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Part of the book series: Studies in Cognitive Systems ((COGS,volume 25))

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Abstract

There are two great traditions in the philosophy of mind that continue to exercise their influence in the age of computing machines. These are the dualistic tradition associated especially with the name of René Descartes and the behavioristic tradition associated with B.F. Skinner. Dualism is strongly anti-reductionistic, insofar as mentality is taken be different than and not reducible to behavior. Behaviorism, by contrast, is strongly reductionistic, taking mentalistic language to be at best no more than an abbreviated mode for the description of behavior and at worst just scientifically insignificant gibberish.

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© 2001 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Fetzer, J.H. (2001). Minds and Machines. In: Computers and Cognition: Why Minds are not Machines. Studies in Cognitive Systems, vol 25. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0973-7_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0973-7_1

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4020-0243-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-010-0973-7

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