Abstract
A schematic classification of different directions of philosophies of history could point out that “classical “philosophical views are concerned with the nature of the historical processes, its components, its meaning, and its goal. In the classical approach, historical understanding is related to an assessment of the historical process. The philosophical problem of history is twofold; both aspects of the problem emerge also in Hegel’s discussion of the two sides of the term “history” as the course of events and as its understanding. The classical tradition, in this sense, refers to Hegel, Marx, Comte, Croce, Bradley, etc. who shaped its image. Measured by the general trend of the classical tradition, the more recent interest in history seems to take a different direction which might be characterized, loosely, as methodological.
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References
Cf., respectively, “The Function of General Laws in History”, Readings in Philosophical Analysis, edited by H. Feigl and W. Sellars, New York, 1948, pp. 459–471, and Laws and Explanation in History, Oxford, 1957.
On Collingwood see Patrick Gardiner, The Nature of Historical Explanation, London, 1952, pp. 46, 47, 77, 115; Oakeshott is discussed on pp. 29–32, 35, 80. On Collingwood see also W. B. Gallie, Philosophy and the Historical Understanding, London 1964, pp. 17, 18, 46.
C. G. Hempel, “Scientific Explanation”, Voice of America Forum Lectures, Philosophy of Science Series, No.11, p. 7.
Karl R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, London, 1961, p. 160. “Historism” or “Historicism” is an ambiguous term. It is clear that Popper’s understanding of the concept is based on a selection of one possible connotation of it. As to the various meanings, consult Karl Heussi, Die Krisis des Historismus, Tübingen, 1932.
Popper, ibid., pp. 27–28.
Ibid., p. 28.
Ibid., p. 29.
Ibid., p. 161.
Cf. ibid.
Ibid., p. 146.
Ibid., p. 147.
Ibid., p. 11.
See ibid.,p. 14.
Ibid., p. 13.
Ibid., p. 115.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 128.
Ibid., p. 65.
Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 65, 67.
Ibid., pp. 80–81.
See ibid., p. 147.
Ibid., p. 149.
Here lies also the origin of the ethico-theological concept, “Situationsethik”.
P. Gardiner, The Nature of Historical Explanation, London 1952, p. 49.
Ibid., p. 45.
Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 138–139.
Ibid., p. 139.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 98.
Ibid., p. 95.
Ibid., p. 82.
Gallie, W. Z. Philosophy and the Historical Understanding, New York, 1964, pp. 118–119.
Ibid., p. 9.
Ibid., p. 13.
Ibid., p. 22.
Ibid., p. 33. Professor E. Gellner observes on this issue “Gallie is not merely a philosopher concerned with contingency, he has something like a passion for it”. See his “The Concept of Story”, Ratio, Vol. IX, June 1967, pp. 49ff.
Ibid., p. 27.
Ibid., p. 23.
Ibid., p. 14.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 27.
Ibid., p. 23.
Ibid., p. 24.
Ibid., p. 26.
Ibid.
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© 1976 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Rotenstreich, N. (1976). The Historical Process and its Explanation: Karl Popper and his Debtors. In: Philosophy, History and Politics. Melbourne International Philosophy Series, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1351-2_4
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