Abstract
Let X and Y “be the pure strategy sets of 2 players Xavier and Yves. Then every payoff function g: X × Y → R defin es a 2 person zero sum game where Xavier maximize and Yves minimize. An extension of the games with pure strategy set X and Y is a “way of playing” the game, which associates to every payoff function g a “value”, in the duality interval
The classical example of extension is the mixed one. It will be shown it is the prototype of the “extensions with out exchange of information”. (part 2). We then study the general case (part 3) and typical example of Iterated games.
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References
Moulin H. Jeux itérés — Cahiers de Mathematiques de la Décision 7305. Mai 1973.
Moulin H. Iterated Games — International Journal of Game Theory (à paraitre).
Moulin H. Prolongements de jeux et jeux itérés colloque d’analyse convexe
Saint-Pierre-de-Chartresse — Springer — à paraître.
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© 1975 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland
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Moulin, H. (1975). Extension of 2 Person Zero Sum Game. In: Grote, J.D. (eds) The Theory and Application of Differential Games. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1804-3_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1804-3_13
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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