Abstract
The most natural attempt to answer the question as to how it is that a benevolent God does to people what among human beings would strongly be condemned as evil is to say that God does not have the same obligations toward his creatures as his creatures have toward one another. If I cause unnecessary suffering to my fellow man that is evil, for he and I are on the same level of creation, he is a completely autonomous being vis-à-vis me, whose person I must regard as sacrosanct at all times. But God, to whom we all owe our existence and without whose constant supervision and help we could not be sustained for a single moment, can take liberties with us which we are forbidden to take with each other.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1977 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Schlesinger, G. (1977). The Standard by which Divine Acts are Appraised. In: Religion and Scientific Method. Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy, vol 10. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1235-5_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1235-5_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-277-0816-8
Online ISBN: 978-94-010-1235-5
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive