Abstract
The present work is an attempt at defining certain semantic concepts which properly belong to the so-called pragmatics of language, that is science which deals with the relations existing between the language itself and the people who use it. For that purpose five primitive expressions of essentially pragmatic character have been chosen, by means of which it is proposed to define the relation of naming, the concept of the true sentence and other semantic notions. It should be made clear that none of these concepts strictly refer to any natural language, though some sections of the latter may satisfy certain conditions of the definitions accepted. Such a situation may arise in many other branches of science, especially in those of the humanist branch. Here we are often unable to describe concrete phenomena by means of a definition which operates a small number of precise terms, as the real phenomena are of much more complex character. Consequently, after we have made the decision to accept an exact definition, it may appear as often as not that there are many borderline cases which satisfy that definition, even if we have not intended so, or do not satisfy it, even if we have intended that they should do it.
First published in Przegląd Filozoficzny XLIV (1948). Reprinted from Synthese VIH (1950–1951) F. G. Kroonder Bussum, Netherlands.
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The word ‘ideal’ is used throughout in a somewhat not precise sense, being equivalent in its meaning to ‘non-existing but possible to realize’. Hence, strictly speaking, it is in some contexts superfluous. A different question must be asked: how can there exist sentences which have not been written by anybody and which are studied by the metalogicians? The question may be answered in different ways. We can suppose that the existing sets of elements of the material world contain in themselves any shapes which are defined as expressions of the system investigated. Hence to write a certain expression belonging to the system is tantamount to the repetition of a certain shape which already exists in nature. One can also apply certain theory of possibility. The solution of this problem is not nescesary for our argument.
Nevertheless a similar distinction can also be drawn here. For instance, in historical sciences all correct descriptions of objects existing at present and which can be seen by every living man (i.e. documents) may become scientific descriptions. All other sentences about events in the past belong to the realm of theory and are usually individual hypotheses. Apart from these hypotheses, which refer to past events, the historian accepts in a more or less conscious manner various laws of physics, chemistry, biology and psychology which, together with purely historical hypotheses, offer the explanation of the fact that such and such a document can be found nowadays at such and such a place. Or, speaking more precisely, a historian adopts such historical hypothèse, from which, together with general laws, he would be able to deduct the descriptive sentences which refer to the present state of documents. Since a very great number of various assumptions enter into historical theories, their formalization may appear practically impossible and perhaps even purposeless, for reasonings are not so involved that their formalization would result in their simplification.
For instance, in the sense of Rudolf Carnap, cf. his ‘Testability and Meaning’, Philosophy of Science 3–4 (1936–37).
The concept of a thing of everyday experience is, therefore, relative. It signifies those objects which the said people can see and touch. Of course, the word ‘can’, as it is used here, does not have a clearly defined meaning. Nevertheless, it is difficult to avoid that word in any methodological consideration where we speak constantly about possible forms of science. The word ‘can’, or its various narrow-ings, appear to be typically theoretical and not descriptive. It can only be reduced to certain descriptive operational terms, but cannot itself become descriptive term.
The descriptive language in this sense will not be limited to the description of someone’s sensations, but may contain all descriptions of the things of everyday experience, hence also, among others, the descriptions of the experiencing people. On the other hand, by reistic language we mean such a language which can be reduced, in an easily visible fashion, to such a language which is characterized by the following conditions: (1) Among logical types there is the lowest category and all expressions of logical types are functors of the lower ones. (The lowest type can be called the category of the names of objects.) (2) The primitive expressions of language (except quantifiers and truth functions such as implication or negation) are functions in which only the expressions of the lowest logical type are arguments (e.g. the variables of the lowest category). (3) All names of bodies which can be seen or touched, hence the names of animals, plants, objects and so on, or, in general, all names of bodies in the somatic sense, are regarded as constant names belonging to the lowest logical type. (If only the names of bodies are constant names of the lowest type, then such a language can be called somatistic.)(4) The names of psychological experiences do not belong to the lowest logical type, but to higher types. Sensations, notions and ideas are not objects, but rather they constitute a way of psychological experience. (For instance, if I want to describe that A imagines a mount of gold, we say that A imagines in such a way in which he would experience remembering such a mount of gold, had he seen it previously), cf. T. Kotarbiński:’ sur l’attitude réiste (ou concrétiste)’, Synthese VU (1948/49).
The idea of making the meaning of terms relative to the situation and the emphasis upon the role of indication comes here from K. Ajdukiewicz, cf. esp. his ‘Sprache und Sinn’, Erkenntnis IV (1934).
Praxeology is a general science of the modes of action; it is the most general methodology of all action, cf. e.g. T. Kotarbinski ‘O istocie i zadaniach metodo-logii ogólnej’ (‘On the Nature and Tasks of General Methodology’), Przeglqd Fi-lozoficzny 41 (1938); ‘Principes de bon travail’, Studia Philosophica 3 (1948).
C. W. Morris, ‘Foundations of the Theory of Signs’, International Encyclopedia of Unified Science I, Chicago 1938; also R. Carnap, Introduction to Semantice, Studies in Semantics, vol. 1, Cambridge, Mass. 1946.
S. Leśniewski, ‘O podstawach matematyki’ (‘On the Foundations of Mathematics’), Przegląd Filozoficzny 30 (1927). Cf. also Z. Jordan, The Development of Mathematical Logic and of Logical Positivism in Poland between the Two Wars, London 1945. Polish Science and Learning No. 6.
K. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, vol. 2, p. 15.
S. Lesniewski, I.e. 34 (1931).
Some of the definitions given here in full have been already published in my communiqué: ‘Un essai d’établir la sémantique du langage descriptif, Proceedings of the International Congress of Philosophy I, Amsterdam 1948, pp. 776-778.
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Grzegorczyk, A. (1977). The Pragmatic Foundations of Semantics. In: Przełęcki, M., Wójcicki, R. (eds) Twenty-Five Years of Logical Methodology in Poland. Synthese Library, vol 87. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1126-6_9
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