 95. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0013-0_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0013-0_10
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