A New Solution

Abstract

The solution I now want to consider is based on a certain view of what constitutes good and evil, a view which is certainly not absurd or wholly arbitrary but in fact is a view to which many of us are prepared to subscribe. It is a solution which I had first vaguely and defectively advanced in the American Philosophical Quarterly (1964) pp. 244–47. With the passage of time, helped by the stimulus received from objections raised, the true nature of this somewhat complex solution gradually unfolded in my mind and I think I was able to provide a much improved account of it by the time I contributed to the discussion held in The Journal of Value Inquiry (1970). At this stage I feel that I may be able to present a clear enough exposition, so that the reader, who may initially be quite put off by the seeming strangeness of the solution, is by the end of the next chapter satisfied that yet another path has been opened toward the elimination of the problem of evil.